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ART. I. - - *The Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament proved to be Corrupt Additions to the Word of God. — The Arguments of Romanists from the Infallibility of the Church and the Testimony of the Fathers in Behalf of the Apocrypha discussed and refuted.* By JAMES H. THORNWELL. New York : Leavitt, Trow, & Co. Boston : Charles Tappan. 1845. 16mo. pp. 417.

IN the articles already devoted to Mr. Thornwell's book, we have vindicated Dr. Lynch's argument drawn from the necessity of the case for the infallibility of the Church, and proved unanswerably, if any thing can be so proved, that, without the infallible Church, the Protestant is utterly unable to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures. Since, then, he concedes, that, if the infallible Church exists at all, it is the Catholic Church, Mr. Thornwell must either acknowledge its infallibility, or give up the Christian religion itself. Having done this, which has been wholly gratuitous on our part, we proceed to the consideration of the Professor's direct arguments for the fallibility of the Church, or his direct attempts to prove that she is not infallible.

We have shown in our first essay, that the nature of the argument the Professor is conducting does not permit him, even in case we should fail to prove the infallibility, to conclude the fallibility of the Church. He denies that she is infallible, that is, asserts that she is fallible, and it is only by proving her fallible that he can maintain his thesis, that the books which he calls apocryphal are "corrupt additions to the word of God." The question is not now on admitting, but on rejecting, the in-

fallibility of the Church, and the *onus probandi*, as a matter of course, rests on him. He is the plaintiff in action, and must make out his case by proving the guilt, not by any failure on our own part, if fail we do, to prove the innocence, of the accused ; for every one is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty.

We have also shown, that, in attempting to prove the fallibility of the Church, Mr. Thornwell must confine himself to such arguments as an infidel may consistently urge. We have already dislodged him from every position he might be disposed to occupy on Christian ground. He has no magazine from which he can draw proofs against the Church, but the reason common to all men. He can prove the Church fallible only by proving that she has actually erred ; and he can prove that she has actually erred only by proving that she has actually contradicted some principle of reason. It will avail him nothing to prove by reason that she teaches things the truth of which reason cannot affirm ; for reason does not know all things, and things may be *above* reason, and yet not *against* reason. Nor will it avail him to prove that she contradicts his private convictions, or the teachings of his sect ; for neither he nor his sect is infallible. Nothing will avail him but to prove some instance of her contradiction of a truth of reason, infallibly known to be such truth. The simple question for us to determine, then, in regard to what he alleges, is, Has he adduced an instance of such contradiction ? If he has, he has succeeded ; if he has not, he has failed, and we, since the presumption, as we say in law, is in our favor, may conclude the infallibility of the Church against him.

1. Mr. Thornwell's first alleged proof that the Church is not infallible is, that Catholics differ among themselves as to the seat of infallibility. It is uncertain where the infallibility is lodged. Then it is not apparent ; and if not apparent, it does not exist ; for *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*. But this, supposing it to be true, though a good reason why we cannot assert the infallibility as a fact proved, is not a good reason for asserting that it does not exist. A thing may exist and yet not appear to us. Otherwise the stars would not exist when the sun shines, nor gems in the mine before being discovered. The point to be established is not the *non-appearance* of the infallibility, but its *non-existence* ; and if the Professor does not show that non-existence, he fails, for his own maxim then bears against him, — *de non apparentibus et non existentibus*

bus eadem est ratio. But what is alleged is not true. Catholics do not disagree as to the seat of infallibility. Mr. Thornwell is mistaken, when he says (p. 76), — “There are no less than three different opinions entertained in your Church as to the organ through which its infallibility is exercised or manifested.” He confounds the three different modes in which Catholics hold that the infallibility is exercised with three different opinions as to its organ, evidently supposing that they who assert one of them must needs deny the other two. All Catholics agree, and must agree, for it is *de fide*, that the pastors of the Church, that is, the bishops in union with the Pope, their visible head, are infallible in what they teach, both when congregated in general council and when dispersed, each bishop in his own diocese; and the great majority hold that the Pope alone, when deciding a question of faith or morals for the whole Church, is also infallible. The only difference of opinion amongst us is as to the fact, whether the Pope is or is not infallible, when so deciding. But as there is no difference of opinion as to the other two modes, whatever difference there may be as to this, it is not true that there are “three different opinions in our Church as to the organ through which its infallibility is exercised or manifested.”

2. The Church cannot be infallible, because she requires a slavish submission of all her members, bishops, priests, and laity, to the Pope. “The system of absolute submission runs unchecked until it terminates in the Sovereign Pontiff at Rome, whose edicts and decrees none can question, and who is therefore absolute lord of the Papal faith.” (p. 77.) We can see nothing unreasonable in making the Pope, under God, the “absolute lord of the *Papal* faith.” As to the submission, if the Pope has authority from God as the supreme visible head of the Church, it cannot be a *slavish* submission; for slavery is not in submission, but in submission to an authority which has no right to exact it. Reason teaches that we are bound to obey God, and to obey him equally through whatever organ it may please him to command us, or to promulgate his will. If he has commissioned the Pope as his vicar in the government of the Church, there is nothing repugnant to reason in submission or obedience to the Pope. The Professor must prove that the Pope is not divinely commissioned, before, from the fact that the Church obliges us to obey him, he can conclude that she errs or is liable to err. But this he has not proved.

3. The Church makes the Pope greater than God, — *Il papa è più che Dio per noi altri*, — and cannot assert his supremacy

without asserting his infallibility. But if she asserts the infallibility of the Pope, she denies that she is an infallible Church ; for, during the first six centuries, there was no Pope. (p. 78.) Where the Professor picked up his scrap of Italian, he does not inform us ; but if any one has made him believe that Catholics hold the Pope to be greater than God, he may be sure he has been imposed upon. How can we hold the Pope to be greater than God, when we believe him to be simply the *vicar* of Jesus Christ, receiving all that he is and has from God ? Grant that Papal supremacy necessarily carries with it Papal infallibility, — a doctrine we by no means dispute, — the conclusion is not sustained ; for it is not proved that during the first six centuries there was no Pope. What the Professor alleges as proof is not conclusive. His statements are either false or irrelevant. What he says that is true is not to his purpose ; what he says that is to his purpose is not true. He alleges, — 1. Till the seventh century, at least, the bishops of the Church, not excepting the bishops of Rome, were regarded as officially equal ; 2. According to St. Jerome, wherever there is a bishop, he is of the same merit and the same priesthood, and, according to St. Cyprian, the episcopate is one, and every bishop has an undivided portion of it ; 3. St. Cyprian says to the African bishops in the great council at Carthage, that none of them makes himself a bishop of bishops, and that it belongs solely to our Lord Jesus Christ to invest them with authority in the government of his Church, and to judge them ; and, 4. St. Gregory the Great disclaimed the title of “ Universal Bishop.” (pp. 78, 79.)

To the first we reply, that, not only as late as the seventh century were all the bishops of the Church, not excepting the bishops of Rome, regarded as officially equal, but they are, as bishops, so regarded even now ; and as the fact that they are now so regarded does not prove that there is now no Pope, the fact that they were so regarded during the first six centuries cannot prove that there was no Pope then. The equality of all bishops is a doctrine of the Church. The Pope, as simple bishop, is only the equal of his brethren ; he is superior only as bishop of Rome, of which see the primacy is an adjunct, or prerogative. “ Thus a Roman council, in 378, says of Pope Damasus, that he is *equal in office* to the other bishops, and surpasses them in the prerogative of his see.” *

* Ep. v. Apud Coustant, T. I. col. 528, cited by Kenrick, *Primacy of the Apostolic See*, p. 106, 3d edition.

To the second we give a similar reply. The unity of the episcopate, and that each bishop possesses an undivided portion of it, that is, that the bishops possess or hold it *in solido*, according to the felicitous expression of St. Cyprian, is held by the Church now, and believed as firmly by all Catholics as ever it was. As the belief of this doctrine is not now disconnected with the belief in the Papacy, it cannot follow, from its having been entertained in the time of St. Cyprian, that there was then no Pope. This reply disposes of the citation from St. Jerome, as well as of that from St. Cyprian. But the Professor argues, that, if the episcopate be one, and the bishops possess it *in solido*, there can be no Pope. We do not see that this follows. Unity is inconceivable without a centre of unity, and how conceive the bishops united in one and the same episcopate without the Pope as their centre of union?

To the third we reply, that, according to the fair interpretation of the language of St. Cyprian, in reference to its occasion and purpose, it has nothing to do with the subject. But let it be that St. Cyprian intended to deny, and actually does deny, the Papal authority, what then? Before the Professor can conclude that there was no Pope down to St. Cyprian's time, he must prove either that St. Cyprian is a witness whose testimony we, as Catholics, are bound to receive, or that he is one who could not err. As Catholics, we are bound to receive the testimony of single fathers or doctors only so far as their teaching is coincident with that of the Church. The infallibility attaches to the Church, and to single doctors only in so far as they teach her doctrine. Never, then, can we be bound to receive the testimony of any father or doctor which conflicts with her teaching. The testimony of St. Cyprian does thus conflict, if what it is alleged to be. Therefore we are not bound to receive it, and it cannot be urged against us, as an *argumentum ad hominem*. Then the Professor must prove that St. Cyprian did not err. But, from the nature of the case, this he can do only by proving that he could not err. This he does not do, and cannot pretend; for he admits no infallible authority but that of the written word. (p. 84.) Consequently, let the testimony of St. Cyprian be what it may, it is not sufficient to prove that there was no Pope down to his time.

Moreover, if the alleged testimony of St. Cyprian refers to the Papal authority at all, it refers to it only inasmuch as it denies the right of St. Stephen, his contemporary, whom Mr. Thornwell himself calls the Pope, to exercise that authority.

If St. Cyprian's language does not express *resistance* to the Papal authority, it contains no reference to it. But resistance to an authority proves its existence. There was, then, in the time of St. Cyprian, an actual Pope, that is, a Pope claiming the right to exercise the Papal authority ; and the position of the Professor, that there was no Pope, is contradicted by his own witness. " But not according to the constitution of the Church." That is a question, not of reason, but of authority, and therefore not debatable. The simple question, stated in the terms most favorable to the Professor, resolves itself into this,—whether St. Cyprian is to be believed against St. Stephen, who claimed to be Pope, and the Church, who admitted his claim. To assume that he is is to beg the question. The Professor must, then, give us a valid reason for believing St. Cyprian rather than St. Stephen and the Church, or he proves nothing by St. Cyprian's testimony, be it what it may. But he has given us no such reason. St. Cyprian was fallible, and fallibility is not sufficient to set aside the claim of infallibility.

To the fourth we answer, St. Gregory the Great disclaimed through humility, as savoring of pride, the title of " Universal Bishop," we grant, but this is nothing to the purpose. The Professor must prove that he disclaimed the Papacy and the Papal authority, or he does not prove his position. But this he does not and cannot do ; for St. Gregory the Great, as is well known, on numerous occasions, asserted and exercised that authority ; nay, it was in the exercise of it that he rebuked John Jejunator, Patriarch of Constantinople, for arrogating to himself the title of " Œcumenical Patriarch," a *title* which even the Bishop of Rome, though Sovereign Pontiff, forbore to assume.

The Professor, it is evident from these replies, fails to prove that during the first six centuries there was no Pope. His objection, founded on the assumption that there was none, falls, therefore, to the ground ; and if it were required by our present argument, we could, and would, prove an uninterrupted succession of Popes from St. Peter to Pius the Ninth.

4. The Professor, taking it for granted that he had proved that the infallibility of the Church, if lodged with the Pope, could not be asserted, proceeds to show that it cannot be maintained, if lodged either with general councils or with the *Ecclesia dispersa*. But these three ways are all the possible suppositions, and if in no one of these the Church can be infallible, she cannot be infallible at all. But he has not, as we have seen,

disproved her infallibility through the Pope, and, for aught he proves, she may be infallible through her Sovereign Pontiffs. Consequently, as far as the argument to disprove her infallibility is concerned, it is no matter whether she is infallible in either of the other two modes or not.

But she cannot be infallible, if the infallibility be lodged with the general councils; for full two hundred years elapsed from the death of the last of the Apostles before such a council was assembled. (p. 79.) If her infallibility is expressed *only* through general councils, we concede it; but this is no Catholic doctrine; for we all, while we hold the general councils to be infallible, hold also that the bishops of the Church in union with their chief, the Pope, teach infallibly when dispersed, each in his own diocese, as well as when congregated in council.

But the councils cannot be infallible, because the early councils attributed the authority of the canons they settled to the sanction of the Emperor. (p. 80.) As this is asserted without any proof, it is sufficient for us simply to deny it. That the *civil* effect of the canons, or their authority as *civil* laws, depended on the sanction of the Emperor, we concede, — for the Church never assumes to enact civil laws; but that they depended on that sanction for their spiritual effect, or their authority in the spiritual order, we deny, and some better authority than that of one Barrow, an Anglican minister, which is no authority at all, will be needed to prove it.

The infallibility of the Church, continues the Professor, cannot be maintained, if lodged with the pastors of the Church dispersed each in his own diocese; because it would then depend on unanimous consent, and the unanimous consent of all can never be ascertained. (p. 81.) This unanimous consent could not be ascertained, if the pastors of the Church were so many independent and unrelated individuals, like Protestant ministers, we concede; but, whether congregated or dispersed, Catholic pastors are *ONE BODY*, hold the episcopate *in solido*, and through the Pope, the centre of unity and communion, they all commune with each, and each with all. Each is bound for all, and all for each, and each by virtue of this communion can give the unanimous faith of all. All that we need know is that the particular pastor to whom we are subjected is in communion with the Pope; for if he is, we know he is in communion with the head, then with the body, and then with the members. If thus in communion with the head, with the body, and with the members, what he gives as the unanimous faith of the whole

must be the unanimous faith of the whole, or that which has the unanimous consent of all.

5. But the Church cannot be infallible, because she has contradicted herself. "Popes have contradicted Popes, councils have contradicted councils, pastors have contradicted pastors, &c." (p. 83.) This argument is good, if the fact be as alleged. But the fact of contradiction must be proved, not taken for granted. Does the Professor prove it? Let us see. The first proof he offers is, that "the Council of Constantinople decreed the removal of images, and the abolition of image-worship, and the Council of Nice, twenty-three years after, re-established both." (p. 84.) But, unhappily for the Professor, no council of Constantinople, or of any other place, recognized or received by the Church as a council, ever decreed any such thing. There may have been, for aught we care, an assembly of Iconoclasts at Constantinople, collected by an Iconoclastic emperor, which made some such decree; but that no more implicates the Church than a decree of a college of dervishes or of a synod of Presbyterian ministers.

"The second Council of Ephesus approved and sanctioned the impiety of Eutyches, and the Council of Chalcedon condemned it." (*ib.*) But there was only *one* Council of Ephesus, and that was held before the rise of the Eutychian heresy! There was an Ephesian Latrocinium which approved the heresy of Eutyches, but it was no council, and its doings were condemned, instantly, by the Church.

"The fourth Council of Lateran asserted the doctrine of a physical change in the Eucharistic elements, in express contradiction to the teachings of the primitive Church, and the evident declarations of the Apostles of the Lord." (*ib.*) The Professor is not the authority for determining what was the doctrine of the Apostles or of the primitive Church, and cannot urge his notions of either as a standard by which to try the Church. He must adduce, on the authority of the Church herself, the teachings of the primitive Church contradicted by the decree of the fourth Council of Lateran, before he can allege that decree or assertion as a proof of her having contradicted herself. This he has not done.

"The second Council of Orange gave its sanction to some of the leading doctrines of the school of Augustine, and the Council of Trent threw the Church into the arms of Pelagius." (*ib.*) Here no instance of contradiction is expressed. But it is not true, and the Professor offers no proof of it, that the

Council of Trent threw the Church into the arms of Pelagius ; and that council, as a matter of fact, defines the doctrines of grace, which condemn the Pelagian heresy, in the very words of St. Augustine. The Professor would do well to set about the study of ecclesiastical history.

“ Thus, at different periods, every type of doctrine has prevailed in the bosom of an unchangeable Church.” (*ib.*) Not proved, and would not be, even if the foregoing charges were sustained. False inferences and unsupported assertions are not precisely the arguments to disprove the infallibility of the Church. We beg the Professor to review his logic.

“ The Church has been distracted by every variety of sect, tormented by every kind of controversy, convulsed by every species of heresy.” If this means that she has *sanc-tioned* every variety of sect and every species of heresy, we simply reply, that the Professor has not proved it ; if it means, that, first and last, she has had to *combat* every variety of sect and species of heresy, we concede it. But to adduce this as a proof of her having contradicted herself is ridiculous in logic, and monstrous in morals. You might as well argue that the Church was once Lutheran, because she condemned Lutheranism, Calvinistic, because she condemned Calvinism, that St. John was a Gnostic, because he wrote his Gospel to condemn Gnosticism, or that Mr. Thornwell himself is a Catholic, because he anathematizes Catholicity ; nay, that the judge, who, in the discharge of his judicial functions, condemns the crime of murder, must needs be the murderer, and that the eleven were guilty of the treachery of Judas, for they no doubt condemned it. Is this Protestant logic and Protestant morality ?

The Church “ at last has settled down on a platform which annihilates the word of God, denounces the doctrines of Christ and his Apostles, and bars the gates of salvation against men.” (*ib.*) Indeed ! How did the Professor learn all that ?

Here is all the Professor adduces to prove the fact of the Church having contradicted herself, and it evidently does not prove it. Then the argument founded on it against the infallibility of the Church must go for nothing. For aught that yet appears, the Church may be infallible. It is certainly a great inconvenience not to know ecclesiastical history when one wishes to reason from it.

torical difficulties in the doctrine of Papal infallibility," we proceed to consider another class, in his Sixth Letter, which we may term philosophical difficulties. The charge under this head is, that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church — Papal infallibility, as the Professor improperly expresses it — leads to skepticism. (p. 89.) The proofs assigned, as nearly as we can get at them, amidst a mass of speculations sometimes correct enough, but illustrating, when considered in relation to the argument, only the *ignorantia elenchi*, — a favorite figure of logic with the author, — are two, namely, the Church enjoins dogmas which contradict reason, and holds that doctrines may be philosophically true, and yet theologically false.

1. The instance adduced to prove that the Church requires us to believe what contradicts reason is the doctrine of Transubstantiation. It is a principle of reason that we believe our senses. But this doctrine denies the testimony of our senses, and therefore contradicts reason. "Upon the authority of Rome we are required to believe that what our senses pronounce to be bread, that what the minutest analysis which chemistry can institute is able to resolve into nothing but bread, what every sense pronounces to be material, is yet the Incarnate Son of God, soul, and body, and Divinity, full and entire, perfect and complete. Here Rome and the senses are evidently at war; and here the infallible Church is made to despise one of the original principles of belief which God has impressed upon the constitution of the mind." (p. 93.) What is here said about the minutest analysis chemistry can institute, &c., amounts to nothing, makes the case neither stronger nor weaker; for chemical analysis, however minute or successful, can give us only sensible phenomena. It never attains to substance itself. The simple assertion is, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation contradicts reason, because it contradicts the senses. But is this true?

There is no contradiction of the senses, unless the doctrine requires us to believe that what is attested by the senses is false. What is it the senses attest? Simply the presence in the Sacred Host of the species, accidents, or *sensible phenomena* of bread. This is all; for it is well settled in philosophy, that the senses attain only to the phenomena, and never to the substance or subject of the phenomena. Does the doctrine of Transubstantiation deny this? Not at all. It asserts precisely what the senses assert, namely, the presence in the Sacred Host of the species, accidents, or sensible phenomena of bread. Then it does not contradict the senses.

“ But it is a principle of human nature to believe, that, where we find the phenomena, there is also their subject ; that, if in the Sacred Host all the sensible phenomena of bread are present, the substance of bread is also present.” Undoubtedly, if reason has no authority, *satisfactory to herself*, for believing the contrary. In ordinary cases, reason has no such authority, and we are to believe that the sensible phenomena and their subject do go together. But reason cannot deny that God, if he chooses, can, by a miraculous exertion of his power, change the subject without changing the phenomena, and if in any particular case it be certified infallibly to her that he actually does so, she herself requires us to believe it. In the Most Holy Eucharist, it is so certified to reason, if the Church be infallible, and therefore, in believing that the sensible phenomena of bread are there without their natural subject, we are simply obeying reason, and of course, then, do not contradict it. It is no contradiction of reason to believe on a higher reason what we should not and could not on a lower reason. In this doctrine, we are simply required to suspend the ordinary reason at the bidding of an extraordinary reason, which is not, and never can be, unreasonable. Consequently, there is in the doctrine nothing *contrary* to reason, and the Church, in enjoining it, does not enjoin a dogma which contradicts either reason or the senses, though she unquestionably does enjoin a dogma which is *above* reason. The first proof, therefore, that the doctrine of infallibility “ leads to skepticism,” must be abandoned, as having no foundation for itself.

2. The second proof is no better. That certain infidel or paganizing philosophers, in the latter part of the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth century, maintained that propositions may be philosophically true, yet theologically false, we concede ; that this was the doctrine of the Schoolmen, or that it was ever for a moment countenanced by the Church, we deny. Indeed, Leo X., in *Concilii Lateranensis Sess. 8, 1513*, condemns it, by declaring every assertion contrary to revealed faith to be false, and decreeing that all persons adhering to such erroneous assertions be avoided and punished as heretics, — *tanquam hæreticos*. It would not be amiss, if the Professor would bear in mind that proofs which are themselves either false or in want of proof prove nothing, however pertinent they may be.

We cannot follow the Professor in his declamatory speculations in support of his charge. His reasoning is all fallacious.

He starts with the assumption, that the Church is fallible, has no authority from God to teach, and then charges her with consequences which would follow, no doubt, if she were fallible, if she had no Divine commission ; for they are the precise consequences which do follow from the teaching, or rather action, of the Protestant sects. If the Church were fallible, a mere human authority, arrogantly claiming to teach infallibly, we certainly should not defend her, or dispute that her influence would be as bad as Mr. Thornwell falsely alleges ; but we do not recognize his right to assume the fallibility of the Church as the basis of his proofs that she is not infallible ; and we cannot accept as facts mere consequences deduced from an hypothesis which we deny, and which is not yet proved, far less receive them as proofs of the hypothesis.

There are in Catholic countries, no doubt, many unbelievers ; but before this can be adduced as evidence that the Church, by claiming to be infallible, leads them into unbelief, it is necessary to prove that she is not infallible. If infallible, she cannot have a skeptical tendency ; because what she enjoins must be infallible truth, and skepticism, when it does not proceed from malice, results always, not from truth being present to the mind, but from its *not* being present. But it is worthy of remark, that the objections to Christianity on which unbelievers chiefly rely are not drawn from the distinctive teachings of the Catholic Church, nor from the Scriptures as she interprets them. They are nearly all drawn from the Scriptures as interpreted by private judgment, and hence, as we should expect, infidelity abounds chiefly in Protestant countries. Protestant Germany, England, the United States, are, any one of them, far more infidel than even France ; and our own city cannot, in religious belief, compare favorably with Paris, infidel as Paris unhappily is. Modern infidelity is of Protestant origin ; Giordano Bruno sojourned in Protestant England ; Bayle was a Protestant, and resided in Holland ; Voltaire, the father of French infidelity, did but transport to France the philosophy of the Englishman Locke, and the doctrines and objections of the English deists, Herbert of Cherbury, Tindal, Toland, Chubb, Morgan, Woolston, and others. Indeed, to England especially belongs the chief glory, such as it is, of infidelizing modern society. France and Germany are nothing but her pupils. Rightly do Protestants regard her as the bulwark of their religion ; for in the war against the Church, against the revelation of Almighty God, she, with her sanctimonious face and corrupt

heart, is the commander-in-chief. It were easy to show, that, aside from the internal malice of unbelievers, the chief cause of infidelity in modern society is Protestantism, which asserts the Divine authority of the Scriptures, and then leaves them to be interpreted by private judgment ; but it is unnecessary. It is becoming every day more and more obvious, that, the more Protestants circulate the Bible, the more do they multiply scoffers and unbelievers.

In Letter VII. we come to another class of objections, which we may term *moral* objections. These are summed up in the assertion, The Church cannot be infallible, because her “ infallibility is conducive to licentiousness and immorality.” (p. 105.) The proof of this is, first, the unproved assertion, that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church leads to skepticism ; and, second, the allegation that Catholicity and Jesuitism are one and the same thing. The first assertion we dismiss, for we have just shown that the Professor does not sustain it. As to Jesuitism, we hardly know what to say ; for we do not know, and the author does not inform us, what is meant by Jesuitism. For aught that appears, the identity asserted may be conceded without prejudice to the Church. The Society of Jesus is composed of Catholic priests, and we are not aware that these have any peculiar doctrines, either of faith or morals. Indeed, they could not have ; for if they were to have any, they would be obliged to leave the Order and the Church. The notion among some Protestants, that the Jesuits are a *sect* in the bosom of the Church, professing certain dogmas of faith or certain principles of morals different from those professed by other Catholics, is a ridiculous blunder. The Church enjoins the same faith and the same principles of morals upon all her children, and no person, or class of persons, would be suffered to teach in her communion, who should add to or take from them. The Jesuits are Catholics, neither more nor less, and it is fair to presume that in faith and principles of morals they agree with all Catholics, and profess what the Church teaches.

But that the Jesuits teach, or ever have taught, doctrines favorable to licentiousness or immorality is a matter to be proved, not taken for granted. What is the proof the Professor offers ? Here is all we can find : — “ These three cardinal principles — of intention, mental reservation, and probability — cover the whole ground of Jesuitical atrocity.” (p. 115.) The Professor labors long and hard to identify Catholicity and

Jesuitism. He must, therefore, concede that these three principles cover the whole of what he holds to be atrocious in Catholicity. Catholicity, then, is "conducive to licentiousness and immorality," because it contains the three principles of "intention, mental reservation, and probability." But what is the meaning the Professor attaches to these principles? Unhappily, he gives us no clear and explicit answer; for he writes with his head full of false assumptions.

"The detestable principles," he says, "of this graceless order [the Jesuits] may be found embodied in the recorded canons of general councils. That the end justifies the means, that the interests of the priesthood are superior to the claims of truth, justice, and humanity, is necessarily implied in the decree of the Council of Lateran, that no oaths are binding—that to keep them is perjury rather than fidelity—which conflict with the advantage of the Church. What fraud have the Jesuits ever recommended or committed, that can exceed in iniquity the bloody proceedings of the Council of Constance in reference to Huss? What spirit have they ever breathed more deeply imbued with cruelty and slaughter, than the edict of Lateran to kings and magistrates, to extirpate heretics from the face of the earth? The principle on which the sixteenth canon of the third Council of Lateran proceeds covers the doctrine of *mental reservations*. If the end justifies the means, if we can be perjured with impunity to protect the authority of the priesthood, a *good intention* will certainly sanctify any other lie, and a man may always be sure that he is free from sin, if he can only be sure of his allegiance to Rome and his antipathy to heretics. The doctrine of *probability* is in full accordance with the spirit of the Papacy, in substituting authority for evidence, and making the opinions of men the arbiters of faith. And yet these three cardinal principles of intention, mental reservation, and probability, which are so thoroughly Papal, cover the whole ground of Jesuitical atrocity."—pp. 114, 115.

It would seem from this, that the Professor understands by the principle of intention, that the moral character of the actor is determined by the intention with which he acts; by that of mental reservation, that no one can bind himself by oath to do that which conflicts with the advantage of the Church; and by that of probability, the substituting of authority for evidence, and making the opinions of men the arbiters of faith. If this is not his meaning, we are unable to divine what it is.

That Catholicity teaches that the moral character of the ac-

tor is determined by his intention, or, in other words, that a man is to be judged according to his intention, may be true ; but this must be morally wrong, or it cannot be adduced as a proof that the teaching of the Church is " conducive to licentiousness and immorality." That this is morally wrong, the Professor does not prove, or even attempt to prove. For ourselves, we are not now called upon to prove that it is right. It is for the Professor to prove that it is wrong. But we own, that, from our boyhood, we have always supposed it a dictate of reason that the man is to be praised or blamed according to his intention. If I really intend to do a man evil, my unintentional failure to do him evil does not exonerate me from guilt ; if I really intend to do him good, but, in attempting to do him good, unintentionally do him evil, I am not guilty. If I have killed a man in self-defence, the law excuses or justifies me ; and it does not hold me guilty of murder, unless the killing has been done with a felonious intent. He who takes the life of a fellow-being through private revenge is a murderer ; the public officer who does it in pursuance of a judicial sentence is no murderer, and does but a justifiable act. Whence the difference, if not in the difference of intention ? That no act, in relation to the actor, is blameworthy unless done from a malicious intention, or praiseworthy unless done from a virtuous intention, we have always supposed to be the teaching of reason, and we must have high authority to convince us that we have been wrong.

" But on this ground the Church erects her doctrine, that the end justifies the means." We cannot concede this ; first, *because the Church has no such doctrine* ; and second, because the principle does not imply it. The assertion, that the Church teaches, that any Catholic doctor teaches, or ever did teach, that the end justifies the means, is made without the faintest shadow of a reason, and the reverse is what she does teach, as every man knows who knows any thing of her teaching. The doctrine of intention objected to implies nothing of the sort. The Church teaches, indeed, that the act for which we are accountable is the act of the will ; but she teaches that no act is done with a good intention that is not referred to God as the ultimate end, and that *every one* of our acts is to be so referred. Now, in choosing the means, we as much *act* as we do in the choice of the end, and therefore must be, as to the means, bound by the same law which binds us as to the end ; and then we can no more choose unjust means than we can unjust ends,

and therefore can be allowed to seek even just ends only by just means.

The Professor says that "the Jesuit Casnedi maintains in a published work, that at the day of judgment God will say to many, 'Come, my beloved, you who have committed murder, blasphemed, &c., because you believed that in so doing you were right.' " But he takes good care not to give us a reference to the work itself, and we hazard nothing in saying that no Jesuit ever published such a sentence, unless it was to condemn it, as containing a Protestant heresy. That invincible ignorance, if really invincible, excuses from sin, is, no doubt, a doctrine of the Church ; for she teaches that no one can sin in not doing that which he has no power to do. No doubt, involuntary mistakes, if unavoidable, springing from no malice in the will, from no culpable neglect of ours, are excusable ; but no Catholic divine ever taught that invincible ignorance can extend to the great precepts of the natural law, to such as forbid murder, blasphemy, &c. ; for they are engraven on the heart of every man, and are evident to every man by the light of natural reason. The Professor has been misled, by relying on the authority of Pascal, and other writers of his stamp. He refers us to Pascal's *Provincial Letters* "for a popular exposition of the morality of the Jesuits." He might as well refer us to Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary* for a popular exposition of the morality of the Gospel. Pascal was a Jansenist, and Jansenists are heretics, not Catholics. The *Provincial Letters* are witty, but wicked, — a tissue of lies, forgeries, and misrepresentations, from beginning to end, as has been amply proved over and over again. If Mr. Thornwell is ignorant of this fact, he will have to search long before he will find a Catholic or a Jesuit doctor that will permit him to hold that his ignorance is excusable.*

* In ordinary times, what we have said in the text is all that would need to be said in reference to the Society of Jesus ; but now, when the Society is suffering a severe persecution, even in Catholic countries, we are unwilling to pass the subject over without bearing our testimony, feeble as it is, in favor of the children of St. Ignatius. We do this the more willingly, because we are conscious that we have ourselves frequently done them great injustice, both in our thoughts and in our words, for which we are heartily sorry, and pray them to forgive us. It is hard, when we hear a body of men widely and constantly decried, not to be more or less prejudiced against them ; and nothing is more natural than, when under the influence of this prejudice, to exaggerate beyond all rea-

1. The principle of mental reservation happens to be no Catholic doctrine. Protestants would, no doubt, be pleased to

sonable bounds the slight imperfections we may observe in here and there an individual member, and to generalize them into characteristics of the body itself. Few persons have been more prejudiced against the Society of Jesus than we ourselves. But having taken some pains to find a basis for the unfavorable judgment we had formed, we hardly know when or how, we confess that we have been entirely unsuccessful. There may have been individual Jesuits whose conduct we could not approve, but we are satisfied, after studying the history of the Order, that it needs no other defence than a simple statement of facts, and no other eulogium than the recital of its deeds.

Every body knows the popular meaning attached to *Jesuitical*. Taking the word in this meaning, there are no men so little *Jesuitical* as the Jesuits. Their whole history proves them to be remarkable for their simplicity of heart, singleness of purpose, and straightforwardness of conduct. No man can take up a work in defence of the Order, written by a member, without being fully convinced that the Jesuit is the antithesis of the character commonly ascribed to him. We have heard many charges, and grave charges, against him; but we have not heard one that we have not seen refuted. Jesuits are men, and, of course, suffer more or less the infirmities common to all men; but we should like to be shown a body of men, of equal numbers, placed in the trying circumstances in which they have been, who have shown less of human infirmity, or been more true to the motto, *Ad majorem Dei Gloriam*. There is no field of science or art which they have not cultivated with success; no department of literature which they have not enriched with their contributions; scarcely a nation to which they have not preached the cross; and hardly a land which they have not sanctified with the blood of their martyrs.

Even the present persecution of the Society is to its glory. If the Jesuits had been political demagogues, — if they had been violent radicals, ready to sacrifice liberty to license, order to anarchy, religion to politics, heaven to earth, — our ears would not have been stunned with maddened outcries against them; the world would have owned them as her children, and the age would have delighted to honor them. We know it is pretended that they are the enemies of liberty and the friends of despotism, but it needs only a slight knowledge of facts to know that this is mere pretence. Liberty has more than once found her noblest champion in the Jesuits, and the hostility a year or two since manifested to them in France was because they demanded the freedom of education, a right guarantied by the Charter itself. They may not be, in these days, foremost among those who stir up rebellions and revolutions; they may not regard the fearful events which have just transpired in Europe, or are now transpiring, as sure to bring back the golden age of the poets; they may hold their mission to be spiritual, rather than political, and believe it more important to convert individuals and nations to God than to one political creed or another; but if so, it does not follow that they are wrong, or that for this very reason they are not all the more worthy of our respect and confidence.

The Society of Jesus was instituted, not for political, but for religious purposes, and its members, by their profession, are devoted to preaching

find that the Church teaches that lying is sometimes justifiable, for such a doctrine is one they stand very much in need of ; but

the Gospel, hearing confessions, and educating youth, and that not for one country only, but for all countries. These ends are the same and of equal importance everywhere and under all forms of government. If the Jesuits were to adopt a political creed, and become its propagandists, how could they devote themselves alike to the ends of their institute under the monarchy of Europe and the democracy of America? What course would or could be proper for them, but to abstain from declaring themselves in favor of any particular form of government, and to content themselves with simply inculcating upon all citizens to obey the legitimate government of their country, whatever its form or constitution?

The charge against the Jesuits of being in favor of this or that form of government arises from their refusal to declare themselves in favor of one or another, from the fact that they have no political creed, and make it a point of duty to stand aloof from politics, and to confine themselves to the discharge of their spiritual functions. They obey the powers that be, and comport themselves as loyal subjects to the authority of the country, whether it be autocracy, as in Russia, constitutionalism, as in France and Great Britain, or republicanism, as in America. What more could we ask of them? If tyrants denounce them because they will not turn defenders of tyranny, if revolutionists denounce them because they will not join in the war against legitimate authority, whose fault is it? Are we to condemn the Jesuits because tyrants and revolutionists wrong them?

Wherever the Jesuits are permitted to establish themselves, they are a blessing. It is not easy to estimate the value to this country of their services as instructors of our youth. It would be difficult to find a substitute for them as educators. In every part of the country, they are, for the pure love of God, founding colleges, and training up our children in the way they should go. Is this nothing? These colleges are but of yesterday, yet have they already done great service, — as we ourselves can testify, who have had four sons for a long time in one of them, and who have peculiar reason to thank Almighty God for raising up and moving the good fathers to devote themselves to the important work of education. But as yet they have really done nothing, in comparison with what they will do. They now rank among the best in the country, and in a few years they must place education with us at least on a level with what it is in the most favored countries of the Old World. And can we count this small service?

Worldlings may despise the Jesuits, infidels and heretics may calumniate them; misguided Catholics, whose faith is but a dead faith, may distrust them; but the world needs them, our own country needs them, and though the Church is dependent on no religious order, they are not the least efficient of her servants. Protestants, in their estimation of the Jesuit, betray only their ignorance or their malice, or both. The character they ascribe to the Jesuit they will find in its perfection in their own ministers, and the best definition of *Jesuitical*, in the popular acceptance of the term, is a *Presbyterian minister*, the antithesis of a Jesuit. Mr. Thornwell illustrates and accepts, in the book before us, every element of what he calls Jesuitism. No man can have been brought up among Presbyterians without knowing that the principle, that the end

she teaches nothing of the sort. She does not command her children at all times and on all occasions to speak *all* the truth they may happen to know, but she does command them never to speak any thing but the truth ; and she teaches them, that, when they use words which by their natural force convey a false sense, they speak falsehood, whatever may have been their secret meaning, and that knowingly and intentionally to use language which is naturally calculated to deceive the hearer, to convey to him a false meaning, or a meaning different from that in the mind of him that uses it, is to lie, to sin against God. All who are acquainted with Catholic morality know that this is her teaching, and whoever asserts the contrary is guilty of the very offence he would fasten upon her, and has no excuse for his conduct. For if he is ignorant of her doctrine, he speaks rashly ; if he is not ignorant, he is guilty of a wilful falsehood.

2. The facts which the Professor alleges, granting them to be facts, do not prove the principle of *mental reservation*. We presume the Professor wishes to maintain that the Church teaches that it is lawful for her children to take oaths which conflict with her advantage, but that they must take them with the mental reservation, not to keep them ; and that if so taken, it is no sin to break them. This is what he needs in order to make out his case. But this he does not prove. Granting that he has rightly stated

justifies the means, is the one on which they generally act, whether they avow it or not. No one can read one of their books against the Church without perceiving that the principle of mental reservation, or, in plain terms, the right to lie for the purpose of advancing Protestantism, is a principle which they practically adopt, and hold in constant requisition ; and whoever will read a Presbyterian dogmatical work will see that to higher certainty than probability its author does not aspire, and that to substitute authority for evidence, and to make the opinions of men the arbiters of faith, is his boast. Nothing is more ridiculous than for a Presbyterian minister to accuse Jesuits of a want of principle, of candor, of honesty, or to charge them with fraud and cruelty. Who ever heard of a Presbyterian minister that was not, officially, the very impersonation of pride, cant, hypocrisy, bigotry, and cruelty ? If such a one there ever was, we may be sure that he did not live and die a Presbyterian. We know something of Presbyterianism ; it was our misfortune to have been brought up a Presbyterian. We know what are its secret covenants, the pledges it exacts of its adherents, and the measures it takes to prevent the least ray of light from penetrating their darkness. Take a Protestant's account of Catholicity or Jesuitism, change the name, and it is a faithful picture, as far as it goes, of proud, arrogant, bigoted, cruel, and persecuting Presbyterianism. There is not a charge brought against us by Presbyterians that we cannot retort.

the doctrine of the Council of Lateran, — he does not tell us which council, — all he proves is, that the Church teaches that no oath taken to her prejudice is binding ; but he does not prove that she teaches that the reason why it is not binding is because it was taken with a mental reservation not to keep it in case it conflicted with her advantage. For aught that appears, the reason why the Church declares that such oaths do not bind is because she holds them to be unlawful oaths, — oaths which no man has a right to take, and which therefore are void *ab initio*. The Professor will hardly maintain the morality of robbers and cutthroats, that a man who has taken an unlawful oath is bound to keep it. He will hardly pretend that he who should swear to assist in a plot for blowing up the Presbyterian Assembly when in session, for instance, would be bound to keep his oath, or to refrain from revealing the plot, simply because he had sworn not to do so. The whole sum and substance of the charge, then, is, that the Jesuits and the Church teach that unlawful oaths do not bind. Does this conflict with reason ? Is this “ conducive to licentiousness and immorality ” ? Is it immoral to teach that no man can bind himself to do wrong ?

But in this the Church teaches that “ the interests of the priesthood are superior to the claims of truth, justice, and humanity ; for she holds that all oaths which conflict with her advantage are unlawful.” The conclusion is not necessary, for it may be that her interests, her advantage, are identical with the claims of truth, justice, and humanity ; or that it is only by promoting her interests and seeking her advantage that it is possible to vindicate the claims of truth, justice, and humanity. If she be what she professes to be, this must be so ; and that she is what she professes to be the Professor must presume till he has proved the contrary. If she be the Church of God, any oath to her prejudice is an oath against God, and no man can be mad enough to say that an oath against God can bind, or that the claims of truth, justice, or humanity can be prejudiced by not keeping it. But the Professor cannot assume that she is not the Church of God, for that she is not is the very point he is to prove, and he cannot prove this by assuming it, and making the assumption the principle of his arguments to prove it. Such a procedure would simply beg the question. Granting, then, that the Church does teach that oaths to her prejudice are unlawful, and therefore do not bind, nothing proves that she is not right in so doing, and therefore nothing proves that in doing so she favors “ licen-

tiousness and immorality." To condemn the Church, on the ground the Professor assumes, would be to assert the doctrine opposite to hers; namely, unlawful oaths are to be kept, — that, if I have been foolish or wicked enough to swear to do wrong, I am bound in conscience to keep my oath and do the wrong, — a monstrous doctrine, which strikes at the foundation of all morals. It is strange what blunders Protestants commit, in trying to get an argument against the Church. It would seem as if it never occurred to them to examine the principle of the objections they urge. They seem to say, If the Church should favor licentiousness and immorality, then she would not be the Church of God; therefore she does favor licentiousness and immorality.

3. The Professor, evidently, is ignorant of the principle of *probability*, or probabilism, as understood by Catholic theologians. That principle, if he did but know it, is very nearly the contrary of what he supposes, and is little else than the well-known maxim of the common law, that, if there is a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to its benefit. But the principle, as the Professor defines it, is not embraced by the Church, nor defended by a single Catholic divine. He says, the Church substitutes "authority for evidence, and makes the opinions of men the arbiters of faith"; but this, in principle, at least, is a mistake; for the Church teaches that God alone is the arbiter of faith, and that nothing but his word, declared to be his word by himself through his divinely appointed organ, can be of faith. His word divinely declared to be his word is the highest evidence reason can demand or receive; and if the Church is proved to reason to be his organ for declaring his word, reason has the highest evidence it can conceive for believing whatever she teaches as the word of God is infallibly true. She asserts that reason has the right to demand this evidence, and has no right to dispense with it. In principle, then, she denies the principle of probability as set forth by the Professor. If she is what she claims to be, she denies it in her practice, and cannot possibly do as alleged. That she is what she professes to be the Professor is bound, as we have already shown, to presume, till he makes the contrary appear; which he does not do.

The Professor identifies Jesuitism with Catholicity, and resolves all that is atrocious in Jesuitism into the three principles enumerated, and therefore all that is atrocious in Catholicity. But the first of these principles is a simple dictate of reason, and contains nothing atrocious. Then all that is atro-

cious in Catholicity, or all the atrocity that can be charged upon Catholicity, is resolvable into the other two principles, namely, mental reservation and probability. But these are not Catholic principles, and, however atrocious they may be, their atrocity cannot be charged to her. Therefore no atrocity can be charged to her, even according to the Professor's own argument. But to be "conducive to licentiousness and immorality" is undeniably atrocious. Therefore the Church is not conducive to them. So the Professor does not sustain his assertion, that "Papal infallibility is conducive to licentiousness and immorality." Assuredly, the Professor is ignorant of the laws of evidence.

The next proof offered against the infallibility of the Church is, that "it is the patron of superstition and will-worship." (p. 116.) This is a singular objection. How *infallibility* can patronize superstition and will-worship, that is, *well-worship*, conceding them to be wrong, is more than we are able to conceive. Infallibility can be the patron of nothing wrong, and the Professor, if he should prove his thesis, would prove that superstition and will-worship are right, not that the Church is fallible. Can he mean that the assertion of her infallibility is the patron of superstition and will-worship? But this he would be troubled to prove, even if he should prove the existence of superstition and will-worship in the Church; for they undeniably exist out of the Church, in communities which lay no claim to infallibility. Does he mean that the Church is not infallible, because she is the patron of superstition, &c.? Why, then, did he not say so? If this is his meaning, his argument is valid, if the fact be as alleged. But, unhappily for his cause, the fact is not as alleged, as we have proved in our Review for last January, in the concluding article of the series, entitled, *The Two Brothers; or Why are you a Protestant?* to which we refer him for a full answer to this objection. Catholics pay divine honors to God alone, as every one knows who knows any thing of Catholic worship. That we keep relics, pictures, and images, and pay them a relative honor as *mémorials* of departed sanctity, we admit; that we venerate the Saints, especially the Ever-blessed Virgin, the Most Holy Mother of God, we also admit; but that this is superstition or will-worship we deny, and the Professor must prove, or not assert it.

The last proof of the fallibility of the Church which the Professor attempts to offer is, that she is not infallible, for "she is hostile to civil government." (p. 143.) His argument is, when reduced to form, — the church that claims and exercises temporal authority is hostile to civil government ; but the Roman Catholic Church claims and exercises temporal authority ; therefore she is hostile to civil government. The church that is hostile to civil government is fallible ; but the Roman Catholic Church is hostile to civil government ; therefore, the Roman Catholic Church is fallible, that is, not infallible.

We distinguish the major of the first syllogism. The church that claims and exercises supreme temporal authority is hostile to civil government, if she has received from Almighty God no grant of that temporal authority, we concede ; if she has received the grant, we deny. No church which possesses, by the Divine grant, temporal authority, can be hostile to civil government by claiming and exercising it, because she is herself, under God, the civil government. But the Roman Catholic Church, if she has received the grant, does thus possess the temporal authority. Therefore, if she claims and exercises that authority, she is not hostile to civil government.

We distinguish also the major of the second syllogism. The church that is hostile to all government in civil affairs is fallible, we concede ; for the necessity of government in civil affairs is clearly evinced from reason ; the church that is hostile only to distinct and independent civil government is fallible, we deny, for it may be that God has vested the government of civil as well as spiritual affairs in the same hands. The denial of civil government distinct from and independent of the Church is a proof of fallibility only on the supposition that such civil government exists by divine right. But if all government, civil as well as spiritual, is vested in the Church, it does not so exist. Therefore its denial is no proof of fallibility. Moreover, the minor of the second syllogism is not proved. The Roman Catholic Church, as we have seen, cannot be hostile to civil government, even if she claim and exercise the supreme temporal authority, if she has received it as a grant from God, the Supreme Ruler. But it is not proved that she claims or exercises it without such grant. Therefore it is not proved that she is hostile to civil government ; and therefore, again, it is not proved that she is fallible.

The Professor labors to prove, that, according to Catholicity, "the Pope is the vicar of the Omnipotent God, invested alike

with temporal power and ecclesiastical authority." (p. 147.) If so, the Pope is the vicar of God in both orders, and is invested with the supreme authority in both. Then he is by Divine appointment the temporal sovereign. But for the temporal sovereign to claim and exercise temporal authority is not to be hostile to the civil government, but to assert and maintain it.

But the claim of the Church "to secular authority merges the state in the Church. Kings and emperors, nations and communities, become merely the instruments and pliant tools of spiritual dominion." (p. 153.) What then, if the spiritual dominion be legitimate? All power is of God, and there is no legitimate authority not from him. Kings, emperors, nations, communities, have no right to exercise temporal authority, save as vicars of the Omnipotent God, and it is only for the reason that they are such that we are under any obligation to obey them. If Almighty God has made the Pope his sole vicar in both orders, obedience is due to him by all both in church and state, and then it is no objection to the Church that she exacts the submission of kings, emperors, nations, communities, for they can, in such case, have no authority not derived from God through the Pope. The Professor, if he grant that the Pope is the vicar of Almighty God in the temporal and in the spiritual order, cannot urge his objection, because in doing so he would resist the authority of the vicar of God, and therefore of God himself.

Again, if the Pope be the vicar of God in both orders, the claim and exercise of the supreme temporal dominion do not merge the state in the church, for then the Church is both church and state. The Church could merge the state in herself by claiming and exercising temporal power, only on condition that she had received no special grant of temporal power, and claimed to exercise it solely by virtue of her grant of spiritual authority. But if she teaches, as the Professor contends, that in the Pope she has been invested with temporal *as well as with spiritual authority*, she does not do this, that is, does not claim the temporal as incidental to the spiritual. Therefore, even granting that she claims the supreme temporal authority, she does not and cannot merge the state in the Church as a spiritual authority, which is the sense intended. This is evinced from the instance of the Papal states. The Pope in regard to them is supreme in both temporals and spirituals, but they exist as a state, as a civil government, as much so as Tuscany or Sardinia.

The Professor does not appear to understand the question he wishes to discuss. The spiritual order is undeniably superior to the temporal, and nothing can be legitimately concluded from the temporal to the prejudice of the spiritual. No man who has any knowledge of even natural morality can pretend that it is the prerogative of the temporal order to define or give law to the spiritual. It is not according to reason that the lower should rule the higher, the body the soul, for instance, or the state the Church. To object to the Church that she subjects the whole temporal order to the spiritual order, or that she makes the spiritual dominion supreme, is to make an objection which reason disavows, because it would be in principle the same as to deny the right of reason to rule the flesh, nay, the same as to deny reason itself. The Church, if she is God's Church, if she has received plenary spiritual authority as the vicar of the Omnipotent God, must needs be superior to the state, and the state can have no authority to do aught she declares to be sinful or morally wrong, and must be bound to do whatever she declares to be required by the moral law. To allege that she subjects kings, emperors, &c., to her dominion is, then, to allege nothing against her.

The Professor does not state the question properly. He begins with an assumption that he has no right to make. He assumes, that, if the Church claims any authority in the temporal order, she is a usurper, and therefore cannot be infallible. He takes it for granted, then, that, if he proves that she has claimed such authority, he has disproved her infallibility. But we demand the proof from reason, that she has no authority in temporals. Till he proves this, he cannot conclude, from the fact that she claims it, that she is a usurper, and therefore fallible. It is certain from reason, since all power is of God, and there is and can be no rightful authority to govern in any order not derived mediately or immediately from him, that he can make the Pope his sole vicar on earth in both orders, if such be his will and pleasure. If he does so, then it is also certain that the Pope has the right to exercise the supreme authority in both orders, and then that, so far from his temporal authority being usurped, all authority not derived from God through him is usurpation. What the Professor has to prove, then, in case he contends that the Church claims the supreme temporal authority, is, not that she claims it, but that she claims it without having received it from God. If she asserts that she has received it, — since the legal presumption is in her favor, and

the argument is not to prove, but to disprove, her infallibility, — he can prove that she has not received it only by proving that she has in the exercise of it violated some principle of natural justice.

Now, we are far from conceding that the Church has ever claimed or exercised temporal authority in the sense intended; but pass over that. Let it be supposed for the present that she has. What is the evidence that she has ever violated any principle of natural justice? You can arraign her only on the law of nature, before the bar of natural reason. Produce, then, the precept of the law of nature which she has violated or contradicted. We have looked carefully through all that the Professor has urged, and we can find nothing that is immoral or unjust. All his proofs are reduced to this, that she claims and exercises temporal authority. Grant all this, what then? Where is your evidence that she has not rightfully claimed and exercised it? You offer none, and only work yourself up into a violent passion against her, because she has claimed and exercised it. Where is your evidence that the exercise you fancy you have proved has been contrary to the law of nature? You offer only two things; first, what you call the Jesuit's oath, and, second, the prohibition of duelling by the Council of Trent. The oath ascribed to the Jesuits is a forgery. The Jesuits have no such oath, for as Jesuits they take no oath at all. The Council of Trent condemns duelling, we grant; but is it the condemnation of duelling, or duelling itself, that is contrary to the precepts of justice? Which is easier to defend, — duelling, or the Church in condemning it? And who is in the wrong, — the Church in condemning, or you in defending, the base, cowardly, and detestable practice of single combat?

But the Church does more than condemn it. According to the statute of the Council of Trent, in its twenty-fifth session, "the temporal sovereign who permits a duel to take place in his dominions is punished not only with excommunication, but with the loss of the place in which the combat occurred. The duellists and their seconds are condemned in the same statute to perpetual infamy, the loss of their goods, and deprived, if they should fall, of Christian burial, while those who are merely spectators of the scene are sentenced to eternal malediction." (p. 152.) Well, what then? *What then?* Why, this proves that the Church claims the right to exercise civil authority, nay, to inflict civil punishments; for such are the forfeiture of goods, and the loss of the place where the combat occurs.

Yes, as you cite the statute, but not as it was passed by the Council of Trent.* But let that pass. If so, it is nothing to your purpose, unless the punishment prescribed is in itself unjust. Will you maintain that ?

“ In a conflict of power between princes and Popes, the first and highest duty of all the vassals of Rome is to maintain her honor and support her claims.” (p. 153.) Suppose a conflict of power between the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States and the civil authorities of the country, which party would the Professor, as a Presbyterian minister and member of that church, support ? The civil authorities ? Then he either condemns his church, or raises the temporal order above the spiritual, which he expressly repudiates. Would he side with his church, and maintain the independence of the spiritual order ? Then he would recognize and act on the principle he objects to us, and we retort his objection. Suppose a conflict between an infallible church and a fallible civil government, we demand which of the two ought to yield, “ But the Church is not infallible.” That is for you to prove. If she is infallible, she must be in the right, and then we are bound in reason to support her ; if she is not infallible, we deny that we are bound to support her at all, for then she is not God’s Church.

“ Hence the Jesuit in his secret oath renounces all allegiance to all earthly powers which have not been confirmed by the Holy See.” (*ib.*) The Jesuit has no secret oath, and renounces no allegiance to the civil government. The charge is false.

“ The Romish Church, too, sets her face like a flint against the subjection of her spiritual officers to the legal tribunals of the state.” (*ib.*) Well, what if she does ? Where is the proof that in this she is wrong ? She “ has positively prohibited the intolerable presumption of laymen, though kings and magistrates, of demanding oaths of allegiance from the lofty members of her hierarchy.” (*ib.*) *In case they hold nothing temporal of them*, conceded ; but what then ? Will the Professor be good enough to demonstrate the right of the temporal authority to demand from a minister of religion an oath of allegiance in spirituals.

La Fayette is reported to have said, that, “ if ever the liberties of this country should be destroyed, it would be by the

* Vide Conc. Trident. Sess. 25, cap. xix.

machinations of the Romish priests." (p. 154.) *Therefore* the Church is fallible! La Fayette is *reported*, by whom? When? Where? What if he did say so? Was La Fayette infallible? And does it follow that the thing must be so, because La Fayette thought so? If he did once think so, it is possible that he changed his mind, for it is *reported* that he became reconciled to the Church and died a Catholic, and it is well known that he was, when dying, exceedingly anxious for the services of a "Romish priest." He had probably had enough of French philosophism during his lifetime, without wishing to carry any with him into eternity.

"They are all of them [Catholic priests] sworn subjects of a *foreign* potentate." (*ib.*) Not true. The authority of the Church is Catholic, not national, and can be no more *foreign* here than at Rome.

"There are peculiar principles in the constitution and polity of Rome which render it an engine of tremendous power." (p. 159.) Who has more power than God? Because, if we admit the existence of God, we must admit his omnipotence, are we to be atheists? If the Church be not God's Church, she cannot possess the authority we claim for her, without danger, we concede; if she is his Church, and the Pope is his vicar, what have we to fear from her power more than we should have, if it were exerted immediately by God himself? We defend the Church as God's Church, and attempt no defence of her on the supposition that she is not his Church. Prove to us that he has not instituted her, and we will abandon her; but remember that proving that she has a tremendous power is no proof to us that he has not instituted her; for it belongs not to us to say how much or how little power it is proper for him to delegate to her. The claim of similar power for a human or man-made church, like the Presbyterian, would unquestionably be dangerous, and has proved itself so in the whole history of Protestantism. But that it is dangerous in a divinely commissioned church, we know, and so does every man of common sense, is not and cannot be true; for God himself becomes our surety for the right exercise of the power, and that is sufficient.

"The doctrine of auricular confession establishes a system of espionage which is absolutely fatal to personal independence, and from the intimate connection between priests and bishops, and bishops and the Pope, all the important secrets of the earth can be easily transmitted to the Vatican." This is ridiculously

absurd. No priest can communicate to any person living the secrets of the confessional, and he can no more do it to his bishop or to the Pope than he can to James H. Thornwell. He cannot speak, out of the confessional, of what has been told him in the confessional, even to the penitent himself. No instance of the secrets of the confessional having been betrayed has ever transpired. Even the vilest apostates have never been known to disclose what they had received under the seal of the confessional. The Catholic clergy do not record the confessions of their penitents in a book, making them a part of the records of the Church, as did the former Puritan ministers of New England, as we had occasion ourselves to know formerly from the inspection of the records of some of their churches, over which it was our misfortune to be settled as pastor.

As to the system of espionage, we all know that it was carried to its perfection in the Congregational churches of New England ; and it still existed in full vigor a few years ago in the Presbyterian churches in the Middle States, as we had personal means of knowing. In most Calvinistic churches, especially the Congregational, the Presbyterian, and the Methodist, the members are bound by a solemn covenant, a covenant frequently renewed, to *watch* over one another, which means, practically, that they shall be spies one upon another ; and who that has had the misfortune to be brought up a Presbyterian has not felt that he was under perpetual surveillance, that every member, it might be, of the particular church to which he belonged was on the look-out to catch him tripping ? We have ourselves had ample opportunities of learning the degree of personal independence allowed by Presbyterianism, and we never knew the meaning of personal independence till we became a Catholic. There is no comparison, in this matter of personal independence, between Catholicity and any form of Protestantism we are acquainted with, and that is saying much, if what is alleged concerning our frequent changes be not altogether untrue. Catholicity provides us all the helps we need in order to attain to Christian perfection ; she exhorts, she entreats us to avail ourselves of them, and to attain to that perfection ; but she throws the responsibility on our own individual consciences. Catholics, also, usually mind their own business, and attend rather to their own consciences than to those of their neighbours. Hence, you find among them very little hypocrisy. Their conduct is free, frank, natural, and, as far as we have had opportunities for observing, they generally wear their worst side

outward. It needs a close and intimate acquaintance with them to know, or even to suspect, their real piety and worth. This indicates any thing but the want of personal independence, and the presence of the system of espionage alleged. Indeed, the Professor in bringing this charge must have argued against us from what he knows to be true of his own sect ; but this is to pass from one genus to another, — not allowable in logic. Servility, slavishness, the want of personal independence, the fear to say that our souls are our own, though unquestionably characteristics of the Presbyterian, are no characteristics of the Catholic. There is a total difference between the mild and parental authority exercised by our clergy over us, and the harsh and severe tyranny notoriously exercised by Presbyterian ministers over their flocks ; and it would take much to make Catholics believe it possible for a people to stand in such awe and dread of a minister of religion as Presbyterians do of their ministers. Our children are delighted to see a priest come into the house ; we, when a boy, if we saw a minister coming, used to run and hide in the barn.

The Professor has mentioned several other points, but they involve no principle not already met and disposed of. The great question of the mutual relation of the temporal and spiritual powers we have not discussed, for it has not lain in our way. In these essays we have not been laboring to establish the claims of the Church, but to test the validity of the objections urged by the Professor. We have shown that he has offered nothing that disproves, or tends to disprove, her infallibility. This is all that was required of us. That the Church is hostile to civil government we deny, and could easily prove, if it were necessary. But the burden of proof is on the Professor, and we are not disposed to assume it for ourselves. The Church represents the spiritual order, and has exclusive jurisdiction under God, for her own children, of all questions which pertain to that order ; but as the Church, she has never enacted, or attempted to enact, civil laws. She asserts, undoubtedly, the independence, and if the independence, the supremacy of the spiritual order, because the spiritual order embraces every moral question, and the state is as much bound to obey the moral law as the individual ; but as long as the civil government seeks the public good, without violating any precept of that law, she leaves it, within its own province, free to adopt and carry out the economical or prudential policy it judges proper or expedient.

The Professor alludes to the struggles which have at times occurred between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, and takes it for granted that in these struggles the civil power was always in the right, and the Church in the wrong. It is singular how readily Protestants, when they wish to deny the infallibility of the Church, assume it for individuals and for civil government. But civil government is confessedly fallible. The simple fact of a conflict between the two powers is, therefore, no evidence that right is against the Church. Indeed, the conflict itself is a presumption that the state is in the wrong ; because the presumption is always in favor of the superior order. Do our Protestant friends ever reflect on the distrust which they manifest of their own pretended churches, when they assume that right must needs be, in every contest, on the side of the temporal authority ? Do they remark that they prove themselves thus to be either courtiers or infidels ? Even if the Church were only a human institution, it would not follow that she would not be in the right in warring against political tyrants. We certainly have no respect for Presbyterianism, and yet, if we should find the state, by virtue of its own authority, attempting to suppress it, we should side with Presbyterianism against the state ; for we hold the utter incompetency of the state in spirituals, and we no more concede its right to sit in judgment on Presbyterianism than we do its right to sit in judgment on Catholicity. The question is one which belongs to the spiritual authority, and the state, in its own right, has and can have nothing to do with it.

It perhaps has never occurred to the Professor that it might be profitable to investigate those struggles which afford him so much matter of virulent but foolish declamation against the Church. In fact, the Popes, in their contests with the civil powers, need no apology. Judged even as a human power, they were always in the right, on the side of justice and humanity, defending the cause of the oppressed, and putting forth their power only to vindicate the rights of conscience, to succour the weak, to console the afflicted, and to protect the friendless. We said all this, and even more, while yet in the ranks of Protestants, and far from dreaming that we should one day be a Catholic. We grant that the Pope has excommunicated princes and nobles, deposed kings and emperors, and absolved their subjects from their allegiance ; but in this he has only done his duty as the Spiritual Father of Christendom, and what was required by humanity as well as religion. These princes were

his spiritual subjects, amenable to his authority by the law of the Church which they acknowledged, and by the constitution of their own states. He was their legal judge, had the right to summon them before him, and to cut them off, if he saw proper, from the communion of the faithful, and excommunication of itself worked virtual deposition. In absolving subjects from their allegiance, he usurped no authority, for he was the legal judge in the case ; for whether the allegiance continued or had ceased presented a case of conscience, of which, as Sovereign Pontiff, he had supreme jurisdiction, and because he was by all parties the acknowledged umpire between princes and their subjects. But he never claimed the right to absolve from their allegiance the subjects of infidel princes, or of any princes not Catholic, or bound to be Catholic by the constitution of their states, as the kings and queens of Great Britain are bound, since 1688, to be Protestant.

But what, in fact, was the absolution granted, and in what cases has the Pope exercised, or claimed, the right to grant it ? Has the Pope ever claimed the right to absolve from their allegiance the subjects of a legitimate prince, who reigns justly, according to the laws and constitution of his state ? Never. In every such case he impresses upon his spiritual children the duty of obedience. But the obligation between prince and subject is reciprocal. If the subject is bound to obey the prince, the prince is bound to protect the subject. This is implied in the very nature of the social compact. The people are not for the prince, but the prince is for the people. The authority of the prince is not a personal franchise or right, but a trust, and he is bound to exercise it according to the conditions on which it is committed to him. Government exists, not for the good of the governors, but for the good of the governed. The true prince is the servant of his subjects. Government is instituted for the common good, and the moment it ceases to consult the common good, or the public good, it forfeits its rights. The tyrant, the oppressor, has and can have no right to reign, and therefore no right to exact obedience. His subjects cease to be subjects to him, and are free — in a lawful manner — to resist, and even depose him ; for resistance to tyrants, if the manner of the resistance be just, is obedience to God. When a prince becomes a tyrant, when he oppresses his subjects, and tramples on the rights of our common humanity, he breaks the compact between him and his subjects, and by so doing releases them from their allegiance. Hence our Congress of 1776,

after having proved George the Third to be a tyrant, conclude, — “Therefore these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; and they *are absolved from all allegiance* to the British crown.” Now suppose the subjects of a prince, feeling themselves aggrieved, oppressed, complain to the Holy Father, the judge recognized by both parties in the case, that their prince has broken the compact, violated his oath of office, and become a tyrant; suppose the Holy Father entertains the complaint, and summons both parties to plead before him, and, after a patient hearing of the cause, gives judgment against the prince, declares him to have forfeited his rights, and that his subjects are absolved from their allegiance, what would there be in all this to which reason could object? Well, this is precisely the kind of absolution the Popes have granted, and never have they deposed a prince or absolved his subjects, except in cases precisely similar to the one here supposed. He merely declares the law, and applies it to the facts of the case presented. The absolution itself simply gives a legal character to a fact which already exists. The necessity of some such authority as that which Protestants complain of in the Popes is widely and deeply felt in modern society, and various substitutes for it, such as a congress of nations, have been suggested or attempted, but without any favorable results. Having rejected the Pope as the natural and legal umpire between the prince and his subjects, we find ourselves reduced to the dilemma, either of passive obedience and non-resistance to tyrants, or of revolution, which denies the right of government, renders order impracticable, and resolves society into primitive chaos. To deny the right to resist the tyrant is to doom the people to hopeless slavery; to assert it, and yet leave to each individual the right to judge of the time, the means, and the mode of resistance, is disorder, no-governmentism, the worst form of despotism. In the “dark ages,” men were able to avoid either alternative. By recognizing the Pope as umpire, who, by his character and position, as head of the Church which embraced all nations, was naturally, not to say divinely, fitted to be impartial and just, they practically secured the right of resistance to tyranny, without undermining legitimate authority. It will be long before modern nations will be wise enough to recognize how much they have lost by what they call their progress.

For ourselves, we thank God that there was formerly a power on earth that was able to depose tyrants, and to step in

between the people and their oppressors. We are not among those who are afraid to glory in the boldness and energy of those great Popes who made crowned heads shake, and princes hold their breath. Our heart leaps with joy when we see St. Peter smite the oppressor of the Church or of his people to the earth, and if we have ever felt any regret, it has been at the slowness of the Holy Father to smite, or at his want of power to smite with more instant effect. Even when a Protestant, we learned to revere the calumniated Hildebrands, Innocents, and Bonifaces, those noble and saintly defenders of innocence, protectors of the helpless, and humblers of crowned tyrants and ruthless nobles. O, how slow even we Catholics are to do them justice ! How little do we reflect on the deep debt of gratitude we owe them ! O, dumb be the tongue that would rail against the Popes or apologize for their firm resistance to the usurpation of the temporal authorities ! Alas ! how often in the history of modern Europe have we seen them, under God, the last hope of the world, the only solace of the afflicted, the sole resource of the wronged and downtrodden ! Alas ! it is precisely because of their noble defence of religion and freedom, of their fidelity to God and to man, that they have been calumniated, and the world has been filled with the outcries of tyrants, and their minions and dupes, against them.

That the interposition of the Sovereign Pontiffs in temporal affairs often occasioned much disturbance, and even civil wars, we are not disposed to deny ; but on them who made the interposition necessary must rest the responsibility. In this world, it often happens that right cannot be peacefully asserted and maintained, and tyranny proves a curse, not only while it is unresisted, but even when resisted, and successfully resisted. We cannot permit a band of depredators to go unresisted, because we must disturb them by resisting them. Injustice, iniquity, can never be redressed, the tyrant can never be deposed and the legitimate sovereign restored, without a combat, and often a long and bloody one. Even our Lord himself told us to think not that he had come to send peace on the earth, but a sword rather. But shall we, therefore, make no efforts to right the wronged, to save justice and humanity from utter shipwreck ? Let no man who glories in the revolutionary principle, who boasts of being a lover of freedom and the progress of mankind, pretend it. We are no revolutionists ; we hold ourselves bound in conscience to obey the legal authority ; but we acknowledge no obligation to obey the

oppressor, and let the competent authority but declare him an oppressor and summon us to the battle-field, and we are ready to obey, to bind on our armour, rush in where blows fall thickest and fall heaviest, let the disturbance be what it may. We are, thank God, Roman Catholics, and therefore love freedom and justice, and dare not, when called upon, to shrink from defending them against any and every enemy, at any and every sacrifice

The Professor contends that the Church is hostile to civil government ; we would respectfully ask him if he has reflected, that, without her, civil government becomes impracticable. How, without her as umpire between government and government, and between prince and subject, and without her as a spiritual authority to command the obedience of the subject and the justice of the prince, will he be able to secure the independence of nations, and wise and just government ? Will he learn from experience ? Let him, then, read modern history. The age in politics discards the Church. Protestantism for three hundred years has been the religion of nearly a third, and, in politics, of the whole of Europe. Three hundred years is a fair time for an experiment. Well, what is the result ? DESPOTISM on the one hand, and ANARCHY on the other. There is not, at this moment, a single well-organized civil government on the whole Eastern continent, and only our own on the Western. The government of Great Britain may seem to be an exception for the Old World, but it is a perfect oligarchy ; it fails to secure the common weal ; enriches the few and impoverishes the many ; and its very existence is threatened by a mob which the ever-increasing poverty of the industrial classes hourly augments, and grim want is rendering desperate. Our own government is sustained solely by the accidental advantages of the country, consisting chiefly in our vast quantities of unoccupied fertile lands, which absorb our rapidly increasing population, and form a sort of safety-valve for its superfluous energy. Strip us of these lands, or let them be filled up so that our expanding population should find its limit, and be compelled to recoil upon itself, our institutions would not stand a week.

Here in the present state of the world, hardly to be paralleled in universal history, — when old governments are either all fallen or tottering ready to fall ; when all authority is cast off, and law is despised ; when the streets of the most civilized cities run with the blood of citizens shed by citizens, and the lurid

light of burning cottage and castle gleams on the midnight sky ; when saintly prelates bearing the olive-branch of peace are shot down by infuriated ruffians ; when murder and rapine hardly seek concealment, and all civilization seems to be thrown back into the savagism of the forests,— here we may read the wisdom of those who discard the Church, and denounce her as hostile to civil government, — the wisdom of the doctrine which a scoffing and unbelieving age opposes to the truth which Almighty God has revealed, and to the lessons of universal experience. Alas ! how true it is, that God permits strong delusions to blind the impious and the licentious, that they may bring swift destruction upon themselves !

But it is time to bring our remarks to a close. We have examined the principal arguments which Mr. Thornwell has brought forward to prove the fallibility of the Church, and we leave our readers to judge for themselves whether we have not proved, that, in every instance, they are either unsound in principle or irrelevant, proving nothing but the Professor's own malice or ignorance. The Professor has made numerous assumptions, numerous bold assertions, but in no instance has he done better than simply to assume the point he was to prove. He has declaimed loudly against the Church, he has said many hard things against her, but he has harmed only himself and his brethren. We now take our leave of him. We have done all we proposed. We have vindicated the Catholic argument for the disputed books drawn from the infallibility of the Church, which is enough, without the testimonies of the Fathers, although we have even these. We regret that the task of answering the Professor had not been assumed by Dr. Lynch himself, who would have accomplished it so much better than we have done. Yet it was hardly fitting that he should have assumed it. He could not, with a proper respect for himself and his profession, have replied to such a vituperative performance as Mr. Thornwell's book. We were brought up a Presbyterian, and have been accustomed from our youth to the sort of stuff we have had to deal with, and therefore have been able to reply without feeling the degradation we should have felt, had we all our lifetime been accustomed to the courtesy and candor of Catholic controversialists.

ART. II. — *Legitimacy and Revolutionism, — Conservatism and Reform.*

WE have taken, in our political essays, unwearied pains to make ourselves understood, and to guard against being misapprehended ; but, through our own fault or that of our readers, our success has rarely corresponded to our efforts. On all sides, from all quarters, we are charged with being hostile to liberty and favorable to despotism, — the enemy of the people, and the friend of their oppressors. We could smile at this ridiculous charge, were it not that some honest souls are found who appear to believe it, and some moon-struck scribblers make it the occasion of exciting unjust prejudices against our friends, and of placing them, as well as ourselves, in a false position before the public. Injustice to us personally is of no moment, and demands of us no attention ; but when, owing to our peculiar position, it can hardly fail to work injustice to others, we are bound to notice and to repel it.

The age in which we live is an age of theoretical, and, to a great extent, of practical anarchy. Its ideas and movements are marked by impatience of restraint, denial of law, and contempt of authority. We have seen this, and have felt it our duty to protest against it, and to do what we could, in our limited sphere, to recall men to a sense of the necessity of government, and to the fact of their moral obligation to uphold the supremacy of law. This is our offence. Yet one would naturally suppose that people of ordinary intelligence, somewhat acquainted with our past history, might, without much difficulty, believe that in this our motive has been to serve the cause of freedom, not that of despotism. We, in fact, have done it, because liberty is impossible without order, order is impossible without government, and government in any worthy sense of the term is impossible without a settled conviction on the part of the people of its legitimacy, and of their obligation in conscience to obey it. Nothing deserving the name of government can be founded on the sense of the agreeable or of the useful. Governments, so called, which appeal to nothing higher, more catholic, and more stable, are mere creatures of passion or caprice, and must follow the lead of popular folly and excess, instead of restraining them, and directing the general activity to the public good. They are not governments, but mere instruments for the private gain or aggrandizement of

the adroit and scheming few who contrive to possess themselves of their management. It is philosophically and historically demonstrable, that the permanence and stability of government, and its wise and just administration for the common weal, — the only legitimate end of its institution, — are impracticable, unless the government is held to rest on the universal and unalterable sense of duty, under the protection of religion.

This truth, though, in fact, a very commonplace truth, our age overlooks, or, if it does not overlook, it rejects. Hence the danger with which liberty in our times is threatened. We have believed it, therefore, not improper to guard against this danger, and in order to do so, we have traced government back to its source, and to the foundation of its authority. We have found its origin, not in the people, but in God, from whom is all power ; and we have concluded from this its divine right, within its legitimate province, to our allegiance. It has, since it derives its authority from God, a divine right to command, and, if so, we must be bound in conscience to obey it. Then it rests, not on the sense of the agreeable or of the useful, to fluctuate as these fluctuate, but on the sense of duty, — and not merely duty to our country or to mankind, but duty to God, — a duty founded in the unalterable relations of man to his Maker. This raises political allegiance and obedience to the law to the rank of moral virtue, and declares their violation to be a sin against God, to whom we belong, all we have, and all we are. Hence, in its legitimate province, even civil government becomes sacred and inviolable ; and therefore we assert, on the one hand, our duty to obey it, and, on the other, deny the right of revolution, what La Fayette calls “the sacred right of insurrection.”

Here, in general terms, is the doctrine we have endeavoured to inculcate. That it is hostile to the political atheism now so rife, we concede. We are Christians, and do not understand the possibility of being Christians, and yet atheists in politics. We have but one set of principles, and these are determined by our religion. We cannot adopt one set of principles in our religion and a contradictory set in our politics, saying “Good Lord” in the one, and “Good Devil” in the other. We are too far behind the age for that. But that this doctrine is hostile to liberty or favorable to despotism, we do not concede, — nay, positively deny. In setting it forth, we have dwelt on that phase of it directly opposed to the dangerous tendencies of the age, because it was not necessary to guard against tendencies from which we have nothing to apprehend, and because we

presumed that our readers would of themselves see that it had another phase equally opposed to the opposite class of tendencies. But for the hundredth time in our short life we have learned that the writer who presumes any thing on the intelligence or discrimination of the bulk of readers presumes too much, and will assuredly be disappointed. The doctrine protects the government against radicals, rebels, and revolutionists ; but it protects, also, the people against tyrants and oppressors. The fears of our politicians on this last point, whether real or affected, do little credit to their sagacity. The monsters which affright them a little more light would enable them to see are as harmless as the charred stump or decaying log which the benighted traveller mistakes for bear or panther.

When we assert the doctrine of legitimacy, we are understood to assert passive obedience and non-resistance to tyrants ; but needs it any extraordinary intellectual power and cultivation to perceive that legitimacy, while it smites the rebel or the revolutionist, must equally smite the tyrant or usurper ? If the doctrine asserts the right of legitimate, it must deny the right of illegitimate government ; if it denies the right to disobey the legitimate authority, it must also deny the right of illegitimate authority to command ; if it disarms the subject before the legal authority, it must equally disarm the illegal authority before the subject. How, then, from the fact that we are forbidden to resist or to subvert legitimate government, the legal constitution of the state, conclude that we are forbidden to resist or to depose the tyrant ? Tyranny, oppression, is never legal, and therefore no tyrant or oppressor ever is or can be the legitimate sovereign. To resist him is not to resist the legitimate authority, and therefore demands for its justification no assertion of the revolutionary principle. How is it, then, that you do not see that the doctrine of legitimacy gives a legal right to resist whatever is illegal, and therefore lays a solid foundation for liberty ?

People, we know, are prejudiced against the doctrine which asserts the divine origin and right of government, but it is because they misapprehend the doctrine, and because they identify liberty with democracy. The doctrine, undoubtedly, does assert the sacredness, inviolability, and legitimacy of every actual political constitution, whatever its form, and that the monarchical or aristocratic order, where it is the established order, is as legitimate as the democratic. But, if liberty and democracy are one and the same thing, since the monarchical order is that which is actually the established order in most

states, liberty in most states is precluded, and the people are and must be slaves. Yet is it true that liberty and democracy are identical or convertible terms? Democracy, whose expression is universal suffrage, intrusts every citizen with a share in the administration of the government, which is and can be done by no other political order. But the elective franchise is a trust, not a right, and therefore to withhold it is not to withhold freedom. Liberty is in the possession and exercise of our natural rights. We have none of us any natural right to govern; for under the law of nature all men are equals, and no one has the right to exercise authority over others. The franchise is a municipal grant, and depends on the will of the political sovereign. Liberty, unless the question be between nation and nation, is not a predicate of the government, but of the subject, and of the subject not in his quality of a constituent element of the sovereignty, but in his quality of subject. As subject he may be free, without being intrusted with authority to govern, and therefore may be free under other forms of government than the democratic.

In fact, democratic politicians never attain to the conception of liberty. The basis of their theory of government is despotism. They make the right to govern a natural right, and differ from the confessedly despotic politicians only in claiming for every man what these claim for only one. They make government a personal right, incident to manhood, inalienable, and inamissible, — not a solemn trust which the trustee is bound to hold and exercise according to law, and for which he is accountable. Hence it is that democracy always sooner or later terminates in despotism or autocracy. We deny that government is ever a personal right, whether of the one, the few, or the many, and therefore deny that a man has a natural right to a share in the administration. He only has the right to whom the power is delegated by the competent authority, and he holds it, not as a personal right, but as a trust. Consequently, we do not concede that the establishment of the democratic *régime* is at all essential to the establishment or maintenance of liberty. He is free, enjoys his liberty, who is secured in the possession and enjoyment of all his natural rights; and this is done wherever the legitimate authority governs, and governs according to the principles of eternal justice. We are aware of no form of government that cannot so govern, or which cannot also govern otherwise, if it choose.

We are republicans, because republicanism is here the estab-

lished order, but we confess that we do not embrace, and never have embraced, as essential to liberty, or even as compatible with liberty, the popular democratic doctrine of the country. We beg leave to introduce here some remarks on *Democracy* which we wrote in 1837, and published in the first number of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1838.

"Democracy is sometimes asserted to be the sovereignty of the people. If this be a true account of it, it is indefensible. The sovereignty of the people is not a truth. Sovereignty is that which is highest, ultimate; which has not only the physical force to make itself obeyed, but the moral right to command whatever it pleases. The right to command involves the corresponding duty of obedience. What the sovereign may command, it is the duty of the subject to obey [to do].

"Are the people the highest? Are they ultimate? And are we bound in conscience to obey whatever it may be their good pleasure to ordain? If so, where is individual liberty? If so, the people, taken collectively, are the absolute master of every man taken individually. Every man, as a man, then, is an absolute slave. Whatever the people, in their collective capacity, may demand of him, he must feel himself bound in conscience to give. No matter how intolerable the burdens imposed, painful and needless the sacrifices required, he cannot refuse obedience without incurring the guilt of disloyalty; and he must submit in quiet, in silence, without even the moral right to feel that he is wronged.

"Now this, in theory at least, is absolutism. Whether it be a democracy, or any other form of government, if it be absolute, there is and there can be no individual liberty. Under a monarchy, the monarch is the state. '*L'État c'est moi*,' said Louis the Fourteenth, and he expressed the whole monarchical theory. The state being absolute, and the monarch being the state, the monarch has the right to command what he will, and exact obedience in the name of duty, loyalty. Hence absolutism, despotism. Under an aristocracy, the nobility are the state, and consequently, as the state is absolute, the nobility are also absolute. Whatever they command is binding. If they require the many to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' to them, then 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' to them the many must feel it their duty to be. Here, for the many, is absolutism as much as under a monarchy. Every body sees this.

"Well, is it less so under a democracy, where the people, in their associated capacity, are held to be absolute? The people are the state, and the state is absolute; the people may therefore do whatever they please. Is not this freedom? Yes, for the state; but what is it for the individual? There are no kings, no nobili-

ties, it is true ; but the people may exercise all the power over the individual that kings or nobilities may ; and consequently every man, taken singly, is, under a democracy, if the state be absolute, as much the slave of the state, as under the most absolute monarchy or aristocracy.

“ But this is not the end of the chapter. Under a democratic form of government, all questions which come up for the decision of authority must be decided by a majority of voices. The sovereignty which is asserted for the people must, then, be transferred to the ruling majority. If the people are sovereign, then the majority are sovereign ; and if sovereign, the majority have, as Miss Martineau lays it down, the absolute right to govern. If the majority have the absolute right to govern, it is the absolute duty of the minority to obey. We who chance to be in the minority are then completely disfranchised. We are wholly at the mercy of the majority. We hold our property, our wives and children, and our lives even, at its sovereign will and pleasure. It may do by us and ours as it pleases. If it take it into its head to make a new and arbitrary division of property, however unjust it may seem, we shall not only be impotent to resist, but we shall not even have the right of the wretched to complain. Conscience will be no shield. The authority of the absolute sovereign extends to spiritual matters, as well as to temporal. The creed the majority is pleased to impose, the minority must in all meekness and submission receive ; and the form of religious worship the majority is good enough to prescribe, the minority must make it a matter of conscience to observe. Whatever has been done under the most absolute monarchy or the most lawless aristocracy may be reënacted under a pure democracy, and what is worse, legitimately too, if it be once laid down in principle that the majority has the absolute right to govern.

“ The majority will always have the physical power to coerce the minority into submission ; but this is a matter of no moment, in comparison with the doctrine which gives them the right to do it. We have very little fear of the physical force of numbers, when we can oppose to it the moral force of right. The doctrine in question deprives us of this moral force. By giving absolute sovereignty to the majority, it declares whatever the majority does is right, that the majority can do no wrong. It legitimates every possible act for which the sanction of a majority of voices can be obtained. Whatever the majority may exact it is just to give. Truth, justice, wisdom, virtue, can erect no barriers to stay its progress ; for these are the creations of its will, and may be made or unmade by its breath. Justice is obedience to its decrees, and injustice is resistance to its commands. Resistance is not crime before the civil tribunal only, but also *in foro conscientiæ*. Now this

is what we protest against. It is not the physical force of the majority that we dread, but the doctrine that legitimates each and every act the majority may choose to perform; and therefore teaches them to look for no standard of right and wrong beyond their own will.

"The effects of this doctrine, so far as believed and acted on, cannot be too earnestly deprecated. It creates a multitude of demagogues, pretending a world of love for the *dear* people, lauding the people's virtues, magnifying their sovereignty, and with mock humility professing their readiness ever to bow to the will of the majority. It tends to make public men lax in their morals, hypocritical in their conduct; and it paves the way for gross bribery and corruption. It generates a habit of appealing, on nearly all occasions, from truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, to the force of numbers, and virtually sinks the man in the brute. It destroys manliness of character, independence of thought and action, and makes one weak, vacillating, — a timeserver and a coward. It perverts inquiry from its legitimate objects, and asks, when it concerns a candidate for office, not, Who is the most honest, the most capable? but, Who will command the most votes? and when it concerns a measure of policy, not, What is just? What is for the public good? but, What can the majority be induced to support?

"Now, as men, as friends to good morals, we cannot assent to a doctrine which not only has this tendency, but which declares this tendency legitimate. That it does have this tendency needs not to be proved. Every body knows it, and not a few lament it. Not long since it was gravely argued by a leading politician, in a Fourth of July oration, that Massachusetts ought to give Mr. Van Buren her votes for the Presidency, because, if she did not, she would array herself against her sister States, and be compelled to stand alone, as the orator said with a sneer, 'in solitary grandeur.' In the access of his party fever, it did not occur to him that Massachusetts was in duty bound, whether her sister States were with her or against her, to oppose Mr. Van Buren, if she disliked him as a man, or distrusted his principles as a politician or a statesman. Many good reasons, doubtless, might have been alleged why Massachusetts ought to have voted for Mr. Van Buren, but the orator would have been puzzled to select one less conclusive, or more directly in the face and eyes of all sound morals, than the one he adduced. The man who deserves to be called a statesman never appeals to low or demoralizing motives, and he scorns to carry even a good measure by unworthy means. There is within every man, who can lay any claim to correct moral feeling, that which looks with contempt on the puny creature who makes the opinions of the majority his rule of action. He who wants the moral courage to stand up 'in solitary grandeur,' like Socrates in face of the Thirty Tyrants, and

demand that right be respected, that justice be done, is unfit to be called a statesman, or even a man. A man has no business with what the majority think, will, say, do, or will approve; if he will be a man, and maintain the rights and dignity of manhood, his sole business is to inquire what truth and justice, wisdom and virtue, demand at his hands, and to do it, whether the world be with him or against him, — to do it, whether he stand alone ‘in solitary grandeur,’ or be huzzaed by the crowd, loaded with honors, held up as one whom the young must aspire to imitate, or be sneered at as singular, branded as a ‘seditious fellow,’ or crucified between two thieves. Away, then, with your demoralizing and debasing notion of appealing to a majority of voices! Dare be a man, dare be yourself, to speak and act according to your own solemn convictions, and in obedience to the voice of God calling out to you from the depths of your own being. Professions of freedom, of love of liberty, of devotion to her cause, are mere wind, when there wants the power to live and to die in defence of what one’s own heart tells him is just and true. A free government is a mockery, a solemn farce, where every man feels himself bound to consult and to conform to the opinions and will of an irresponsible majority. Free minds, free hearts, free souls, are the materials, and the only materials, out of which free governments are constructed. And is he free in mind, heart, soul, body, or limb, he who feels himself bound to the triumphal car of the majority, to be dragged whither its drivers please? Is he the man to speak out the lessons of truth and wisdom when most they are needed, to stand by the right when all are gone out of the way, to plead for the wronged and down-trodden when all are dumb, he who owns the absolute right of the majority to govern?

“Sovereignty is not in the will of the people, nor in the will of the majority. Every man feels that the people are not ultimate, are not the highest, that they do not make the right or the wrong, and that the people as a state, as well as the people as individuals, are under law, accountable to a higher authority than theirs. What is this Higher than the people? The king? Not he whom men dignify with the royal title. Every man, by the fact that he is a man, is an accountable being. Every man feels that he owes allegiance to some authority above him. The man whom men call a king is a man, and, inasmuch as he is a man, he must be an accountable being, must himself be under law, and therefore cannot be the highest, the ultimate, and of course not the true sovereign. His will is not in itself law. Then he is not in himself a sovereign. Whatever authority he may possess is derived, and that from which he derives his authority, and not he, in the last analysis, is the true sovereign. If he derive it from the people, then the people, not he, is the sovereign; if from God, then God, not he, is the sovereign.

Are the aristocracy the sovereign? If so, annihilate the aristocracy, and men will be loosed from all restraint, released from all obligation, and there will be for them neither right nor wrong. Nobody can admit that right and wrong owe their existence to the aristocracy. Moreover, the aristocracy are men, and, as men, they are in the same predicament with all other men. They are themselves under law, accountable, and therefore not sovereign in their own right. If we say they are above the people, they are placed there by some power which is also above them, and that, not they, is the sovereign.

"But if neither people, nor kings, nor aristocracy are sovereign, who or what is? What is the answer which every man, when he reflects as a moralist, gives to the question, Why ought I to do this or that particular thing? Does he say, Because the king commands it, — the aristocracy enjoin it, — the people ordain it, — the majority wills it? No. He says, if he be true to his higher convictions, Because it is right, because it is just. Every man feels that he has a right to do whatever is just, and that it is his duty to do it. Whatever he feels to be just he feels to be legitimate, to be law, to be morally obligatory. Whatever is unjust he feels to be illegitimate, to be without obligation, and to be that which it is not disloyalty to resist. The absolutist, he who contends for unqualified submission on the part of the people to the monarch, thunders, therefore, in the ears of the absolute monarch himself, that he is bound to be just; and the aristocrat assures his order that its highest nobility is derived from its obedience to justice; and does not the democrat, too, even while he proclaims the sovereignty of the people, tell this same sovereign people to be just? In all this, witness is borne to an authority above the individual, above kings, nobilities, and people, and to the fact, too, that the absolute sovereign is justice. Justice is, then, the sovereign, the sovereign of sovereigns, the king of kings, lord of lords, the supreme law of the people, and of the individual.

"This doctrine teaches that the people, as a state, are as much bound to be just as is the individual. By bounding the state by justice, we declare it limited, we deny its absolute sovereignty, and therefore save the individual from absolute slavery. The individual may on this ground arrest the action of the state, by alleging that it is proceeding unjustly; and the minority has a moral force with which to oppose the physical force of the majority. By this there is laid in the state the foundation of liberty; liberty is acknowledged as a right, whether it be possessed as a fact or not.

"A more formal refutation of the sovereignty of the people, or vindication of the sovereignty of justice, is not needed. In point of fact, there are none who mean to set up the sovereignty of the peo-

ple above the sovereignty of justice. All, we believe, when the question is presented as we have presented it, will and do admit that justice is supreme, though very few seem to have been aware of the consequences which result from such an admission. The sovereignty of justice, in all cases whatsoever, is what we understand by the doctrine of democracy. True democracy is not merely the denial of the absolute sovereignty of the king, and that of the nobility, and the assertion of that of the people; but it is properly the denial of the absolute sovereignty of the state, whatever the form of government adopted as the agent of the state, and the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of justice.

"Sovereignty may be taken either absolutely or relatively. When taken absolutely, as we have thus far taken it, and as it ought always to be taken, especially in a free government, it means, as we have defined it, the highest, that which is ultimate, which has the right to command what it will, and which to resist is crime. Thus defined, it is certain that neither people, nor kings, nor aristocracies, are sovereign, for they are all under law, and accountable to an authority which is not theirs, but which is above them and independent of them.

"When taken relatively, as it usually is by writers on government, it means the state, or the highest civil or political power of the state. The state, we have seen, is not absolute. It is not an independent sovereign. It is not, then, in strictness, a sovereign at all. Its enactments are not in and of themselves laws, and cannot be laws, unless they receive the signature of absolute justice. If that signature be withheld, they are null and void from the beginning. Nevertheless, social order, which is the indispensable condition of the very existence of the community, demands the creation of a government, and that the government should be clothed with the authority necessary for the maintenance of order. That portion of sovereignty necessary for this end, and, if you please, for the promotion of the common weal, justice delegates to the state. This portion of delegated sovereignty is what is commonly meant by sovereignty. This sovereignty is necessarily limited to certain specific objects, and can be no greater than is needed for those objects. If the state stretch its authority beyond those objects, it becomes a usurper, and the individual is not bound to obey, but may lawfully resist it, as he may lawfully resist any species of injustice, — taking care, however, that the manner of his resistance be neither unjust in itself, nor inconsistent with social order. For instance, the state assumes the authority to allow a man to be seized and held as property; the man may undoubtedly assert his liberty, his rights as a man, and endeavour to regain them; but he may not, in doing this, deny or infringe any of the just rights of him who may have deemed himself his master or owner." — pp. 37 — 45.

When we wrote this, we enjoyed the reputation of being one of the staunchest friends of liberty and the most ultra radicals in the country, — a fact which we commend to those of our former friends who are now so ready to represent us as having gone over to the side of despotism. We should not now call the doctrine of the extract Democracy, as we did when we wrote it, nor should we use certain locutions, to be detected here and there in the extract, dictated by an erroneous theology ; but the doctrine itself is our present doctrine, as clearly and as energetically expressed as we could now express it. It seems to us to contain an unanswerable refutation of the popular democratic principle, and a triumphant vindication of the sovereignty of justice, — therefore, of the divine origin and right of government ; for justice, in the sense the writer uses it, is identical with God, who alone is absolute, immutable, eternal, and sovereign Justice.

The purpose of the writer was evidently to obtain a solid foundation for individual freedom. If he, in order to do this, found and proved it necessary to assert the divine origin and right of government, to rise above the sovereignty of kings, of nobles, and even of the people, to the eternal and underived sovereignty of God, King of kings, and Lord of lords, how should we suspect ourselves of being hostile to liberty, when asserting the same doctrine in defence of the rights of government ? Having for years proved the doctrine to be favorable to liberty, how could we believe the public would be so unjust to us as to accuse us of favoring despotism, because we undertook to prove it equally favorable to civil government ? Why are we to be classed as hostile to freedom, because we defend in the interests of authority the doctrine which we have uniformly asserted as the only solid foundation of freedom ? Whether we are right or wrong in the doctrine itself, or in its application, would it be any remarkable stretch of charity to give us credit for believing ourselves no less favorable to liberty in bringing the doctrine out in defence of authority, than we were in bringing it out in defence of the rights of the subject ? Are liberty and authority necessarily incompatible one with the other ? Or is it a blunder to derive both from the same source, and to suppose that what establishes the legitimacy of authority must needs establish also the legitimacy of liberty ?

But is the doctrine of the divine origin and right of government hostile to liberty ? If government derives its existence and its right from God, it can have no power but such as God

delegates to it. But God is just, justice itself, and therefore can delegate to the government no power to do what is not just. Consequently, whenever a government exercises an unjust power, or its powers unjustly, it exceeds its delegated powers, and is a usurper, a tyrant, and as such forfeits its right to command. Its acts are lawless, because contrary to justice, and do not bind the subject, because he can be bound only by the law. If they do not bind, they are null, and the attempt to enforce obedience to them may be resisted. Is it difficult, then, to understand, that, while the doctrine asserts the obligation in conscience of obedience to legitimate authority, to the government as long as it does not command any thing unjust, it condemns all illegal authority, and deprives the government of its right to exact obedience the moment it ceases to be just? What is there in this hostile to liberty? Is my liberty abridged when I am required to obey justice? If so, be good enough to tell me whence I obtain the right to do wrong.

Modern politicians assert, in opposition to the sovereignty of God, the sovereignty of the people. The will of the people is with them the ultimate authority. Is it they or we who are the truest friends of liberty? Liberty cannot be conceived without justice, and wherever there is justice there is liberty. Liberty, then, must be secured just in proportion as we secure the reign of justice. This is done in proportion to the guaranties we have that the will which rules shall be a just will. Is there any one who will venture to institute a comparison between the will of the people and the will of God? No one? Then who can pretend that the doctrine which makes the will of the people the sovereign is as favorable to liberty as the doctrine which makes the will of God the sovereign? The will of God is always just, because the Divine will is never separable from the Divine reason; but the will of the people may be, and often is, unjust, for it is separable from that reason, the only fountain of justice. We make the government a government of law, because we found it on will and reason; these modern politicians make it one of mere will, for they have no assurance that the will of the people will always be informed by reason. By what right, then, do they who maintain the very essence of despotism charge us with being hostile to liberty? Wherefore should we not, as we do, denounce them as the enemies, nay, the assassins of liberty, — men who salute her, and at the same instant smite her under the fifth rib?

But, it is gravely argued, if you deny the popular origin and

right of government, you are a monarchist or an aristocrat. We deny the conclusion. If people would pay a little attention to what we actually say, before conjuring up their objections, they would, perhaps, reason less illogically. We raise no question between the sovereignty of kings and nobles and that of the people. What we deny is the *human* origin and right of government. We deny all undelegated sovereignty on earth, whether predicated of the king, the nobility, or the people. The question we are discussing lies a little deeper and a little farther back than our modern politicians are aware. They are political atheists, and recognize for the state no power above the people; we are Christians, and hold that all power, that is, all legal authority, is from God; therefore we deny that kings, nobilities, or the people have any authority in their own right, and maintain that the state itself, however constituted, has only a delegated authority, and no underived sovereignty. They place the people back of the state, and maintain that it derives all its powers from the people, and is therefore bound to do their will; we tell them that the people themselves are not ultimate, — have no power to delegate, except the power which Almighty God delegates to them, and this power they, as trustees, are bound to exercise according to his will, and are, therefore, not free to exercise it according to their own. They are desirous mainly of getting rid of kings and nobles, and, to do so, they assert the sovereignty of the popular will; we wish to get rid of despotism and to guard against all unjust government, and we assert the sovereignty of God over kings, nobles, and people, as well as over simple private consciences. Is this unintelligible? Who, then, is the party hostile to liberty?

But, reply these same politicians, we do not mean to deny the sovereignty of God; we only mean that the authority he delegates is delegated to the people, and not to the king or the nobility. If by people you understand the people as the nation with its political faculties and organs, and not the people as mere isolated individuals, who disputes you? Who denies that kings and nobilities hold their powers, if not from, at least for, the people, and forfeit them the moment they refuse to exercise them for the common good of the people? What are you dreaming of? Do you suppose all men have lost their senses because you have lost yours? Who born and brought up under a republic, who acquainted with and embracing the teachings of Catholic theologians, is likely to hold the slavish

doctrine, that the people are for the government, not the government for the people? Do you suppose that the republican and Catholic advocate the divine right of kings, and passive obedience, — the invention of Protestant divines, set forth and defended by that pedantic Scotchman, the so-called English Solomon? Who that has meditated on the saying of our Blessed Lord, "Let him that would be greatest among you be your servant," can hold that a prince receives power, or has any right to power, but for the public good? We do not deny the responsibility of kings and nobles to the nation, or that the nation may, under certain circumstances, and observing certain forms, call them to an account of their stewardship. But if this removes your objections to our doctrine, it by no means removes ours to yours. We complain of you, not because you make princes responsible to the people, that is, to the nation, but because you leave the people irresponsible, and make them subject to no law but their own will. You simply transfer the despotism from the one or the few to the many, and deny liberty by resting in the arbitrary will of the people. You stop with the people, and, if you do not deny, you at least fail to assert, the sovereignty of God; you tell them their will is sovereign, without adding that they have only a delegated sovereignty, and are bound to exercise it in strict accordance with and obedience to the will of God. Here is your original sin. On your ground, no provision is made for liberty, none for resistance to tyranny, without resorting to the revolutionary principle, the pretended right to resist legitimate government, a contradiction in terms, and alike hostile to liberty and to authority. On our ground, the right to resist tyranny or oppression is secured without detriment to legitimate government; because the prince who transgresses his authority and betrays his trust forfeits his rights, and having lost his rights, he ceases to be sacred and inviolable.

But we are told, once more, that practically it can make no difference whether we say the will of God is sovereign, or the will of the people; for the will of the people is the true expression of the will of God, according to the maxim, *Vox populi, vox Dei*. We deny it. The will of God is eternal and immutable justice, which the will of the people is not. The people may and do often actually do wrong. We have no more confidence in the assertion, "The people can do no wrong," than we have in its brother fiction, "The king can do no wrong." The people must be taken either as individuals or

as the state. As individuals, they certainly are neither infallible nor impeccable. As the state, they are only the aggregate of individuals. And are we to be told, that from an aggregation of fallibles we can obtain infallibility? Show us a promise from Almighty God, made to the people in one capacity or the other, that he will preserve them from error and injustice, before you talk to us of their infallibility. The people in their collective capacity, that is, the state popularly constituted, never surpass the general average of the wisdom and virtue of the same people taken individually; and as this falls infinitely below infallibility, let us hear no more of the infallibility of the people. For very shame's sake, after denying, as most of you do, the possibility of an infallible Church immediately constituted and assisted by Infinite Wisdom, do not stultify yourselves by coming forward now to assert the infallibility of the people. If the people are infallible, what need of constitutions to protect minorities, and of contrivances for the security of individual liberty, which even we in our land of universal suffrage find to be indispensable?

But we return to our original position. All power is of God. By him kings reign and princes decree just things. Government is a sacred trust from him, to be exercised according to his will, for the public good. The government which he in his providence has instituted for a people, and which confines itself to its delegated powers, for the true end of government, is legitimate government, whatever its form, and cannot be resisted without sin. But the government which is arbitrarily imposed upon a people, or which betrays its trust, or usurps powers seriously to the injury of its subjects, is illegitimate, and has no claim to our allegiance. Such a government may be lawfully resisted, and sometimes to resist it becomes an imperative duty.

But who is to decide whether the actual government has transcended its powers, and whether the case has occurred when we are permitted or bound to resist it? This is a grave question, because, if the fact of illegitimacy be not established by some competent authority, they who resist run the hazard of resisting legitimate government, and of ruining both their own souls and their country. Evidently the individual is not to decide for himself by his own private judgment; for that would leave every one free to resist the government whenever he should choose, which would be whenever it should command any thing not to his liking. If he had the right thus to

resist, the government would have no right to coerce his obedience, and there would be an end of all government. Evidently, again, not the people, for we must take the people either as the state, or as outside of the state. Outside of the state they are simple individuals, and, as we have seen, have not, and cannot have, the right to decide. As the state, they have no faculties and no organs but the government which is to be judged, and therefore can neither form nor express a judgment. Who, then? Evidently the power whose function it is to declare the law of God. Since the government derives its authority from God, and is amenable to his law, evidently it can be tried only under that law, and before a court which has authority to declare it, and to pronounce judgment accordingly.

But what shall be done in case there be no such court of competent jurisdiction? We reject the supposition. Almighty God could never give a law without instituting a court to declare it, and to judge of its infractions. We, as Catholics, know what and where that court is, and therefore cannot be embarrassed by the question. If there are nations who have no such court, or who refuse to recognize the one Almighty God has established, that is their affair, not ours, and they, not we, are responsible for the embarrassments to which they are subjected. They, undoubtedly, are obliged either to assert passive obedience and non-resistance, or to deny the legitimacy of any government by asserting the right of revolution; that is, they have no alternative but anarchy or despotism, as their history proves. But this is not our fault. We are not aware that we are obliged to exclude God and his Church from our politics in order to accommodate ourselves to those who blaspheme the one and revile the other. We are not aware that we are obliged to renounce our reason, and reject the lessons of experience, because, if we admit them, they prove that Almighty God has made his Church essential to the maintenance of civil authority on the one hand, and of civil liberty on the other, — because they prove that the state can succeed no better than the individual, without religion. We have never supposed that a man could be a Christian and exclude God from the state, and we have no disposition to concede, or to undertake to prove, that he can be. If the Church is necessary as a teacher of piety and morals, she must be necessary to decide the moral questions which arise between prince and prince, and between prince and subject, and to maintain the contrary is only to contradict one's self. Politics are nothing but a branch of gen-

eral ethics, and ethics are simply practical theology. If there is any recognized authority in theology, that authority must have jurisdiction of every ethical question, that is, every question which involves considerations of right and wrong, in whatever department of life they may arise. You may fight against this as you please, but you cannot change the unalterable nature of things. It is useless as well as hard to kick against the pricks. The question of resistance, as we have shown in the preceding article, presents a case of conscience, a moral question, and as such belongs by its very nature to the spiritual order, and then necessarily falls under the jurisdiction of the legitimate representative of that order. All the great principles of politics and law are ethical, and treated as such by both Catholic and Protestant theologians. How, then, can we dispense with the agency of the Church in politics, any more than in private morals or in faith itself? And are we to forego civil government, are we to submit passively to tyrants, or to rush into anarchy, because the madness or blindness of others leaves them no other alternative? Must we reject or refrain from using the infallible means which we possess for determining what is the law of God, because others discard them and attempt to get on without them? Must we strip ourselves and run naked through the streets, because some of our brethren obstinately persist in being Adamites? Really, this were asking too much of us.

But let no one be frightened out of his propriety, for we really say no more for our Church than every sectarian claims for his sect, — no more in principle than was claimed last year by the Presbyterians, when they officially condemned the Mexican war, or by the Unitarians, when, as officially as was possible with their organization, or want of organization, they did the same. The Church, in the case we have supposed, decides only the morality or immorality of the act done or proposed to be done. And is there a Protestant who belongs to what is called a church who does not take his church as his moral teacher? When Philip of Hesse found his wife unsatisfactory to him, and wished to take unto himself another, did he not submit the question to Luther and the pastors of his new religion? What are your Protestant ministers, if not, in your estimation, among other things, teachers of morals? And in case of doubt, to whom would you apply for its resolution but to your church, such as it is? Do you say you would not? To whom, then? To your politicians? What! do you

regard politicians as safer moral guides than your pastors ? To the state ? So you hold the state more competent to decide questions of morals than your church ! But the state is the party accused ; would you suffer it to be judge in its own cause ? Then you are at its mercy, and are a slave. Trust your own judgment ? But you are a party interested, and what right have you to be judge in your own cause ?

The fact is, every man who admits religion at all must admit its jurisdiction over all moral questions, whether in their individual or in their social application, and therefore does and must defer in them to that authority which represents for him the spiritual order. The state has no commission as a teacher of morals or as a director of consciences, and unless you blend church and state, and absorb the spiritual in the temporal, you cannot claim authority for the state in any strictly moral question. The theory of our own institutions is the utter incompetency of the state in spirituals. But spirituals include necessarily every question of right and wrong, whether under the natural law or the revealed law, — a fact too often overlooked, and not sufficiently considered by some even of our nominally Catholic politicians and newspaper-writers and editors. If this be so, the legitimate province of the state is restricted to matters which pertain to human prudence and social economy. Within the limits of the law of God, that is, providing it violate no precept of the natural or revealed law, it is, as we have said in our reply to Mr. Thornwell, independent and free to pursue the policy which human wisdom and prudence suggest as best adapted to secure the public good. To give it a wider province would be to claim for it a portion at least of that very authority which Protestants make it an offence in us to claim even for the Church of God. We claim here no temporal authority for the Church, but we do claim, and shall, as long as we retain our reason, continue to claim for her, under God, supreme and exclusive jurisdiction over all questions which pertain to the spiritual order.

The conservative doctrine which we have contended for, and which does not happen to please some of our readers, follows necessarily from this doctrine of the divine origin and right of government. No one particular form of government exists by divine right for every people, but every form so exists for the particular nation of which it is the established order. The established order, the constitution of the state, which God in his providence has given to a particular people, which is

coeval with that people, has grown up with it, and is identified with its whole public life, is the legitimate order, the legal constitution, and therefore sacred and inviolable. If sacred and inviolable, it must be preserved, and no changes or innovations, under the name of progress or reform, that would abolish or essentially alter it, or that would in any degree impair its free, vigorous, and healthy action, can be tolerated.

This is the doctrine we have maintained, and this is asserted to be hostile to liberty and favorable to despotism. However this may be, the doctrine is not a recent doctrine with us, not one which we have embraced for the first time since our conversion to Catholicity. We held and publicly maintained it during that period of our life when we were regarded as a liberalist, and denounced by our countrymen as a radical, a leveller, and a disorganizer. Thus, in October, 1838, we oppose it to the mad proceedings of the Abolitionists, and maintain that it is a sufficient reason for condemning those proceedings, that they are unconstitutional and revolutionary.

“We would acquit the Abolitionists, also, of all wish to change fundamentally the character of our institutions. They are not, at least the honest part of them, politicians; but very simple-minded men and women, who crave excitement, and seek it in Abolition meetings, and in getting up Abolition societies and petitions, instead of seeking it in ball-rooms, theatres, or places of fashionable amusement or dissipation. Politics, properly speaking, they abominate, because politics would require them to think, and they wish only to feel. Doubtless some of them are moved by generous sympathies, and a real regard for the well-being of the Negro; but the principal moving cause of their proceedings, after the craving for excitement, and perhaps notoriety, is the feeling that slavery is a national disgrace. Now this feeling, as we have shown, proceeds from a misconception of the real character of our institutions. This feeling can be justified only on the supposition that we are a consolidated republic. Its existence is therefore a proof, that, whatever be the conscious motives in the main of the Abolitionists, their proceedings strike against our Federal system.

“Well, what if they do? replies the Abolitionist. If Federalism, or the doctrine of State sovereignty, which you say is the American system of politics, prohibits us from laboring to free the slave, then down with it. Any system of government, any political relations, which prevent me from laboring to break the yoke of the oppressor and to set the captive free, is a wicked system, and ought to be destroyed. God disowns it, Christ disowns it, and man ought to disown it. If consolidation, if centralization, be the order that enables us to free the slave, then give us consolidation, give us

centralization. It is the true doctrine. It enables one to plead for the slave. The slave is crushed under his master's foot; the slave is dying; I see nothing but the slave; I hear nothing but the slave's cries for deliverance. Away with your paper barriers! away with your idle prating about State rights! clear the way! let me run to the slave! Any thing that frees the slave is right, is owned by God.

"We express here the sentiment and use very nearly the language of the Abolitionists. They have no respect for government as such. They, indeed, are fast adopting the ultra-radical doctrine, that all government is founded in usurpation, and is an evil which all true Christians must labor to abolish. They have, at least some of them, nominated Jesus Christ to be President of the United States; as much as to say, in the only practical sense to be given the nomination, that there shall be no President of the United States but an idea, and an idea without any visible embodiment; which is merely contending, in other words, that there shall be no visible government, no political institutions whatever. They have fixed their minds on a given object, and, finding that the political institutions of the country and the laws of the land are against them, they deny the legitimacy of all laws and of all political institutions. Let them carry their doctrines out, and it is easy to see that a most radical revolution in the institutions of the country must be the result.

"Now, we ask, has a revolution become necessary? Is it no longer possible to labor for the progress of Humanity in this country, without changing entirely the character of our political institutions? Must we change our Federal system, destroy the existing relations between the States and the Union and between the States themselves? Nay, must we destroy all outward, visible government, abolish all laws, and leave the community in the state in which the Jews were, when 'there was no king in Israel, and every man did that which was right in his own eyes'? We put these questions in soberness, and with a deep feeling of their magnitude. The Abolition ranks are full of insane dreamers, and fuller yet of men and women ready to undertake to realize any dream, however insane, and at any expense. We ask, therefore, these questions with solemnity, and with fearful forebodings for our country. We rarely fear, we rarely tremble at the prospect of evil to come. The habitual state of our own mind is that of serene trust in the future; and if in this respect we are thought to have a fault, it is in being too sanguine, in hoping too much. But we confess, the proceedings of the Abolitionists, coupled with their vague speculations and their crude notions, do fill us with lively alarm, and make us apprehend danger to our beloved country. We beg, in the name of God and of man, the Aboli-

tionists to pause, and if they love liberty, ask themselves what liberty has, in the long run, to gain by overthrowing the system of government we have established, by effecting a revolution in the very foundation of our Federal system.

"For ourselves, we have accepted with our whole heart the political system adopted by our fathers. . . . We take the American political system as our starting-point, as our primitive data, and we repulse whatever is repugnant to it, and accept, demand, whatever is essential to its preservation. We take our stand on the Idea of our institutions, and labor with all our soul to realize and develop it. As a lover of our race, as the devoted friend of liberty, of the progress of mankind, we feel that we must, in this country, be *conservative*, not *radical*. If we demand the elevation of labor and the laboring classes, we do it only in accordance with our institutions and for the purpose of preserving them, by removing all discrepancy between their spirit and the social habits and condition of the people on whom they are to act and to whose keeping they are intrusted. We demand reform only for the purpose of preserving American institutions in their real character; and we can tolerate no changes, no innovations, no alleged improvements, not introduced in strict accordance with the relations which do subsist between the States and the Union and between the States themselves. Here is our political creed. More power in the Federal government than was given it by the Convention which framed the Constitution would be dangerous to the States, and with less power the Federal government would not be able to subsist. We take it, then, as it is. The fact, that any given measure is necessary to preserve it as it is, is a sufficient reason for adopting that measure; the fact, that a given measure is opposed to it as it is, and has a tendency to increase or diminish its power, is a sufficient reason for rejecting that measure." — *The Boston Quarterly Review*, 1838, Vol. I. pp. 492 – 495.

The same doctrine we had inculcated in the *Review* for the previous July of the same year.

"Our government, in its measures and practical character, should conform as strictly as possible to the ideal or theory of our institutions. Nobody, we trust, is prepared for a revolution; nobody, we also trust, is bold enough to avow a wish to depart very widely from the fundamental principles of our institutions; and everybody will admit that the statesman should study to preserve those institutions in their simplicity and integrity, and should seek, in every law or measure he proposes, merely to bring out their practical worth, and secure the ends for which they were established. Their spirit should dictate every legislative enactment, every judicial decision, and every executive measure. Any law

not in harmony with their genius, any measure which would be likely to disturb the nicely adjusted balance of their respective powers, or that would give them, in their practical operation, a character essentially different from the one they were originally intended to have, should be discountenanced, and never for a single moment entertained.

"We would not be understood to be absolutely opposed to all innovations or changes, whatever their character. It is true, we can never consent to disturb the settled order of a state, without strong and urgent reasons; but we can conceive of cases in which we should deem it our duty to demand a revolution. When a government has outlived its idea, and the institutions of a country no longer bear any relation to the prevailing habits, thoughts, and sentiments of the people, and have become a mere dead carcass, an encumbrance, an offence, we can call loudly for a revolution, and behold with comparative coolness its terrible doings. But such a case does not as yet present itself here. Our institutions are all young, full of life and the future. Here, we cannot be revolutionists. Here, we can tolerate no innovations, no changes, which touch fundamental laws. None are admissible but such as are needed to preserve our institutions in their original character, to bring out their concealed beauty, to clear the field for their free operation, and to give more directness and force to their legitimate activity. Every measure must be in harmony with them, grow, as it were, out of them, and be but a development of their fundamental laws." — Vol. I. pp. 334, 335.

Undoubtedly, we here recognize a case in which a revolution would be justifiable; but not a case in which it would be lawful to subvert the constitution; for the case supposed is one in which the constitution has already been subverted, — ceased to be living and operative. The doctrine is nowise different from our present doctrine on the subject, only what we called revolution then we should call by another name now. The movements of a people to depose the tyrant, to throw off the illegitimate and to restore the legitimate authority, are not a revolution in the sense in which we deny the right of revolution. It is essential to our idea of a revolution, that it should involve, in some respect, an effort or intention to subvert the legal authority of a state. If, for instance, it be conceded that Ireland is an integral part of the British empire, or rather, of the British state, an effort on the part of Irishmen to sever her from the British state, and erect her into an independent nation, would be revolutionary and unjustifiable. But if it be conceded that she is a separate state, that she has never

been merged in the British state, and has been bound to it only by a mutual compact, and if it be conceded or established that England has broken the compact or not complied with its conditions, a like effort at separation and independence would involve no revolutionary principle, and, if prudent or expedient, would be justifiable, even though it should lead to a fearful and protracted war between the two nations.

It is clear, however, from these extracts, that, as long ago as 1838, we were, in relation to our own country, decidedly conservative. Here is another extract from the same Review, for October, 1841, which proves that we, while still regarded as a radical, generalized it and extended it to all countries.

“In this matter of world-reforming, it is our misfortune to disagree with our radical brethren. The reforms which can be introduced into any one country are predetermined by its geographical position, the productions of its soil, and the genius of its people and of its existing institutions. Any reform which requires the introduction or the destruction of a fundamental element is precluded. All reforms must consist in, and be restricted to, clearing away anomalies and developing already admitted principles.” — Vol. iv. p. 532.

Here is the conservative doctrine stated as broadly and as distinctly as we state it now, and we could easily show that we entertained it at a much earlier date. Doubtless there are many things to be found in *The Boston Quarterly Review* not easily reconcilable with this doctrine; for we had not, at the time of conducting it, reduced all our ideas to a systematic and harmonious whole. Moreover, we wrote with less care than we do now; for we wrote more for the purpose of exciting thought than of establishing conclusions. But the discrepancies to be detected are in general more apparent than real; for we, unhappily, adopted the practice of using popular terms in an unpopular sense, which often gave us the appearance of advocating doctrines we by no means intended. Thus, we adopted the word *democracy*, but defined it in a sense of our own, very different from the popular sense. We did the same with many other terms. There was in this no intention to deceive. But we had a theory, — for in those times we were addicted to theorizing, — that the people used terms in a loose and vague sense, and that the business of the writer was to seize and define it, — to give in its precision what the people really mean by the term, if they could but explain their meaning to themselves. But we found by experience that we could not make

the people attend to our definitions, and that they would, in spite of them, continue to use the popular term in its popular sense, and that, if we wished to express another sense, or the same sense somewhat modified, we must select another term. The mistake we fell into is fallen into by many who are not so fortunate as to detect it. Some of our friends have tried to find fault with our views on liberty, when their own views were the same as ours. They use the word *liberty* in relations in which we avoid it; but they, in using it, fail to convey their real meaning. The popular mind understands by liberty something very different from what they do. It is necessary to select terms with a view of denying what we do not mean, as well as of expressing what we do mean. Many of the inconsistencies we have been charged with have grown out of our former neglect of this rule, and not a few of the changes we are supposed to have undergone are really nothing but changes in our terminology, made for the purpose of getting our real meaning out to public apprehension. But this by the way. Versatile as we may have been, we have always had certain fixed principles, and what they were may be known by noting what we have cast off in our advance towards manhood, and what we have retained and still retain. The conservative principle is evidently one of these, and as we undeniably held it when nobody dreamed of charging us with hostility to liberty, we cannot see why our holding it now should be construed into proof that we are on the side of despotism.

But let us look at the doctrine itself. People hold it objectionable, because they suppose it commands us to preserve old abuses and forbids us to labor for the progress of civilization. But in this they assume two things: — 1. That the legitimate constitution of a state is, or may be, an abuse; and, 2. That the progress of civilization is denied, if the right to subvert the constitution is denied.

The first involves a contradiction in terms. Nothing legal or legitimate is or can be an abuse. An abuse is a misuse of that which is legal. The abuse is always contrary to the constitution, or at least some departure from it; and consequently conservatism, or the preservation of the constitution, instead of requiring us to conserve the abuse, imperatively commands us to redress it; because, if not redressed, it may in time undermine and destroy the constitution itself.

The second is equally unfounded. The destruction of the constitution is the destruction of the state itself, its resolution

into anarchy or despotism, either of which is fatal to civilization. What should we think of the physician who should undertake to restore a man to health, or to increase his soundness and vigor, by destroying his constitution? What we should think of him is precisely what we ought to think of the statesman who seeks to advance civilization by subverting the constitution of the state. The progress of civilization is inconceivable without the progress of the state, and the progress of the state is inconceivable without the existence of the state. How, then, can the subversion, that is, the destruction, of the state tend to advance civilization? If you will listen either to common sense or to the lessons of experience, you will grant that revolutions tend only to throw men into barbarism and savagism. The passions they call forth are the lowest, fiercest, and most brutal of our nature, and your patriot so called, he who seeks to advance his country by destroying its constitution, is usually a tiger for his ferocity.

But it is said that the existing constitution is destroyed only in order to make way for a new and better organization of the state. When you have shown us an instance, in the whole history of the world, in which the destruction of an existing constitution of a state has been followed by the introduction and adoption of a new and better one, — better for the particular nation, we mean, — we will give up the point, acknowledge that we have been in this whole matter consummate fools, and become as mad revolutionists as the best of you. But such an instance cannot be found. How often must we tell you that a constitution cannot be made as one makes a wheelbarrow or a steam-engine, — that of the constitution we must say, as we say of the poet, "*Nascitur, non fit*"? It is generated, not constructed, and no human wisdom can give to a state its constitution. The experiment has often been tried, and has just as often failed. Shaftesbury and Locke tried it for the Carolinas. They failed. France tried it in her old revolution; she is trying it again. Her former experiment resulted in anarchy, military despotism, and the restoration; her present experiment in four short months has reached the military despotism. England has tried it, and sent out from her mills at home, along with her other manufactures, a constitution cut and dried for each of her colonies, and in what instance has the constitution not proved a curse to the colony for which it was made and on which it has been imposed? Who are these men who now come forward and ask us to credit them in spite

of philosophy, of common sense, uniform experience, and experiment? Surely they must be prodigies of modesty, or else count largely on our simplicity and credulity.

But we are referred to our own country, to the American Revolution. Be it so. In reply, we might refer to the Spanish American revolutions, as a case much more in point. But our own country is the case on which the modern revolutionists chiefly rely for their justification. We do not contest the right of the Anglo-American colonies to separate from the mother country; we are not the men to condemn the Congress of 1776; and we cheerfully concede the prosperity which has followed the separation. But what is called the American Revolution was no revolution in the sense in which we deny the right of revolution, and in it there was no subversion of the state, no destruction of the existing constitution, and no assertion of the right to destroy it. The colonies were held by compact to the crown of Great Britain. The tyranny of George the Third broke that compact, and absolved the colonies from their allegiance. Absolved from their allegiance to the crown, they were, *ipso facto*, sovereign states, and the war which followed was simply a war in defence of their independence as such states. No abuse of terms can convert such a war into a revolutionary war. Then there was no civil revolution. The internal state of the colonies was not dissolved, and there was no war on the constitution of the American states. They retained substantially the very political constitutions with which they commenced, and retain them up to this moment. We have never undergone a revolution in any sense like the European revolutions which have followed since the war of our independence. Slight alterations have from time to time been, wisely or unwisely, effected in the State constitutions, but none which have struck at essential principles.

Nor was the formation of our Federal Constitution any thing like what the French National Assembly are attempting. It was similar in its character to what the German Diet at Frankfort have just done, or are still engaged in doing. It was not making and giving a constitution to a people who had just overthrown an old government, destroyed the old constitution, and resolved the state into its original elements, but was the act of free, sovereign states, already constituted, and exercising all the faculties of sovereign states. Here are vast differences, which are too often overlooked, and which should prevent our conduct in throwing off the crown of Great Britain and forming

the Federal Union from being regarded as a precedent for those who would destroy an existing constitution for the purpose of reorganizing the state. We never did any thing of the sort, and from the fact that the result of what we did do has been great national prosperity it cannot be inferred that such will be the result of revolutions in the European states. Revolutionists both at home and abroad, especially abroad, do not sufficiently consider the wide difference between colonies already existing as bodies politic, exercising nearly all the functions of government, separating themselves politically, under the authority of their local governments, from the mother country, and setting up for themselves, and the insurrection of the mob against the existing constitution, destroying it, and attempting to replace it by one of their own making. We were children come to our majority, leaving our father's house to become heads of establishments of our own ; the revolutionists are parricides, who knock their aged parent in the head or cut his throat in order to possess themselves of the homestead.

But however this may be, it is clear that the doctrine we put forth is not favorable to despotism ; for despotism is as destructive of the legitimate constitution as revolutionism in favor of what is called Liberalism. Radicalism and despotism are only two phases of one and the same thing. Despotism is radicalism in place ; radicalism is despotism out of place. Both are unconstitutional, and to preserve the constitution requires us to oppose the one as much as the other. Liberty demands the supremacy of the law, and law is will regulated by reason, restrained by justice ; and to preserve law in this sense, we must resist every attempt, come it from what quarter it may, to substitute for it the government of arbitrary will.

Nobody denies the right to correct abuses. The doctrine we set forth not only concedes our right to correct abuses, but makes it, as we have seen, our duty to correct them. All that it forbids is our right to correct them by illegal, and therefore unjustifiable means. We must obey the law in correcting the abuses of the law, the constitution in repelling its enemies. This restriction is just, and good ends are never attainable by unjust means. Needs it be said again and again, that iniquity can never lead to justice, tyranny to liberty ? But observing this restriction, you may go as far as you please. The doctrine we contend for does not, indeed, allow you to change a legal monarchy into a democracy, nor a democracy, where it is the legal order, as with us, into a monarchy ; but it does

allow you to change the individuals intrusted with the administration of the government. Kings, as long as they reign justly, reign by divine right ; and in this sense, and in no other, we accept the doctrine of the divine right of kings ; but when they cease to reign justly, become tyrannical and oppressive, they forfeit their rights, and the authority reverts to the nation, to be exercised, however, in accordance with its fundamental constitution. The nation may depose the tyrant, even dispossess, for sufficient reasons, the reigning family, and call a new dynasty to the throne ; for no nation can be rightfully the property of a prince, or of a family, or bound to submit to eternal slavery. Thus far we go ; for we hold with the great Catholic authorities, that the king is not in reigning, but in reigning justly.

But we have said enough to vindicate our doctrine from the charge of being hostile to liberty and favorable to despotism. We yield to no man in our love of liberty, but we have always felt that just ends are more easily gained by just than by unjust means, and that the truth is much more effectually defended by arguments drawn from sound than from unsound principles. It is not that we are indifferent to liberty, but that we reject the grounds on which modern politicians defend it, and disapprove of the means by which they seek to secure it. We have shown that those grounds are untenable, and that those means are fitted only to defeat the end for which they are adopted. He who wants more than justice will give him what he cannot have without injustice to others. Our doctrine will satisfy no such man, and we should be satisfied with no doctrine that would. He who wishes for liberty without obedience to law wishes for what never has been and never can be. An authority which does not restrain, which is only an instrument to be used when it serves our purpose, and to be cast off the moment it can no longer serve it, is no legitimate authority, is not a government at all. If we have government, it must govern, and we must obey it, even when to obey it may be a restraint on our private feelings and passions, for it is only at this price that we can purchase immunity from the private feelings and passions of others. Nothing is, then, in reality more unwise than to cherish an impatience of restraint and a spirit of insubordination. The sooner we learn the difficult lesson of obedience, the better will it be for us. We cannot, if we would, have every thing our own way ; and perhaps it would not be to our advantage, if we could. Life has, and as long as the world

stands will have, its trials, and, however impatient we may be, there is and will be much which we can conquer only by learning to bear it. It is easy to stir up a revolution, to subvert a throne or a dynasty; but to reëstablish order, to readjust the relations of man with man, of prince with subject and subject with prince, so as to remove all evils and satisfy every wish, — this is labor, this is work, which no mortal man has ever yet been equal to. A man could lose paradise, bring sin, death, and all our woe into the world; only a God could repair the damage, and restore us to the heaven we had forfeited.

Our doctrine, just at this moment, may be unpopular, and we know it will put no money into our pocket, and bring us no applause; but this is not our fault, nor a reason why we should withhold it. Having never yet pandered to popular prejudices, or sought to derive profit from popular passions and fallacies, we shall not attempt to do it now. We love our country, perhaps, as much as some others who make much more parade of their patriotism; and we love liberty, it may be, as well, and are likely to serve it as effectually, as our young revolutionists in whom reason “sleeps and declamation roars.” We have, indeed, a tolerable pair of lungs, and if not a musical, at least a strong voice; we know and could use all the commonplaces of our young patriots and reformers, — nay, we think we could, if we were to try, beat them at their own trade, grave and staid as we have become; but we have no disposition to enter the lists with them. We have never seen any good come from the declamatory speeches and fiery patriotism of boys just escaped the ferule of the pedagogue, and who can give utterance to nothing but puerile rant about liberty and patriotism. We have never seen good come to a country whose counsellors were young men with downy chins, and we set it down as a rule, that the country in which they can take the lead, whatever else it is fitted for, is not fitted for the liberty which comes through popular institutions.

We can weep as well as our juniors over a nation robbed of its rights, on whose palpitating heart is planted the iron heel of the conqueror, and have the will, if not the power, to strike, if we can but see a vulnerable spot, or a chance that the blow will tell upon the tyrant. But, as a general thing, we have a great distaste for the valor that evaporates in words, though they be great and high-sounding words, well chosen, skilfully arranged, and admirably pronounced; and an equal distaste even for deeds which recoil upon the actor, and aggravate his sufferings,

already too afflicting to behold. We believe it wise to bide one's time, and to take counsel of prudence. In most cases, the sufferings of a people spring from moral causes beyond the reach of civil government, and they are rarely the best patriots who paint them in the most vivid colors, and rouse up popular indignation against the civil authorities. Much more effectual service could be rendered in a more quiet and peaceful way, by each one seeking, in his own immediate sphere, to remove the moral causes of the evils endured. St. Vincent of Paul was a far wiser and more successful patriot than the greatest of your popular orators, declaimers, and songsters. He, humble-minded priest, had no ambition to shine, no splendid scheme of world or state reform. He thought only of saving his own soul, by doing the work that lay next him; and he became the benefactor of his age and his country, and in his noble institutions of charity he still lives, and each year extends his influence and adds to the millions who are recipients of his bounty. O ye who would serve your country, relieve the suffering, solace the afflicted, and right the wronged, go imitate St. Vincent of Paul, and Heaven will own you and posterity revere you.

ART. III. — *Grantley Manor. A Tale.* By LADY GEORGIANA FULLERTON, Author of "Ellen Middleton." New York: Appleton & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 320.

THIS work has been well spoken of by the reviewers, and the public, we believe, has given it a favorable reception. It possesses more than ordinary interest, and bears the marks of genius and power. We have rarely read a novel written by a lady which indicated more ability or contained less that was extravagant or offensive. For inveterate novel-readers, who *will* read novels, at whatever risk to the strength of their characters or the salvation of their souls, we agree with our esteemed friend of the *New York Freeman's Journal*, that it is as unobjectionable as any that can be easily selected, and to those who *must* have their feelings harrowed up by fictitious woe it may even be commended.

Judging from the work before us, Lady Fullerton is a gifted and highly cultivated woman, endowed with fine powers of ob-

servation, and possessing very considerable knowledge of the human heart, and mastery over its passions. Her characters are drawn with freedom and delicacy, within the bounds of nature, and with a nearer approach to individuality, as in Margaret and old Mrs. Thornton, than is common save in authors of the very highest rank. She intersperses her work with many wise and just, if not profound and original, remarks, and hits off many of the petty vices, annoyances, and foibles of conventional and every-day life not unsuccessfully. In a purely literary point of view, we may object, however, a too visible effort at intense writing, a want of calmness and repose, and the attempt to give us a vivid impression of the exquisite beauty of her heroines by dissecting and limning it feature by feature, instead of leaving it to be depicted by the imagination of her readers from the effects it is seen to produce on those within the sphere of its influence, — the common faults of modern novelists, which prove, not their strength, but their weakness. There is, also, too much sighing, weeping, and shedding of floods of tears, as well as too much embracing, kissing of hands, foreheads, cheeks, &c., &c. The latter might have been left to the experience or the imagination of the reader, and the former should have been relieved. We are as loath to see literature as beauty in tears, which add to the charm in the one case no more than in the other. Give us the merry and joyous literature, not the sad and doleful.

But we have graver faults to find with *Grantley Manor*. If it had been written by an author not professedly of our religion, but by a fair-minded Protestant, wishing to diminish the prejudices against Catholicity, and to show that it may be very nearly as respectable as Anglicanism, Methodism, or Presbyterianism, we could not find it in our heart to criticize it with much severity or at any great length. We could pardon its insults to our holy religion for the sake of the obviously benevolent intentions of the author. Readers would, moreover, be on their guard, and its mistakes or misrepresentations would be comparatively harmless. But Lady Fullerton some time since conformed, we can hardly say was converted, to the Church, and it is evident from her book that she professes to be a Catholic. We have, then, the right, and, as Catholic reviewers, are bound, to test her work by the Catholic standard. Tried by that standard, it is, unquestionably, in many respects deficient, and in some highly offensive.

It may be alleged, that Lady Fullerton is a popular writer,

that she does not profess to write what is technically termed a Catholic novel, and we have, therefore, no right to exact of her a theological tract, ascetic or dogmatic. To the principle of this plea we do not object. We certainly do not complain that *Grantley Manor* is not more theological; for, as our readers well know, we are far from being partial to novels which mingle a treatise on theology with a tale of profane love. We complain, not that her *Ladyship* has abstained from theology, but that she has not abstained, — not that she has *not* introduced religious topics, but that she *has* introduced them, and in a false light, so as to mislead her readers, unless they happen to be well instructed, and strictly on their guard. She brings religion upon the scene; she makes Catholics and Protestants, as such, actors in her plot; and it has obviously been a leading purpose with her to exhibit the Catholic spirit in its relations with Protestants, and to show the practical effects of Catholicity in forming the minds and hearts, and in prompting and directing the conduct, of those brought up under its influence. Religion is the atmosphere in which she breathes and moves; it is the chief power on which she relies; it is the mainspring of her dramatic action; and on no recognized principles of criticism can she withdraw her work from the standard by which professedly Catholic works are to be judged. She not only introduces the Catholic religion, but she approves in her Catholic characters, from first to last, things which the Church abominates, and appears to commend them for things which even her catechism would teach her the Church positively forbids. Here, then, are sins, not of omission merely, as the plea in her defence assumes, but sins of commission, for which, as an author, she is answerable at the bar of Catholicity.

It may also be alleged, in extenuation, that we must not be severe upon slight errors and inaccuracies in popular works, — that we are not to expect from a popular author, like Lady Fullerton, the knowledge and accuracy of a doctor in theology, or an experienced master of novices. But we cannot accept the principle of this new plea. Errors and inaccuracies are less excusable in popular writers than in others, and if her *Ladyship* was not well enough instructed in her religion to be able to avoid them, she had no business to introduce it. Who compelled her to touch upon religious topics, or to write upon matters of which she knew nothing? If she could not state her religion with accuracy and precision, what right had she to attempt to state it at all? It is enough to have our holy

religion misrepresented and falsified by its enemies, without having it travestied by its professed friends. No doubt, the author thought she was breathing the living soul of Catholicity into her novel, and, while seeking to interest or amuse the public, she would be rendering a service to the cause of Catholic faith and piety. But she reckoned beyond her means. She was too recently from the ranks of heresy. Her Catholicity is evidently not genuine, and her book reminds us of the *Nibelungen-Lied*, the national epic of the Germans, — a pagan story, conceived in the true pagan spirit, and transmitted, body and soul, from pagan times, but dressed out, by some half-convert of the thirteenth century, in a Christian garb. The *Nibelungens* are genuine pagans, only they hear Mass and bless themselves after the Christian fashion. So is *Grantley Manor* a Protestant tale, conceived and executed in a Protestant spirit, and will find few admirers except among Protestants, and Catholics who, from breathing the atmosphere of heresy and the study of heretical literature, are themselves more than half Protestant. Its Catholics are amiable, cultivated, and respectable Puseyites, who happen to have been born and brought up under the *Roman* instead of the *Anglican* "Branch" of the Church.

The author appears to proceed on the assumption, not uncommon, as we have observed, with converts from Anglicanism, that we and Anglicans embrace a common Christianity; that up to a certain point they and we are of one and the same religion; that they are perfectly right, as far as they go; and that, with two or three additional dogmas from us, accepted purely as additions to their present creed, they would be thoroughly and unexceptionably orthodox. Thus, she makes her Catholic heroine tell her Protestant sister that they have certain prayers in common, — the Lord's Prayer, for instance, — which they may say together. Thus, too, she makes a respectable Puseyite gentleman the organ of her Catholic instructions and advice in the formation of character and the conduct of life. Ginevra, the Catholic sister, asks, in her hour of trial, her Protestant friends to pray for her, that her faith fail not, and is made to take, distinctly and gravely, the ground, that we sympathize with Protestants as Christians, and trust that God, by extraordinary interior inspirations, will supply their external doctrinal deficiencies. Now we need not say that all this is false, and, to a Catholic, exceedingly nauseous. Between us and Anglicans, or any Protestant sect, there is nothing in common but reason and nature, but our common humanity. The

notion, that there is a common Christianity, common to the Church and the sects, except in a very loose way of speaking, is a grave mistake. Christianity is a fact, and that fact is the Church. The Church is herself Christianity, and without her there is no Christianity. We do not come to the Church through Christianity, but we come to Christianity, if at all, through the Church. There is nothing distinctly Christian, in its Christian sense, which we and Anglicans, or any Protestant sect, can be said to believe in common ; for whoever denies any one dogma or proposition of faith denies, and must be held to deny, the whole. We cannot, either in our private or our public devotions, worship in common with those external to the Church ; for there is no common worship between them and us, no book of *common prayer* which they and we acknowledge ; and we are forbidden to hold communion with them *in sacris*. We cannot ask a heretic to pray for us, for he is an enemy to God ; and what greater affront can we offer to the Majesty of heaven than to despatch to his court his enemy to intercede for us ? Heretics are children of Satan, not children of God, and we may as well ask the father as the children to pray for us. Only think of a Catholic asking the Devil to pray God for him, that his faith fail not ! Certainly, we are bound to love those out of, as well as those in, the Church ; certainly, we must do them all the real service in our power, and never cease to pray for their temporal and spiritual welfare ; but we must never forget that they are not members of the household of faith, and that we can have no religious communion or fellowship with them.

Will you tell us that we have no right to judge the secrets of the heart, and to pronounce every one who is in a communion external to the Church an enemy of God ? Be it so, if you wish. But you have just as little right to judge the secrets of the heart and to pronounce one in such a communion the friend of God. Nay, if it comes to that, not so much. In regard to those in the Church, we must presume them to be friends of God, unless the contrary is established. But the case is the reverse in regard to those out of the Church. Out of the Church no one can ever be saved, and yet all who are not the enemies of God will be saved, as is certain. All, then, out of the Church are certainly the enemies of God. All who are in heretical or schismatical communions are, at least, presumptively out of the Church. Then, whatever extent you give, in your excessive liberality, to invincible ignorance, —

which you seem at times to make far more desirable than knowledge of the truth, — you are bound to presume all out of the visible communion of the Church, in communions external to her, to be, in fact, enemies of God, and to be treated as such, until the contrary is proved, which cannot be without a special revelation. Not one of us who are in the Church can know, without such revelation, whether we “deserve love or hatred,” and then, *a fortiori*, not that those out of the Church deserve love. The rashness, if any in the case, is not, then, in our presuming that those in communions alien to the Church are enemies of God, and in treating them as such, but in your presuming them without evidence to be the friends of God, with whom you are free to commune in sacred things. It is you who undertake to judge the secrets of the heart in such cases, not we.

We do not pretend to fathom the secret counsels of the Almighty, or to set bounds to his mercy ; and it is in the salvation of our brethren, not in their condemnation, that we take pleasure. But we cannot know beyond what we are taught. What extraordinary means Almighty God has in reserve for the salvation of those who fail to use the ordinary means, though living all their lifetime within sound of the Church’s voice, we cannot pretend to say ; for the fact that there are any such means is not revealed, and we are ignorant of our right to assume even their possibility, much more our right to presume on them for ourselves, or for our friends who apparently live and die in heretical or schismatical communions. We, as Catholics, are restricted to the ordinary means, to what God has revealed, and these are all the means that we know or can assert. How can we, then, hold out to Protestants the hope, that, though neglecting the ordinary means, Almighty God will in their behalf employ extraordinary means for their salvation, as if he owed them a reward for their perversity, or as if he loved them better than his own Catholic children, and will do altogether more for them ? This were uncharitable to them, and hardly just to ourselves.

Lady Fullerton has no doubt wished, in this her first publication since her reconciliation to the Church, to manifest her continued regard for her former friends, and to convince them that she is as amiable, as indulgent, and as friendly to them as she was before, — in a word, to prove to them, that, if she has become a Catholic, she has by no means become a bigot. All this may be very well, as it affects her Ladyship’s private

relations. We, certainly, have no wish to see a convert, the moment he has entered the Church, proving himself harsh and bitter towards his former associates, and insensible to their many amiable qualities as men and women, or to the many admirable human virtues which, in cases not a few, adorn their private and public life. But there are some things which may be left to be taken for granted, and an overweening anxiety to make our former friends believe in our continued regard for them may sometimes tend to awaken suspicions to the contrary. Where there is no consciousness of any decrease in our love and esteem, there is generally no effort to disprove it. Innocence is usually unconscious. Unquestionably, our conversion denies to us the right, and, if thorough, the wish, to hold religious communion with the sect we have abandoned ; but we should pay but an indifferent compliment to our recently received faith, if we should regard it as necessary to prove that it does not render us harsh and bigoted, that it does not sour our tempers, but leaves us as mild, as gentle, as amiable, and as tenderly alive to the interests and feelings of those with whom we formerly associated as ever we were. The truth is, the convert has, as a Catholic, a tender regard for all men which was inconceivable to him before his conversion ; for, prior to his conversion, he never had any proper disposition towards God or man, never understood the worth of the human soul, nor the ground of his obligation to love his neighbour as himself.

Lady Fullerton has also wished, and with the best intentions in the world, no doubt, to recommend her religion as well as herself to her former friends ; and in order to do this, she appears to have studied to show them that the religion she has embraced is really not inferior to the one she has abandoned ; that, in fact, it differs far less from it than they suppose ; and that even they might embrace it without any fundamental change in their belief or their practice. We do not believe this the wisest or the most honest way of recommending our religion ; for the differences between us and Protestants are not few or slight ; they are many, fundamental, essential. If our only purpose, or our legitimate purpose, were to be suffered to live quietly amongst Protestants, to be permitted to worship in our own way without having our religion calumniated or our throats cut, — or if the great body of Protestants really loved the Church, and were anxious to see their way clear to return as faithful children to her communion, — it certainly would

be our policy and our duty to represent the differences between us and Protestants to be as few and as unimportant as we possibly could without sacrificing truth. But neither is the fact. We can never be indifferent to the salvation of our Protestant friends and neighbours ; we cannot proceed on the supposition, that these heretical sects are always to remain, and that our principal study is to avert their wrath and to secure their friendly regard. What we are to seek is not peace with them as they are, but their reconciliation to the Church. On this point what we must labor for is clear, and we cannot conceal it from Protestants, if we would. They know, as well as we, that our Church is propagandist in her very nature, that she seeks by spiritual means the subjection of all to her authority, and that in religious matters she tolerates no rival. We but disarm and expose ourselves to their contempt, if we are foolish enough to pretend the contrary. The Church has been commissioned to teach all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature, and she makes no secret of her constant intention and her untiring efforts to discharge with fidelity the high and solemn trust she has received. All the world knows this, and all the world would justly despise us, if we should seek to conceal or deny it. It is a thing not to be ashamed of, but to glory in.

Whatever may be the case with individual Protestants, the great body have no love for the Church, and would rather impede than clear the path for their return to her communion. They may be dissatisfied with their present position, but if so, it only embitters them against her. Their anxiety is not to return to her communion, but to remove farther and farther from it. Hence we see them almost universally rejecting the earlier forms of Protestantism, as not sufficiently removed from Catholicity ; and to prove to them that a proposition is Catholic, or coincident with what the Church teaches, is only to give them, in their estimation, a valid reason for not holding it. The more we show that a given form of Protestantism resembles Catholicity, the more do we prove to them that it is objectionable.

Our Puseyite friends, and some few of the converts from Puseyism, seem to us to mistake entirely the feeling of Protestants towards the Church. It is idle to suppose that Puseyism has penetrated far among them, or that it is, or is likely to be, a dominant tendency in the sects. The Puseyites have not in the remotest degree affected the state of the controversy be-

tween us and Protestants, save so far as themselves are concerned. Their views and dispositions are their own, not those of the Protestant community; their concessions bind only the individuals who make them, and are not available to us in controversies with Protestantism in general. We are willing that converts from Puseyism should address themselves specially to their former friends, if they choose; but they should be careful not to speak as if Puseyites were all the uncatholic world worth counting, and not to make concessions or assume positions in order to operate on them which can only embarrass us in our efforts to operate favorably upon others. Puseyism was, in its origin, only a sectarian movement in the bosom of Anglicanism, and is already disowned by the Establishment, and followed in the very place of its birth, if report be true, by a decided reaction in favor of Rationalism. The Anglican Establishment is farther removed from Catholicity at the present moment than it has been before for many years. Puseyism is virtually dead and buried, and there is for it no resurrection. The conversion of its principal originators has proved its insufficiency as a final movement, and placed the whole Protestant world on their guard against it as a provisional movement. There is little use in writing and publishing works fitted only to the dozen or two of mourners who still linger around its grave. We must consult and adapt ourselves to the main body of Protestants in their onward movement, if we would exert any wide or permanent influence in recalling them to the paths of salvation.

There is, however it may be with here and there an individual of a peculiar temperament, no use, as it regards Protestants in general, in attempting to make the differences between them and us appear small and unimportant; for their wish is not to be as like, but as unlike, us as possible. Moreover, just in proportion as we diminish the apparent difference between them and us, and concede, that, in the affair of salvation, they are as well off as we, perhaps better off, — for we have and can have no hope of salvation save through the ordinary means, but they, if Lady Fullerton be right, may, failing the ordinary means, still hope to be saved by extraordinary means, — we give them reasons, not why they should become, but why they need not become, Catholics. We in this way work against their conversion, not for it; and still more endanger, instead of securing, their salvation. In our communications with individuals, we are, undoubtedly, to adapt ourselves, as far as truth

will warrant, to the mental and moral state of the particular individual we are addressing ; but when we address the public at large, we must consult the mental and moral state of the great body of Protestants. There is only one argument that will weigh with serious Protestants, — nay, there is only one that ought to weigh with them, — namely, that they cannot be saved, unless they become Catholics. The sooner our popular writers learn this and conform to it, and give up their namby-pambyism, the better will it be for all parties. We greatly underrate the intelligence of Protestants, if we suppose that, in Protestant countries, where all the worldly motives are in their favor, they can be generally induced to embrace our religion, if they understand us to concede that they need not despair of salvation in their own. What, except salvation, have we to offer them ? We must show them that we wish their conversion, because, in our view at least, salvation is impossible in their religion, or they will treat, as well they may, all we say with contempt. It is idle to suppose that they can be won over by a little commonplace morality, pretty sentiments, or even solemn chants and magnificent old cathedrals, or by arguments which merely prove, that, after all, Catholics are not much worse than Protestants. It is a poor recommendation of Catholicity, that it is not inferior to Puseyism ; for if it be not infinitely superior to that, or to any other form of religion, it should be rejected as a gigantic imposition upon mankind.

But while we insist on these things as necessary to be observed by every Catholic who writes with a view to induce Protestants to embrace our holy religion, we by no means wish to see them in a popular novel. Every thing in its time and place. Nothing disgusts us more than to see the novelist put on the doctor's cap, or assume the tone and port of the preacher. We do not wish every one who writes, no matter to what department of literature his work may belong, to be perpetually dinging in the ears of Protestants that they are heretics, and cannot be saved unless they come into the Church. We ourselves conduct an avowedly polemical work, — a work expressly devoted to the exposition and defence of Catholic faith and morals, — and we are obliged to bring out the truth, however stern and offensive it may be, and to wage war with error, let it manifest itself on what side it will. But every work is not expected to have the same special purpose, or to pursue the same special method. Many things may be said with perfect propriety in a work like ours, that would,

though true, be wholly misplaced in a popular novel. Popular literature should cultivate all the courtesies and amenities of civilized life ; it should be neither polemical nor denunciatory ; it should abstain from theological controversy, and avoid the introduction of those topics which cannot be freely and honestly treated without exciting prejudice or stirring up bitter feelings. All we ask of it, under the religious point of view, is, that the author should write simply so as to utter nothing inconsistent with our holy religion, or which can leave an uncatholic impression upon his readers. We shall be satisfied with it, if, in regard to religion, it maintains the negative merit of not being in any respect irreligious.

It is plain enough from Lady Fullerton's work, that she wished, while avoiding all religious controversy, to write a novel which, besides interesting or delighting the public, should silently exert a pure moral and religious influence upon the hearts of her readers. In this she was right, and seized the true idea of what we may term the moral tale or the serious novel. But she does not appear to have duly considered on what conditions such a work can be produced, if produced at all. She erred in supposing that she could, compatibly with her design, introduce Protestants and Catholics as joint actors in her plot. Wherever the two are introduced, in their distinctive character, the author must either make his work directly or indirectly controversial, or else represent both as belonging to the same great religious family, distinguished from each other only by minor shades of difference. The former Lady Fullerton wished to avoid ; the latter, as a Catholic, she was not permitted to do. Yet it is what she has done, and hence the objectionable character of her work. She was unhappy in the adoption of her plot. Her plot was, indeed, very well contrived for a controversial novel, or for displaying the respective merits of Catholicity and Protestantism by contrasting the one with the other ; but not for such a novel as she wished to write. She should, with her general design, have introduced no persons of a different religion from her own. She should have laid her scene in a Catholic country, and introduced only Catholic characters. If she wished to secure Protestant readers, she might have done it by throwing into the shade those features of Catholicity which are peculiarly offensive to strangers, and bringing out in a strong light those great moral and religious traits of character which never fail to command universal admiration. What we mean is, that, while silently

assuming, throughout, her own religion, she should have taken care not to introduce it or her characters as distinctively Catholic. In this way she might have been truly Catholic, and yet have pleased her Protestant friends, as far as it was lawful to please them, without displeasing her Catholic friends. A Madonna from the studio of a Raphael has a peculiar merit for the faithful, yet it commands, though Catholic in its subject, its genius, its execution, and its associations, the admiration of cultivated Protestants. So in literature, which is only art under another form, if we have real genius, we may select a Catholic subject, treat it in a Catholic spirit, and place it in a Catholic light, without despairing, if that be our ambition, of readers beyond the pale of the Church. It is precisely that portion of our literature which has been written solely for Catholic readers, without any reference to dissenters, that is the most universally admired. Religion may and should pervade popular literature, and in its true form too ; but in its catholic, not in its distinctive character.

The difficulty with us moderns is, that we are ourselves too polemical. The circumstances in which we live force us to be constantly considering our religion, not in its own essential character of the one universal religion, but in its distinctive character, as the true religion opposed to false religions. Our religion is assailed everywhere by the false, and our minds are affected, nay, to a great extent formed, by the opposition we encounter, and the hostility in the midst of which we live. Our life is the life of the camp. Our very piety and devotion assume a polemical cast. We can hardly throw off our armour long enough to repeat a *Pater* or an *Ave*. The times are exceedingly unfavorable to the creation of such a literature as Lady Fullerton seems to contemplate, and of which she has given us so poor a specimen. But if our friends believe such a literature possible and desirable, if they will labor for its creation, they must enter more deeply into the spirit of their own religion, and study to forget that there are such people as Protestants, and such a religion as Protestantism, in the world. They will make no contributions to it, if they place before them a mixed audience of Catholics and Protestants, and endeavour to speak two languages at one and the same time. The man can be himself, give free play to his wit, his imagination, the deep and warm emotions of his soul, only at home, in the bosom of his own family, or surrounded by his intimate friends. The presence of a stranger is an intrusion, throws a

damp on his spirits, restrains his genius, — for genius is always shy, — checks the flow of his eloquence, the play of his wit or his fancy, and renders him grave, formal, and reserved. So is it with him who would be an author in polite or popular literature. He must speak his own mother tongue to those who have the same mother tongue. He must make himself at home, banish all strangers and heretics from his mind, and write out freely from his own full Catholic heart and well-stored mind, as if all the world were his friends, of his own household, of his own faith and religion.

There are other faults which, as Catholics, we must find with Lady Fullerton's novel. The heroines are two half-sisters, daughters of a Colonel Lesley, an English gentleman, — the elder by an English, and the younger by an Italian wife. They are brought up each by her maternal relations, the elder in England, and in the Protestant religion, the younger in Italy, and in the Catholic religion, and without ever seeing one another till the former is nineteen and the latter nearly seventeen. Of Margaret, the elder sister, we have nothing to say, although she is our favorite. Ginevra, the younger sister, appears to be the favorite of the author, and her character is drawn with great affection and elaborate finish. She is evidently designed as a model of female beauty and loveliness, and intended to display the author's conception of the practical effects of Catholic faith and piety. She is indeed beautiful, lovely, fascinating. But she secretly marries a heretic, a stranger with whom she has had but a brief acquaintance, without the consent or knowledge of her father, and against the known wishes of the family of the young man himself. It is true, her father is absent on his travels, and she does not know when he will return, and her old uncle in his dotage approves and urges the match. But this is no sufficient excuse. Her uncle has no authority to bestow her hand upon a heretic; she has no reason to think that her father has abandoned her, or become indifferent to her welfare; and it is plain, that, in consenting to the marriage, she only yields to a sincere, but inordinate, passion.

Now we do not like the morality which makes passion — love, if you will — an excuse for neglect of filial duty. We do not say that a child must in every conceivable case marry according to the will of the parent, and may in no case marry without or against parental authority; but no one under age can, if the father be living, rightfully marry without his consent, or

at any age without at least his consent being asked. Ginevra is under age ; she is not seventeen ; and has no right to dispose of herself, — certainly not without some efforts, at least, to obtain her father's consent or advice. Here we insist she was wrong, undutiful. We are not disposed to make light of genuine affection, of which there is in this world none to spare ; but we have no patience with the morality which makes love triumph over duty, or that does not withhold its approbation from all love that leads us to omit any serious duty of our age or state. Such love is not properly love. It is passion, sinful passion, to which religion forbids us to yield, and which it commands us to subdue. We do no service to our sons and daughters by representing to them passion as too strong for duty, and then excusing the neglect of duty in consideration of the strength and ardor of the passion. It is all moonshine to suppose that there is any unlawful passion which, by the aid of religion, we cannot overcome, if we choose ; and every passion is unlawful, however sincere and pure it may be in other respects, which in our actual relations we are not free to indulge, or which cannot be indulged without imprudence ; for prudence is one of the cardinal virtues.

Ginevra not only marries imprudently, secretly, without her father's knowledge or consent, but she marries a heretic, a man without principle, an enemy of her religion, — which no good Catholic can do. The Church abhors mixed marriages, and if she sometimes tolerates them in order to avoid a greater evil, she refuses them her benediction. She never ceases to admonish her children to avoid them. If Ginevra had been as pious as the author would have us believe, she never would, she never could, have listened for a single moment to the addresses of young Neville ; she never would and never could have opened her heart to love for one whom she must regard as a child of Satan, the enemy of her religion and her God. How can the heart that loves God above all things consent to form the closest of all unions, a union typical of the union of Christ and the Church, with one who she knows has no sympathy with her religion, no love of God in his heart, and who despises her own sweet and holy Mother ? It seems strange to us, or would, indeed, did we not know the perversity of the human heart, and the fatalism in regard to love widely believed, and generally taught by novels and romances. Lady Fullerton would have furnished a far better moral, if she had shown us her Catholic heroine resolutely suppressing any growing affection

she might have detected, stealing unawares into her own heart, for young Neville, coldly dismissing him, and refusing to hear a single word of love from his lips, on the simple ground that he was not of her religion.

Neville's father is represented to us as an intolerable bigot, because he swears to disinherit his only son, if ever he presumes to marry a Catholic; and the author contrives to make it appear that Catholics are cruelly treated, because Protestant fathers are opposed to their sons marrying Catholic wives. We have no patience with this. Has her Ladyship a Protestant husband, or is she in pursuit of one? Can our daughters find no Catholic young men worthy of their heart and of their hand? Then let them offer their virginity to God, and choose a celestial spouse; or, if they wish to remain in the world, let them remain there in a state of "single blessedness." If they have piety, this will be no hardship; and if they have it not, they are ill fitted to be wives and mothers. For ourselves, we honor old Neville; he acted like a sensible man and a prudent father. He was a Protestant; he believed Catholicity to be from the Devil, as we ourselves should believe, if we believed Protestantism to be from God; and so believing, he would not and could not consent to receive a Catholic as his daughter-in-law. He warned his son betimes, long before he ever saw Ginevra, forbade him ever to marry a Catholic, and told him what he would have to expect, if he did. We see no bigotry in this; we see only consistency, — only a correct principle, misapplied solely because the old man's religion was not the true one. Indeed, all her Ladyship's Protestants are excellent people; it is only her Catholics who are uncatholic, or act on uncatholic principles. We have no patience with this blaming of Protestants for their opposition to mixed marriages, when our own Church detests them, and does all she can in prudence to prevent them. Let us not blame Protestants for the few sound principles they have retained from the general shipwreck of their faith. We are not remarkably partial to Protestants, and not much accustomed to spare them; but we are not willing to blame them where they are not blamable, or to reject a sound principle because they may adhere to it.

But after these faults, what are the redeeming traits of Ginevra's character? Passing over her natural endowments, which have no moral or spiritual character, she has two merits, — she retains her love for her selfish and unprincipled hus-

band, notwithstanding his base and cruel treatment of her, and she refuses, at his infamous request, to apostatize entirely from the Church. The first is very well, but nothing very remarkable. We can find instances enough, and without going far either, of women, who make no great show in the world, who have borne in silence, not for a few months only, as was the case with the passionate Ginevra, but for long years, conduct far more cold, heartless, cruel, and brutal, than she received from Edmund Neville. All she suffered was purely sentimental, and, with firmness and strength of character, could have been made quite tolerable. She retained throughout — what is so precious to the wife — the love of her husband, who, in the language of the author, adored her, and it is not till the last moment before her trials end that she for an instant seriously doubts it. She is one day falsely informed that Neville is going to marry another. Then, indeed, she believes he has ceased to love her; hope vanishes, and the terrible conviction flashes upon her, that he is lost to her for ever. Now comes her real trial. How does she bear it? Does her religion sustain her? Does she embrace the cross and piously bear it? Not at all. No heathen could have been more completely overcome. She raves, she is beside herself, she becomes mad, works herself into a brain fever, and as good as gives up the ghost. All this is, no doubt, very natural; but it betrays a weak, not a strong character, — a character abandoned to nature, not elevated and sustained by grace. How many women have borne all she bore, have endured far greater trials than hers, and that too without losing their senses, or working themselves into a brain-fever, the “*Deus ex machinâ*” of recent novelists! Have we not seen women abused and abandoned to poverty and want by their husbands, women who know they are no longer beloved, who feel the terrible truth that they have no longer any hold on the affections of their husbands, who know that love is bestowed elsewhere, and who see with their own eyes the tenderness and caresses which are their due lavished upon others, and who nevertheless quietly and meekly discharge their duties as faithful and affectionate wives, and retain till death all the warmth, energy, and freshness of their young love? We have seen it; and without going out of the circle of our own personal acquaintance, we can bring instance after instance, from real life, of a wife’s affection for her husband withstanding far severer trials than those to which Ginevra was subjected, except for half an hour, for we apprehend that most women will

agree with us that the severest trial of a wife's affection is the certainty that she has lost her husband's.

The other merit named is nothing very extraordinary. Is it an extraordinary merit in a Catholic not to apostatize outright from the Church? You tell us that Ginevra had strong temptations, that she chose to lose the society of her husband, to have him deny her to be his wife, to see him conduct himself in the world as if unmarried, to find herself in a false position and subject to the most odious misconstructions, rather than give up her God, and deliberately damn her own soul. Be it so. Is there a Catholic man or woman deserving the name that would not do as much? Is not all Catholic history filled with martyrs, and all Catholic land hallowed by their blood? Is not martyrdom a thing of course in our Church? And is it characteristic of Catholics to hesitate between a life of comparative poverty and abandonment by those we love, and apostasy from their God? If martyrdom is too common among Catholics to attract much attention, as we know it is even in our own day, why make so much ado about Ginevra's refusing to apostatize from her religion to gratify the ambition and luxurious tastes of her base and selfish husband? Ginevra is no martyr, and shows nothing of the martyr spirit. She has not even to choose between her religion and her husband's love, for he still "adores" her, and she herself fears, that, if she changes her religion, she shall forfeit his love. She herself tells him, that, if she could change her religion from the motives he presents, he himself would despise her, which it is plain he would have done. She has not to choose between religion and poverty; for she is the daughter of a rich father who idolizes her, and the greatest poverty she can imagine to exist is wealth to the great majority of us. Moreover, even to the last moment, till the aforesaid brain-fever, which brings all to a happy termination, she still hopes that matters will take a favorable turn, that she shall recover her Neville, and have her rights as a wife acknowledged. Nay, she can at any moment, by confiding in her father, and ceasing to be a dissembler, have them acknowledged at once. And this it was her duty to do, both for Neville's sake and her own, and also for the sake of her father, whom she had wronged, and from whom she had no right to withhold the fact that she was married. It is idle, then, to call Ginevra a martyr for her religion. If she could have heard the still voice of duty rising above her excessive sentimentality, she could easily have extricated herself from her painful situation.

Her sufferings were only the just punishment of her secret marriage with a heretic.

The novel is said to be replete with genuine religious feeling ; but its piety is Puseyitish rather than Catholic, and smells strongly of Littlemore. It is such as serious, cultivated, and amiable people, outside of the Church, aiming to imitate Catholics, can attain to, — a tolerably well executed counterfeit, which may pass with those who are ignorant of the genuine coin. The sentiment, even when it is intended to be religious, is too human ; weakens, instead of strengthening ; and aggravates, instead of assuaging the pain. When we witness the sufferings of Ginevra, we assist at a tragedy ; we do not behold the Christian bearing his cross, and borne by it. Our human sympathies are excited, our hearts bleed for the tender floweret torn and tossed in the blast. We see the poor girl grow pale and pine day by day ; we are told that she is comforted and soothed by prayer ; we are told that she is patient and resigned ; but we feel, as we read, that, if things do not alter for the better very soon, she will assuredly grow mad or die. This indicates very little of that calm, serene, and sustaining piety which kisses affectionately the rod that smites, and says, “Let it be, my Father, as thou wilt ; thy will is mine.” If we would give a true picture of Catholic piety, we must show it, not in our words, but in its effects on the character. Any body can talk piously ; but not every one can infuse piety into the creatures of their imagination.

But our readers will do us injustice, if they suppose that we object to Lady Fullerton’s novel simply because her characters have certain weaknesses and defects, simply because they are not perfect. We have no great affection for the perfect characters of novelists, and have not had since we read *Cælebs* by Hannah More, and its twin monster, *Dunallan*, by some author whose name we forget. As a young friend of ours pleasantly remarked of the Non-resistants, that she “did not like them, for they were too belligerent,” so we say, we do not like these perfect characters, for they are too imperfect. It is said that no writing is so faulty as that which is faultless ; and certainly we find no characters more faulty than those intended by the novelist to be perfect. They are always cold, stiff, formal, dull, prosy, crotchety, unhappy themselves, and rendering perfectly miserable every body within the circle of their influence. The Lord deliver us from Methodism or Puritanism in novels, as well as in the Church and in society !

The novelist has the right to represent men and women as he finds them in real life, and the more faithful he is to reality, the more is he to be commended. It is a thousand times better that our youth should see life represented in literature as they must find it when they go forth into the world, than that they should amuse their fancy or exalt their imaginations with pictures of an ideal life, never realized, and never to be realized. There is enough of romance in the natural composition of every one, without its being augmented by the art of the novelist. Bring out, if you will, the romance of real life, show the poetic side, if you can, of ordinary characters, of every-day duties and events ; but leave the purely ideal world to the "prince of the air," to whom it belongs.

The novelist has not only the right to represent characters as he finds them in real life, but he has the right to enlist our sympathies for them, to make us love and esteem them, though they are marred by grave faults, even by vices and crimes. It is no objection to modern literature that it paints vicious and criminal characters, that it makes us acquainted with the deformities of social and individual life, the shocking depravities and loathsome corruptions of human nature. This does not of itself necessarily corrupt its readers or its admirers. Nay, it is well that these things should be known, that our youth should betimes learn how rotten is human nature, and how necessary it is that they should beware of trusting themselves to its depraved appetites and vicious propensities. Nor is it a fault of modern popular literature that it shows us in characters marred by a thousand faults something still pure and lovely, something which rightfully commands our love and esteem. In this world, we are not, save in the Saints, to look for perfection. The characters of all are a mixture of good and evil. None, or, at best, very few, under the human point of view, are totally depraved, destitute of every generous feeling, of every noble quality ; and even the best must mourn over their own shortcomings. We have no right to exclude any human being from our sympathy, or from our love. Alas ! who are we who demand perfection in others, and claim the right to exclude from our kindness and respect those who may have fallen ? Let us look into our own hearts, recall our own past lives, and see what we have been, and what we are. What have we whereof to boast, in the presence of this erring brother or this fallen sister ? Alas ! who that knows himself, the rottenness of his own heart, the baseness of his own conduct, and feels in

his conscience the load of guilt he has incurred, can look upon himself in any other light than as the very chief of sinners? Our religion commands us, while we are inexorable in judging ourselves, to be lenient in judging others; and as long as we feel it but reasonable, as we all do, that we should be loved and esteemed, notwithstanding our vices and crimes, how can we deem it just to withhold our love and esteem from others, who, after all, may be far less vicious, less criminal, in the sight of God, than ourselves? The fault of modern literature is not here; it is elsewhere, in the fact that it enlists our sympathies, our love and esteem, for characters because they are vicious and criminal. What it compels us to approve in them is the moral weakness, the lawless passion, the criminal strength of purpose, the successful vice, the triumphant crime. Read the writings of Goethe, Byron, Bulwer, Victor Hugo, De Balzac, George Sand, Ida of Hahn Hahn, and you are cheated into sympathizing with the illicit, the vicious, the criminal. Take away from their characters what is contrary to Christian morality, and nothing is left to love or admire. Their very excellence is made to consist in what is condemned by the laws of God and man. Here is the error; here is their fatal poison; here is that which makes their writings so immoral and so corrupting. They might have painted the same amount of depravity, uncovered the same festering wounds, and exposed the same abyss of corruption, and yet have exerted a healthful influence, an influence which would have tended to heal, instead of deepening and perpetuating the running sores of individuals and of society. All they needed to have done this was to have had a correct moral standard for themselves, and to have refrained from sympathizing with the corruption they represented.

Lady Fullerton, of course, does not sin to the extent — far, far from it — that these do; and yet her own standard of morals is too low, and she herself sympathizes with things which, though natural and in some measure excusable, ought not to be approved. The character of Ginevra is, for the most part, true to nature; her passionate love for Neville was in keeping with her character, and to be expected; yet it was imprudent, and, under the circumstances, unjustifiable. It is of the author's apparent unconsciousness of this fact that we complain, not that she did not give Ginevra a more perfect character, and make her conduct herself differently. She not only does not disapprove, but she even approves, Ginevra's excessive passion and its unjustifiable indulgence, and would fain persuade

us that it was a virtue. True, she makes Ginevra suffer from her imprudence, neglect of filial duty, and disregard of the admonitions and wishes of the Church, but not as a merited chastisement. She points all our indignation at Neville, and bids us behold in Ginevra only a martyr to religion. Here her Ladyship is wrong, and shows her own defective moral sense. It is this we censure, not her not having made Ginevra a perfect character.

Other faults we could point out, but we have said enough for our purpose. As novels go, *Grantley Manor*, notwithstanding what we have urged against it, deserves, even under a moral point of view, a high rank ; and we have criticized it, not because it is worse, but because it is better, than the average. We have, however, in our remarks, looked beyond its particular merits or defects, to popular literature in general. We have wished to call the attention of our popular writers, among the laity, to a fact which they seem to us not to have duly considered, that they may err against religion when the topics they treat are not immediately religious. All principles, whether literary, political, or scientific, are related to the principles of theology. Almighty God has created and sustains and governs all things in order to the Church, his Immaculate Spouse. Nothing in the universe can be seen in its true light, in its real relations, save from her point of view. She, in the ontological order, is not subsequent to reason and nature, but they are subsequent to her ; and reason, if strong enough and clear-sighted enough to see truth in its unity and catholicity, would perceive, that, without the dogmas of the Catholic faith, it would cease to be reason. The Church is no accident in creation or Providence. As this lower world was made for man, so man was made for the Church, the crowning glory of the works of the Almighty. Every thing is related to her. All truth, in whatever order we find it, is from God, through her, and has its unity and complement in her alone. It is important that we remember this.

This being so, theology, as the schoolmen always maintained, is the science of sciences, and gives the law to every particular science, and therefore to every department of human thought. Consequently, every psychological or ontological, every literary or political error, is at bottom an error against faith, and, if pushed to its last consequences, would be found to deny some element of the Church's teaching. Here is the great fact which our popular writers seem to us to overlook. They seem to us

to write under the persuasion, that, if they are not professedly treating theological topics, they are in no danger of erring against religion ; that religion has nothing to do with their literary, political, or scientific principles ; that, if they adopt false principles under these heads, it is their own affair, and religion has no right to call them to an account for it. Literature, politics, science, they assume, are subject to human reason alone, exempt by their very nature from all ecclesiastical or theological supervision or control ; and if they assent to the several articles formally proposed by the Church as *de fide*, no fault can be found with them, whatever the views they advance, or the tendencies they follow. Hence it seldom occurs to them, when not writing professedly on religious topics, to compare the principles they adopt with the principles of their religion ; and hence it is not unfrequently we find them, in their literature, politics, and pretended sciences, undermining the very truths they assent to in their profession of faith.

It is true, that, though every error is at bottom an error against faith, or the truth taught by the Church, yet not every error is culpable or a heresy ; for no error is counted a heresy that is not immediately against some proposition of faith, and none is culpable that is free from malice. It is true, also, that the Church does not take official notice of errors which are only indirectly and remotely against faith. But no error is harmless. Errors, as Melchior Canò teaches us, which do not kill faith outright, may yet impair its soundness, render it weak and sickly, and hinder the free, healthy, and vigorous growth of Catholic piety. Even these indirect and remote errors against faith, which may coexist in the mind with a firm faith in the Christian mysteries, conceal the germs of heresy, which some acute, bold, and self-willed reasoner may one day develop and mature into a doctrine formally heretical, and which may prove the destruction of thousands, perhaps millions, of souls. All heresies take their rise in popular literature or science. No heresiarch sets out with the express and formal denial of the faith, for no man in the outset intends to be an heresiarch, — ever says to himself, Go to, now, let us found a heresy. His heresy is only the logical development of principles which he finds already incorporated into popular literature and science, already received as axioms by the popular mind, and held by persons of unquestioned orthodoxy. What lies barren, or apparently so, in other minds becomes fruitful in his, and ripens into doctrines directly and immediately against faith. He,

having more confidence in his own judgment than in the decision of the Church, or being too proud to acknowledge his errors, adheres to them after their condemnation by authority, and thus becomes an heresiarch.

It is, then, never a matter of slight importance what are the principles and views we entertain and set forth even in those provinces which our popular writers are apt to consider as remote from religion. It is precisely from this quarter that danger is to be specially apprehended ; for popular writers, treating subjects not immediately connected with faith, and borrowing their views, not from the special study of the subjects to which they respectively pertain, but from the loose and uncertain public sentiment of their time and place, are of all writers those who are the most liable to err, and their readers, who are rarely the best instructed or the most devout of the Catholic community, are precisely those who are of all readers the least able to detect their errors. The danger becomes especially greater in a Protestant country, where we breathe constantly the atmosphere of heresy, and form our literary and scientific tastes and habits by the study of heretical writings. In England and this country, whether we are converts, or whether we have been brought up Catholics, our literary education, as far as relates to our own language, is received under Protestant influences, and from Protestant literature. This literature, whether grave or light, whether immediately or only remotely connected with religion, is full of false principles. We unconsciously imbibe these principles ; they become the habits of our intellectual life ; and whenever we write, unless on topics immediately religious, or unless we have received a special theological education, and that a thorough one, we necessarily reproduce them, and give as Catholic literature only a copy, usually an exaggerated copy, of the Protestant. The less directly connected with religion, the more remote from theological subjects, the more popular in its character this imitative literature is, the more is its influence to be dreaded. Kirwan's Letters are comparatively harmless, for the Catholic reader is on his guard against them ; but not so with one of Bulwer's or Miss Bremer's novels, or a Catholic novel written on similar principles, in a like spirit ; for such a work is not read for its theology, is not presumed to be related to theology, the reader is not on his guard, and therefore receives its poison before suspecting it to be poisonous.

In treating such questions as those to which we in our Re-

view for the most part confine ourselves, it is easy to keep clear of any grave errors ; for we have nothing to do but to write what has been taught us. But in popular literature, the case is different ; because that is the expression of our own interior life, and necessitates the application of Catholic truth to matters remote from the direct and formal teaching of the Church, and where we must trust to our own discernment of principles and power of logical deduction. If we are but little accustomed, as is the case with most men, to discriminate, if we are but indifferent logicians, if we are mere poets, sentimentalizers, or declaimers, and if our interior life, save in what is directly and immediately connected with religion, is formed by the heretical, infidel, and Jacobinical literature of the age and country, we shall produce only a literature which, as Catholics, we must deprecate, and which can be influential only for evil.

No class of writers need to be so thoroughly instructed in Catholic faith and theology, none need so much meditation and to approach so frequently the sacraments, as they who would write popular novels, or conduct literary and political journals. A political journal, conducted by a Catholic, circulating almost exclusively among Catholics, and exerting a wide and deep influence by appeals to the weaknesses or the dominant sentiments and tendencies of its public, yet, in all save what is immediately and formally of faith, breathing the tone, adopting the style, and advocating the Jacobinical principles of the literature which has formed the general character of its editors, can do more than the whole anti-Catholic press combined to retard, under existing circumstances, the growth of Catholicity in this Protestant country. We have, and have had for a long time, more than one such journal exerting its baleful influence, to the grief of our Catholic pastors and of every Catholic who prizes his religion, as he should, above all other things, — not excepting even politics and patriotism ; for patriotism itself is a virtue only when it springs from religion and is subordinated and made subservient to religion.

Literature must always exert a bad influence when it is the product of half-educated authors, who make up in impudence what they lack in humility, in conceit what they lack in knowledge, and in vehemence what they lack in sober sense and religious feeling. Such authors only echo what is popular, and reinforce what is already objectionable in public opinion. They are unable to discriminate between the popular and the

true ; and uniformly take it for granted, that, if they write what their public approves, they write what is just and true in itself. This would do, if they were Jacobins or infidels, but will not do, if they are Catholics, and wish to exert no influence not favorable to their religion. Literature is a powerful agent in forming the popular mind, and it ought itself to be formed by pure, holy, and Catholic minds and hearts. It should aim to correct, not to exaggerate, popular errors and tendencies, — not to follow, but to form, public sentiment. To do this, it is a matter of great importance that the men and women who are to produce it should know their religion thoroughly, should, by prayer, meditation, and the frequenting of the sacraments, be thoroughly imbued with its spirit, and then draw from this religion their inspiration and their principles. He who wishes to do evil may go with the current, wafted down the stream by the breath of popular applause ; but he who would do good must be always prepared to stem the current, to make his way, as best he can, against wind and tide. The applause of the multitude is never for him who is laboring to serve his day and generation. The people, when he is dead, may erect a monument to his virtues and bedew his memory with their grateful tears ; but while he is living, they will not be with him ; they will distrust him, thwart him, denounce him, and leave him alone with his conscience and his God. He who is not prepared for trial, for popular opposition, the wrath of demagogues, and of foolish men believing themselves wise, imprudent men believing themselves prudent, timid men believing themselves brave, ignorant men claiming to be wise, and impious men affecting to be pious, is no man to labor in the department of popular literature ; and to be thus prepared, one must live above the world while in it, must have his conversation in heaven, his affections weaned from the earth, and his heart set only on hearing at the last day that welcome plaudit, “ Well done, good and faithful servant ! enter thou into the joy of thy Lord.”

ART. IV. — *A Lecture on the Pentateuch. — Its Contents, — its Inspiration.*

"The Scripture cannot be broken." — John x. 35.

"All Scripture inspired of God." — 2 Tim. iii. 16.

"Understanding this first, that no prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation: for prophecy came not by the will of man at any time; but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost." — 2 Peter i. 20, 21.

WE have reached a period in the world's history, when the minds of men seem to be engaged in a general and violent conflict, either on the subject of the Divinity of the Scriptures, or of the manner of interpreting them. Nor would this conflict be any thing more than the natural effect of human reason, were the issue of the case to be left to its capricious opinions. But, fortunately, the medium by which the one and the other can be decided depends not on the researches of human sagacity, but rests altogether on the requirements of supernatural authority. The Scriptures themselves claiming the character of Divine origination, no other than a Divine tribunal can arraign in judgment the conceits of the mind concerning them, can check the onward and far-spread progress of doubt, and can impart what is indispensably necessary in a matter so momentous, perfect conviction and infallible certainty as to the character and signification of the inspired writings. Possessing as we do, in the pale of the ancient Church, that necessary tribunal, we can entertain no misgivings of the Divinity of their origin, nor can we be led astray in their interpretation. To us, as by an hereditary right, belongs the deposit of the Sacred Scriptures; and carefully has it been preserved and dearly approbated, at every epoch, and by every generation, — "all true Catholics *adoring*," in the language of Tertullian, "*the plenitude of the Bible*," or affirming, with Robert, king of Sicily, that "it should be esteemed infinitely more precious than the diadem that sparkles on the brow of majesty."

And yet we sometimes delight in refreshing our minds in the limpid fountains of evidence which never cease to flow from heavenly sources. Bathing in them, our souls come forth, not only filled with delightful and salutary influences, but likewise unsullied by any mental defilement, if, peradventure, in the midst of our contact with the skeptic and doubting world, any such should ever involuntarily have attached to them. With this view, I have proposed to throw together

some ideas on the "Law of the Law," the title given by the Jews to the books of Moses, or the PENTATEUCH. The subject naturally divides itself into two parts : first, the *contents* of the book, and, second, their *Divine inspiration*.

The name PENTATEUCH is derived from the heads or books into which the subject-matter has been divided, these being *five* in number. And every tyro in the Greek language has learned its derivation. On opening the sacred volume, you will at once perceive the titles and mark the collocation of these five books ; namely, *Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy*. The ordinary reader of the Bible, in casting his eyes upon this fivefold division, would naturally be led to suppose that this division was made by the author himself in the original manuscripts. But such is not the case ; the ancient Hebrews knew no such division, — which is mentioned, for the first time, by Josephus, in his famous "Antiquities." They designated the Pentateuch, as I observed just now, the "Law of the Law," or the "Book of the Law."

The Pentateuch is an authentic and inspired narrative of events connected with the establishment of religion, as they occurred from the era of the creation down to the death of the author, — an unbroken and magnificent chain, of which the links are important and remarkable facts, through which the Providence of God can be visibly traced, and in all of which the finger of Jehovah is manifestly discerned.

The most important portion of the Pentateuch is the history of the Mosaic legislation. What precedes this may be regarded as a mere introduction or exordium ; so intimately connected with it, however, that it is necessary to the whole, and therefore cannot be separated from it. Through it we are led, step by step, to the mighty drama to which it is meant to conduct us ; as through an introduction to some magnificent poem, or through the exordium to some sublime oration. We follow the graphic and inspired author from one scene to another, through varied fields and lonely solitudes, until at length, ere we are aware of the majesty that is to burst upon our vision, we find ourselves at the foot of the mountain clad with the awful glories of the Most High, quaking under his terrific thunder, and gleaming with the fearful flashes of his lightning, from the midst of which supernatural coruscations and uproar, the Decalogue is published to the people shuddering with awe in the valley below.

The Pentateuch may very naturally be divided into three

parts. The first comprises the history of what occurred in the world from the period of its creation down to the death of the patriarch Joseph. And this part forms what is entitled *Genesis*, from the circumstance of its treating of the birth of things. The Hebrews call it *Beresith*, from the word with which it opens. It comprehends the space of 2369 years. The second part contains the Mosaic legislation, which runs through *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, and *Numbers*. *Exodus* is so styled from the *going out* of the people of Israel from the land of Egypt; it is denominated by the Hebrews *Veelle Semoth*, and occupies a term of 145 years. *Leviticus* derives its name from the Levites, because it treats of the offices and functions, rites and ceremonies, of the priests and Levites, and is called by the Hebrews, from the first word with which it begins, *Vaicra*. The name *Numbers* is derived from the contents of the book, namely, the numbering of the people; it is denominated by the Hebrews *Vaiedabber*, and extends through a cycle of about thirty-nine years. The third part is but the repetition of certain laws already given, and the addition of some new precepts, exhortations, and motives for the observance of the law already promulgated; hence its appellation, — *Deuteronomy*, and in Hebrew, *Elle Haddebarim*.

In the Pentateuch, there are four distinctive divisions of character, namely, history, religion, legislation, and poesy: history the most accurate and simply narrated; religion which reveals to the favored race of Israel a system Divine and authentic, raising them far above the position of the nations by whom they were surrounded, and marking them and their posterity as the true adorers of the only living God; legislation breathing a wisdom and adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of the people which proved the heavenly source from which it emanated, and the temporal blessings which it was intended to convey; and a poesy as far superior in beauty and sublimity to the most admired strain of the pagan muse as the spirit of prophecy is above the genius of human thought, or the fountains of inspiration are more grand, more deep, more bright, than the springs of human imagination.

Its history is the most ancient, certain, and interesting to mankind. It is the production of the proto-author, and therefore stands alone in the midst of the early years, telling of events and men and scenes which, had it not been for his halloved style, must have been lost and buried and forgotten. No author whom he might cite preceded his era; on the contrary,

during a long series of years, his was the only record, and a record which begins its date with the birth of creation, relates how man, the great parent of the human race, was formed, and in what manner the earth was peopled. Under the divine description of Moses, every thing speaks with a thrilling and marvellous interest, every thing bursts upon the reader with a fresh and glowing beauty and sublimity. Chaos seems in labor, the elements of matter coalesce, as it were, and assume a consistency, which, by the omnipotence that brought them out of nothing, grows into form and symmetry, and palpitates with existence. The waters are separated from the dry land ; the firmament is thrown like a pavilion over the earth ; light flashes from the womb of darkness ; the sun ascends his flaming throne, from which, as from an everlasting watch-tower in the heavens, he is destined to regulate the days, the hours, the years, as long as time shall endure. The deep is rolled into its vast and fathomless abysses, and its billows are chained within their prescribed boundaries, traced by the Eternal finger on the sands ; the waters are alive with fishes ; the fields and groves swarm with beasts and reptiles, and are resonant with the incessant songs of joyous birds. Eden is prepared, with its sweet and beautiful gardens, its limpid rivers and ever-blooming bowers, for the reception of the lord of the earth ; and man, made after God's own image, standing erect, looking to the heavens of which he is destined to become an inhabitant, walks in majesty and dominion among the inferior animals. This is the character of the historic record of the Pentateuch.

Nor does the smallest shadow of uncertainty rest upon its accuracy or veracity. Both are placed beyond the influence of doubt ; both stand upon the authority of unquestionable truth. For, independently of the inspiration of its author, on every detail the characters of exact authenticity are visibly impressed. All the personages introduced upon the scene are mentioned by name ; all the epochs are distinctly marked ; all the events are intimately woven together, — like a chain, of which one link cannot be removed without causing the whole to break and fall to pieces. From Adam down to Noe, there is no interruption ; both eras are inseparably united together by a tissue of epochs and characters and events. The first man whose raptured eye beheld the wonders of the new-formed universe, and the family which, after witnessing the bursting of the cataracts of heaven, was preserved to re-people the regenerated

earth, seem to join hands, through an interval of two thousand years, — such is the unity of this record. Then, again, commences another concatenation, not less closely linked nor less uninterrupted, stretching down to the epoch of Moses, the legislator of the Jewish people, and the formation of the twelve tribes, the origin of the Mosaic legislation, and the entrance of the people of God into the land of Canaan ; all which facts are incontestably authentic.

Nor can it be denied that these facts are, moreover, the most interesting to the human race. They teach us our own history, which, otherwise, would have been but a vague, and perhaps mythological, tradition, like that of the posterity of Confucius, or of the other pagan nations. We are made acquainted, with perfect accuracy and beyond all misgiving, with our wondrous origin, with the formation of the universe in which we are placed, with the common parent of our race, with the great catastrophe which overwhelmed in destruction nearly the whole of the human family, — a catastrophe to which the common tradition of all nations, the fictions of mythology, and the condition of the globe, — cut up into continent and island, vale and mountain, in all of which are discovered fossil and animal remains, which by no other theory could be accounted for, — render a striking and universal testimony. Compare the mythology of Deucalion with the history of Moses, and it will be evident that the former tradition is founded substantially upon the latter. The “ *Deucalion unde homines nati, durum genus,*” of Ovid, whence derived except from the event of the deluge as narrated by the inspired historian ? from whose pen we also learn the manner in which the shattered earth was repaired, the heads and founders of the nations that afterwards spread anew over the face of the world, the account of the patriarch of the Hebrew people, their journeys in the desert, their legislation, and the prodigies and miracles which attested and confirmed the Divinity of the whole. Such is the nature of the historic part of the Pentateuch ; — and could any thing be more interesting or more important to the human family ?

The religious division of the Pentateuch displays to the mind a character manifestly divine, whether in regard to dogma or to morals ; and of these two constituents all true religion, it will be confessed, is composed. These make known what man must believe in his relation to God, and how he must comport himself towards his fellow-beings. They consequently

afford a double position, on which, as a believing people, we are to stand, — one eternal, the other temporal; one, like Jacob's ladder, reaching to heaven, — the other, like Israel's tents, spread on earth, and covering under their magnificent and beautiful expansion all the charities which should bind brethren together. In effect, what sublime ideas of the Divinity are not conveyed by the author of the Pentateuch, — ideas worthy the majesty of the Supreme Creator, and which, by their light and glory, cast into impenetrable shade the most gorgeous conceits and fanciful apotheoses of the wisest and politest pagan theologians? Only compare them, as they are left on record, whether in the loftiest strains of epos or ode, or in the elegant description of history, or in the romantic feats and triumphs of mythology. What are the "cloud-compelling" Zeus of the Greeks, or the demigods and penates of the Romans, when contrasted with the God of Moses, — one, omnipotent, eternal, whose fiat struck out matter from nothing, — who spoke and all things were made, — whose providence governs all the events of human life, whose infinite wisdom sounds the depths of the heart, unfathomable by any other power, who, in a word, by excellence, and by nature, is? Nowhere, except in the Pentateuch, has any appellation been given to the Creator that conveys the smallest idea of grandeur and self-existence, when placed by the side of the name by which he characterizes himself, — *I AM WHO AM*, *Ego sum qui sum*; a name which reveals the nature of the Divinity as clearly as it is possible to descry it amid the deep shades of this sublunary world.

The God of Moses is not, like the imaginary deities of his contemporary philosophers, indifferent to the fate, present or future, of human kind, consigning over to the caprice of fortune or the fatality of destiny beings endowed with intellect and immortality. He is the Father and the Friend of his people, walks in invisible, but yet sensible, majesty, amongst them; dwells in their tents, selects and treats them as his own precious inheritance; adopts them as his children, and, as the eagle with outstretched wings covers and protects her tender brood, he fosters them under the shadow of his presence and providence, nourishes them with manna prepared for their use in the clouds of heaven, and refreshes them, in the midst of arid and weary solitudes, with streams of pellucid water, leaping, at the stroke of his prophet's wand, from the barren and desolate rock. That God, who walked and conversed with Adam among the virginal bowers of Eden, continued with his posterity, although

tainted by the original iniquity of their progenitor, and in process of time, the more admirably to prove his love for mankind, embodied in the person of his Eternal Son the Divinity and humanity, and gave evidence to heaven and earth that it was his "delight to be with the children of men."

It is true that the author of the Pentateuch, having to address his language and adapt his ideas to mortal men, is compelled to speak of God after a human manner, — to attribute to the Eternal affections and faculties which, rigorously speaking, cannot be applied to him; yet this is counteracted by the exact and spiritual notions which he, at due times, conveys of the Divinity, and thus admonishes us of the true signification which should be given to his metaphorical expressions.

From the teachings of pagan philosophy no information could be derived respecting the origin of the world or the creation of man. Over these and similar momentous facts, a gloomy, an impenetrable veil of ignorance was thrown, which no hand, save one directed and empowered from above, could draw from the scene. Poetry, imagination, superstition, had in vain attempted to display to the bewildered reason of man the source and power to which all things — and himself especially — should be traced back. The Pentateuch removes every vestige of uncertainty, and discloses, in plain but splendid verity, the history of the formation of man's being; and while it exhibits the mortal part moulded, by a plastic energy, out of the slime of the earth, it tells, in like manner, of the soul, — the breath of the Eternal Spirit, who breathed into the comely, but originally cold and lifeless body, and infused into its nostrils warmth and immortality. It convinces the reader of the exalted and heaven-born character of man, the masterpiece of Infinite Wisdom, who, ere the perfect work was undertaken, seemed to deliberate with himself how to impress upon it the image of his own Divinity. One only word was all that was required to produce the heavens and earth, with *their ornaments* and irrational inhabitants; but the production of the intellectual and godlike master of creation is represented, in these pages, as the premeditated effect of the omnipotence and wisdom of the Trinity, — "*Faciamus hominem, Let us create man.*"

Not satisfied with making man acquainted with his Creator, and with imparting the most accurate ideas of the Divinity, the author of the Pentateuch teaches, also, the duties which man is bound to pay him. Essential duties, founded upon the

natural relation existing between the creature and the Creator, upon the absolute dependency of the former on the infinite majesty of the latter, and upon the necessity of expressing and testifying, by homage and sacrifice and prayer, a profound sense of gratitude for the favors bestowed on the human race. Those duties are contained in the Decalogue, and may be comprised in that one great commandment, placed by Moses at the head of all the others : — *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, and with all thy mind* : a golden precept, which, including the love of one's neighbour as one's self, was promulgated afterwards by Christ the Messiah, as the compend of the New Law, as well as the cardinal maxim of the Old, on which the Law depended and the Prophets. Of this sublime nature is the religion prescribed by the author of the Pentateuch, — so pure, so enlightened, and so perfect, that of it mere human philosophy never could have conceived the faintest notion.

The legislative character of the Pentateuch is not less admirable, in its theory and adaptation, than the one of which I have just treated.

In promulgating his code, every legislator has some particular end in view ; and to this all his legislation is meant to be directed. Among various people, various objects were proposed to be attained ; that of the Spartans, for instance, differed from that of the Athenians ; and hence, while Lycurgus gave laws for the purpose of forming robust and vigorous men, Solon's legislation had in view the refinement of the mind and the polish of life, by encouraging the arts and sciences. Both succeeded in their different objects. The Spartan was famed for his bodily strength and activity, the Athenian for his mental elegance and intellectual accomplishment. A Latin poet, Propertius, has sung of the former : —

“ *Multa tuæ, Sparte, miramur jura palæstræ*” :

We admire thee, Spartan, in thy manly games ;

while Horace has not forgotten to transmit to posterity this eulogy of the latter : —

“ *Adjecere bonæ paulo plus artis Athenæ.*”

Athens hath added to the fine arts more.

An infinitely more vital and lofty motive than either of the former inspired the legislation of Moses ; it was the preservation of the Hebrew people from idolatry, the conservation among them of the knowledge of the Most High, and the preparation, at a

long distance of time, for the coming of the Messiah. On these as its essential foundation is based the whole of the Mosaic code, and all the circumstantial enactments that grew out of that original code must be regarded and understood in reference to that threefold object which its author had in view. To examine them all in detail would require volumes. Volumes, indeed, there are, within the reach of every individual desirous of entering more thoroughly into the study of this question, in whose elaborate and erudite pages nothing is left untouched that might demonstrate the supreme wisdom of the minutest points of the Mosaic laws. Suffice it, on this occasion, to appeal to experience as a witness. The clearest proof of the wisdom of a legislator is the fact of his having fully and effectually attained the end which he proposed by the promulgation of his laws. That Moses has accomplished this, the history of the past and the experience of the present render evident to the mind of the ingenuous and reflecting inquirer. If we go back into the past, we then find, in the midst of the dismal darkness and lamentable superstitions that enveloped and debased the surrounding nations of the earth, the Jewish people enlightened by the knowledge, and elevated by the worship, of the true and only God. If we cast our eyes upon the present, do we not behold the same people, despite of all their vicissitudes and their calamities, adhering with unprecedented fidelity — though, unfortunately, laboring under a sad hallucination — to the worship of the God of their fathers? Nothing can alienate them from Him who brought them out of the land of Egypt and out of the house of bondage. Their fidelity to the Law is, indeed, a marvel, and there is no means of accounting for it, except the profound and enduring conviction of its divinity, which neither dispersion throughout the universe, nor despondency at their long and fruitless expectation of the Messiah, can eradicate from their hearts. This being the end of the Mosaic legislation, its wisdom, consequently, cannot be disputed.

The laws of the Pentateuch are moral, civil, and ceremonial. The first — for example, the Decalogue, and the other precepts depending on it — are founded on the law of nature; they may be said to be a ratification, in more distinct characters, of that law which, having, in the beginning, been written by the Creator on the human heart, was afterwards inscribed by the same Eternal Legislator on tablets of stone. Hence it is manifest that this part of the Pentateuch could never be abrogated, but

was, on the contrary, emphatically enforced, by the Divine Legislator of the Christian world. The second — the civil — were those issued by God's own will, and regard either the administration of the government, or the duties of individual citizens. The third — ceremonial — emanated, in like manner, from God's good pleasure, and refer to the regulation, practice, and external rites of Divine worship. What an immense field for commentary here expands before the mind ! But want of time forbids me from even entering upon it, and I therefore hasten to the consideration of the poetic division of the Pentateuch.

In approaching this topic of my remarks, I only regret that I am not possessed of at least a portion of the eloquence of a Rollin, a La Harpe, or a Chateaubriand, to do some justice to its exalted merits. The beauty and sublimity of the poetry of Moses immeasurably surpass the most admired strains of Homer ; and eminently entitle him to the honor of being the first of poets, as we have proved him to be the greatest of historians, legislators, and theologians. Innumerable passages might be culled from the pages of the Pentateuch in exemplification and proof of this assertion ; I will, however, direct your attention but to a few. Read, for instance, the blessing of Jacob, in Genesis, chapter xxvii. ; the prophecy of Balaam, in Numbers, chapter xxiv. ; and the blessing of Moses, before his death, on the tribes of Israel, in the thirty-third chapter of Deuteronomy. I point especially to these three passages, (numberless others, and particularly the canticle after the crossing of the Red Sea, might also be quoted,) as, in my earlier years, I attempted to render them, as literally as possible, into versification : —

JACOB'S BLESSING.

The dew of heaven may God bestow,
 The fatness of the earth be thine ;
 For thee may corn abundant grow,
 And ever fruitful be the purple vine.

Thee let the people always serve,
 And the tribes worship as their lord ;
 Thy brethren ne'er from thee shall swerve,
 Thy mother's children shall obey thy word.

Cursed the man who curseth thee :
 Let him who blesseth filled with blessings be.

BALAAM'S PROPHECY.

How beautiful, O Jacob, are
Thy tabernacles bright !
Thy tents, O Israel, how fair
And lovely to the sight !

As gentle valleys, crowned with wood,
As gardens near the river's tide,
As tabernacles pitched of God,
As cedars by the water's side.

Out of his bucket streams shall flow,
His seed in waters deep be proved,
Agag, his king, shall be laid low,
And his proud kingdom be removed.

From Egypt God hath brought him out,
Whose strength is like unto the power
Of the rhinoceros ; — they shall rout
The hostile nations, and devour ;

And break their bones, and pierce them through
With arrows sharp and merciless :
He, lying down, hath slept, as though
A lion or a lioness,

Whom to arouse from sleep none durst :
Who blesseth thee shall blessed be ;
But reckoned, too, among the accursed
Shall stand that man who curseth thee.

THE BLESSING OF MOSES ON THE TRIBES OF ISRAEL.

“ Let Reuben live, nor let him die, for he
In number small and limited shall be.”

And this is Juda's blessing : — “ Lord, give ear
To Juda's voice, and hearken to his prayer :
Conduct him in unto his people. And
He shall fight for him, and no foe shall stand
Against His helping and resistless hand.”

He said to Levi, — “ To that man of heaven
Be thy perfection and thy doctrine given,
Who hath temptation's strongest power defied,
And been at contradiction's waters tried ;
Who to his father, mother, brethren, spake, —
' I do not know you ' ; and could dare forsake
Their children ; these thy covenant have observed,

And from thy holy word have never swerved,
Thy judgment, Jacob ; thy law, Israel ; — these
With burning incense shall thy wrath appease.
And on thine altars holocausts shall place.
Lord, bless his strength, nor from him turn thy face ;
Strike, strike the backs of his fierce enemies,
And let not them that hate him dare to rise.”

To Benjamin he said, — “ In him shall dwell,
With confidence, the one whom God loves well,
All day, as in the chamber of a bride,
And rest between his shoulders shall abide.”

He said to Joseph, too, — “ The land be given
Of the Lord’s blessing, of the fruits of heaven,
And of the dew, and of the sea below
That lieth, and of all the fruits that grow
And ripen by the moon, or by the sun,
Whether the everlasting hills upon,
Or on the ancient mountain-tops brought forth ;
Be his the fulness and the fruits of earth.
His blessing, in the bush who burned, come down
On Joseph’s head, and on the Nazarite’s crown.
On him, among his brethren, is conferred
The beauty of the firstling of the herd :
His horns like horns of the rhinoceros are, —
With them shall he the nations push afar
E’en to the earth’s remotest boundaries.
Manasses’ thousands, Ephraim’s hosts, are these.”

To Zabulon, — “ In thy going out,” he said,
“ O Zabulon ! and in thy tents, be glad,
Isaachar ! to the mountains they shall call
Thy people, and upon their tops shall all
Their sacrifices offer, and shall slay
Victims of justice, and, as milk, shall they
Suck the deep sea’s abundance, and their hands
Shall search the hidden treasures of the sands.”

He said to Gad, — “ Gad in his breadth be blest,
For like a lion he hath taken his rest ;
He seized the arm and head, and from his high
Preëminence, as his, doth he descry
Laid up the teacher, justices to tell,
And deal out judgment unto Israel.”

To Dan he said, — “ A lion young is Dan ;
He shall flow plentifully from Basan.”

To Nepthali he said : — “ To Nepthali
Abundance, as his portion, there shall be.
Him shall the Lord with richest favors bless ;
The ocean and the south shall he possess.”

He said to Aser, — “ Blest with children he,
And to his brethren acceptable be :
Dip he his foot in oil ; for it must bear
A shoe of iron and of brass ; as were
The days of youth, so shall thy old age be.
There is no God, save of the rightest ; He
Who sitteth mounted on the highest heaven
Thy helper is, by whom the clouds are driven
Hither and thither, subject to his breath :
His dwelling he hath made above ; beneath
Are stretched the everlasting arms ; to naught,
Driven before him, shall the foe be brought :
Under the wings of peace shall Israel,
Alone and happy in his safety, dwell.
A land of corn and wine to Jacob’s view,
And skies all misty with perpetual dew.”

Having, thus far, dwelt on the contents of the Pentateuch, we now arrive at the second part of the subject, namely, *the divinity of its inspiration*. This character of divinity appears from the manner in which Moses invariably speaks, addressing himself to the people, not in his own name, but in the name of the Omnipotent. He breaks upon the nation like a messenger from on high ; his language is the language of Heaven’s ambassador. He is commissioned by the Lord to write the laws promulgated by Divine authority. If the mission of Moses be derived from above, it necessarily follows that the Pentateuch is Divinely inspired. But the divinity of his mission is attested in a twofold manner, — by his miracles and his prophecies. Miracles in Egypt, in the passage of the Red Sea, and in the desert, all which prodigious occurrences manifestly transcended the ordinary laws of nature, and are related in a simple, grave, and unaffected style. He mentions dates, designates places, names persons. He displays them anew to the eyes of his readers who had been witnesses of them, or, at least, beheld around them the monuments erected to perpetuate their memory. Nor do all these marvels reflect honor upon his people. Some, on the contrary, are humiliating to their pride, and an everlasting stigma upon many of their posterity. Among

these may be specified the death of Dathan and Abiron, and the leprosy of Aaron and his sister. The Israelites gave credence to these facts, — they followed Moses to the desert on the strength of his prodigious achievements, submitted to the yoke of a heavy law, and clung to their leader with a fidelity little short of enthusiasm. Would this have been the case, had the narrative of Moses been a fiction? Would he not have been contradicted, and refuted, and abandoned? Would it have been possible for him to impose so flagrant and notorious a delusion on the common sense of an entire nation, and entail it upon all posterity? No, men believed the writings of Moses because they knew the veracity of them; the events were fresh, and had been witnessed by a whole nation. They were acknowledged to be miraculous, and consequently it follows that the divinity of Moses's mission and the inspiration of the Pentateuch are signalized and attested by his miracles.

It is, moreover, confirmed by his prophecies. The accomplishment of events, predicted years, and even centuries, previous to their coming to pass, can be the effect only of supernatural inspiration. The seer, who, fired with a heavenly enthusiasm, summons up from the deep womb of the future deeds and persons, and describes them with the accuracy of one before whose eye they are existing, cannot be less than an ambassador from the Eternal, before whom "a thousand years are but as yesterday." Now Moses did this: predicted the prosperity of Israel, if faithful to the worship of Jehovah, and his calamities, if recreant to his commandments, — that fertility should dwell in the soil, that abundance should cover the land, that peace should hover over the nation, as long as they would continue obedient to the Lord their God. But if they should fall into idolatry, he warned them that all these blessings should be withdrawn from them: they should become the prey of their enemies, their beautiful land should be seized upon by the rapacity of strangers, and they themselves carried away into ignominious captivity. That all these predictions have been verified, no one acquainted with the history of the Jews can deny. The skeptic cannot cite an epoch when Israel was rich or powerful, without being, at the same time, faithful to the Law; and never was he forgetful of it, never guilty of the crime of idolatry, without being visited with condign punishments on account of his prevarication. In the midst of the surrounding providences of Heaven, the people murmur; and Moses predicts, that, in chastisement of their ingratitude and

mutiny, not one among them, — with the exception of Caleb and Josue, — over the age of twenty years, should reach the promised land. What was the result? Those two individuals alone excepted, the six hundred thousand souls who were then living perished, according to the terrible pre-announcement of their fate, in the heart of the wilderness.

Again, Moses foretold that the succession in the Jewish priesthood should be confined to the family of Phinees. This, too, was faithfully realized. For that favored family alone held the pontifical censer in the days of David, as well as in those of the Macchabees, and the long and uninterrupted series of pontiffs which we discover in the holy writings is traced exclusively through the posterity of Phinees.

He predicted, that, in consequence of not always having displayed sufficient confidence, during their trials, in the protecting providence of Jehovah, neither himself nor his brother Aaron should reach the land of promise. And both were, in effect, doomed to forego the privilege of treading upon that blessed soil, in sight of whose fertile plains and smiling valleys they were gathered to their fathers.

But still another, and a more extraordinary, prediction did he make, — one which, in the minds of the remotest posterity, and of all the inhabitants of the world, was to be the unerring test of his inspiration and the Divinity of his mission. This was, that *ALL NATIONS* should, one day, be brought to the knowledge and worship of the true God, and should be blessed in the seed of Abraham. And thousands of years after this announcement, we cast our eyes around the globe, and are filled with amazement, and confirmed in our faith in the Divinity of the Pentateuch, at contemplating the event. The gods of the Gentiles have been forgotten, the temples reared to them in Egypt, and in other once gorgeous and potent regions, when idolatry swayed the earth, have mouldered away, while the God of Abraham is adored and served wherever the sun shines, by Christian and by Jew.

He declared, moreover, that, in the fulness of time, God would raise up, from among the Jewish race, a prophet like himself, and a legislator supreme, whom all men were commanded to hear and believe, under the penalty of drawing upon themselves the wrath of Heaven. This wonderful personage was, indeed, to appear amid circumstances less terrific than those that accompanied the mission of Moses, but with credentials from the same Divine authority, — nay, with a person of

itself Divine, inasmuch as he was to be the Son of God and the Redeemer of mankind. Hear the words in which the author of the Pentateuch foretells, in the name of the Eternal, the advent of that Saviour : — “ I will raise them up a prophet out of the midst of their brethren like to thee : and I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I shall command him.” — Deuteron. xviii. 18. Has that prophet been “ raised up ” ? The world has witnessed his coming. In Judea, as foretold, he made his appearance ; born of a virgin of Nazareth, he came forth from its shady valleys into the city of Jerusalem, and proclaimed his law ; — not, indeed, enveloped in dark clouds, and speaking amid the clangor of trumpets and the peals of thunder, but clothed in simplicity and meekness, like a brother among brethren, — vindicating his character as “ the prophet ” by innumerable miracles, discharging the functions which brought him into the world, and accomplishing to the letter the prediction of Moses.

Christians contemplate the fulfilment of the prophecy in the august and Divine person of Jesus of Nazareth. The Jews combine with Christians in its ultimate fulfilment, if not, according to their idea, in HIM, certainly, at some indefinite period, in their expected Messiah. Their incredulity, however, in the true “ prophet ” has not gone unavenged. The woes that have befallen their race, exiled from the Holy City, and scattered, without an altar, a priesthood, or a sacrifice, to the four quarters of the globe, prove the denunciation of the Messiah to be realized in their regard : — “ *Ego ultor existam, I will be their avenger.* ”

Independently of these external characters of Divinity impressed upon the mission and writings of Moses, there are others of an intrinsic nature, which demonstrate the spirit of God by which he was directed. Impostors are not in the habit of giving very sublime ideas of the Deity, or of enforcing men’s mutual and necessary duties towards one another, or of vindicating the majesty and sanctity of truth. Moses, on the contrary, labors to inculcate, on every occasion, the loftiest notions of the magnificence and greatness of Jehovah ; has published the wisest laws touching our relations with our fellow-men ; and produced the most solemn, unequivocal, and convincing evidences of the veracity of his doctrines. To this end has he instituted the pomp and splendor of the Jewish ceremonial, which incomparably surpasses the inventions of other wise men, and sealed all the elements of his system by laws infinitely

wiser and purer than those of Zeleucus, Solon, or Lycurgus, — laws breathing a spirit of philosophy so sublime and excellent as never to have been emulated, much less equalled, in the most polished and enlightened subsequent epochs of time. From the miracles, therefore, and the prophecies of Moses, as well as from his virtues, disinterestedness, and veracity, his character as an inspired writer is unquestionable. Consequently, the *Pentateuch* is a divine book.

I am not ignorant of the objections which infidel philosophy has brought against the inspiration of the *Pentateuch*. I know that criticism has contested its authenticity and integrity ; that astronomy, history, and geology have essayed to contravene its epochs and its data ; that chemistry has taxed with absurdity the natural events it records, and ethics have condemned as cruel, unjust, and imprudent the legislation it decrees. But, on the other hand, I likewise know that all these difficulties have been thoroughly investigated, and entirely removed, by the aid of sound and enlightened philosophy. It would, indeed, be a truly instructive and eminently interesting study for every Christian, to apply the principles of such philosophy to all the perplexing questions which are deemed paradoxical by the superficial criticism of the impious philosopher, — the creation, the fall of man in the garden of Eden, the deluge, the history of the kings of Egypt, the passage of the Red Sea, the miracles in the desert, the story of Balaam, and the right of the Israelites to take possession of the land of Canaan. On these subjects a series of important lectures might be written to great advantage ; the matter, you perceive, from the mere heads, is copious, nay, inexhaustible, and I shall readily be excused from so much as touching upon it on the present occasion, when your attention, patient though I always have found it, has already been sufficiently taxed. A few moments more may, perhaps, be allowed me, to lay before you a last and irrefragable argument in vindication of the Divinity of the *Pentateuch*. It is this : — All Scripture has been written, not merely with the assistance, but under the immediate inspiration, of the Holy Ghost ; but the *Pentateuch* constitutes a part of the Scripture. This proposition has never been disputed by the Christian or Jew ; it is denied only by the skeptic, who eschews all revelation, or by the Manichæan, who pretended that the Ancient Testament was the production of the Evil Principle, or by the Albigenses, the lineal descendants of the followers of Manes, who, though they be lauded by the declamation of the enemies

of Rome as true evangelical Christians, yet rejected the Pentateuch, and the Old Testament, with the exception of the few isolated passages which Christ or the Apostles have quoted from them.

The usual arguments which are employed to demonstrate the inspiration of the Old Testament in general serve still more directly and more forcibly to prove that of the Pentateuch in particular, which is supported by the unvarying and perpetual tradition of the Jewish people ; and not only by the orthodox Hebrews, but likewise by all sects, — Samaritans, Hellenist Jews, and others, unanimously admit and hold to the inspiration of these writings of Moses. The Church, too, which was made by Christ the depositary of all truth, whether written or traditionary, has ever esteemed inspired, and venerated and handed down as such, the books of the Pentateuch. Of this there is a bright and perpetual chain of evidences in the canons of the General Councils, in the writings of the Fathers, and in the discipline of the Church ordaining the public reading of those books, to confirm the faith of her children, by opening to them the primitive fountains of inspiration and Divine revelation. From those unerring sources the early apologists of the Christian religion were accustomed to draw their strongest arguments, — and, in a word, their authority was never questioned or disputed by the Catholic or the heterodox.

These books, then, being of heavenly origin, — their contents being Divinely inspired, — it is evident that our souls should love to drink of their living waters. The Church has never wished to close them against us. But, that they may produce the beneficial effect contemplated by her, she places the interpreting as well as the keeping of them in the custody of her pastors. By their vigilant care, the flock is led to these blessed springs, which are opened and dispensed judiciously and usefully, according to the wants and circumstances of all. This wise control must be approved of by every rightly thinking mind, — especially as in the Ancient Testament there are chapters which are as obscure to the untaught and superficial intellect as they are unsuitable to the inexperience and dispositions of the youthful heart. Hence the necessity of notes and commentaries, — hence the prudential conditions which are required in the general perusal of the Scriptures, both Old and New ; and hence, in fine, the carrying out of the maxim which St. Peter has left recorded in the text quoted at the beginning of this lecture : — “ Understanding this first, *that no prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation.*”

ART. V. — *The Dublin Review*. No. XLVI. Art. VI.
London : Richardson & Son. 1848.

PRESUMING, from the fact that two numbers of the *Dublin Review* have appeared without containing the remainder of its promised reply to us, that it is disposed, silently, to drop the controversy on *doctrinal developments*, we shall offer no formal answer to its last article on the subject, but content ourselves with a few statements and explanations which may serve to set in a clear and distinct light the principal points we have denied, and the doctrine we have opposed to them. With this, we shall take our leave of the controversy, till something new comes up to demand our attention or our animadversion.

The controversy which appears to have scandalized the recently converted editor of *The Catholic Herald*, — formerly one of the best Catholic journals in the country, — which has, no doubt, been painful to all our readers, and which can have had no attractions for ourselves, has not been one of our own seeking or provoking. It was occasioned by the publication of Mr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. The manifest favor with which some of our friends received it, and the use which our adversaries might make, and, in England and this country, were actually making of it, the high character of its author, the time and occasion of its publication, and the purpose for which it was presumed to have been written and published, combined to render it a work of more than ordinary importance ; the analogy of its peculiar theory with the popular doctrine of progress now so generally held by the sects naturally gave it many attractions for such Catholics as are strongly infected with the spirit of the age, and sigh to bring the literature of the Church into harmony with that of the world ; and its evident abandonment of the ground hitherto occupied by our theologians in their controversies with Protestants, and assumption of a new and doubtful ground, which gives the opponents of Catholicity an immense advantage over us, made our adversaries anxious to represent it, and to have it treated, as a work of authority on the real, if not avowed, sentiments of modern Rome. Was it likely, said they, that Mr. Newman, a man of various, rare, and profound erudition, of an acute, subtile, and highly cultivated intellect, — confessedly one of the master minds of the age, pious, humble, conscientious, — should, in a work apparently intend-

ed to be his *compte rendu* of the reasons of his conversion, write in ignorance or in contempt of the real sentiments of the Church, into whose communion he had evidently made up his mind to seek admission? Indeed, the reasonable presumptions in the case were strong in favor of the view our adversaries wished to take of the doctrine of the Essay. How, then, was the evil it might do, and actually was doing, to be counteracted, but by subjecting it to the test of well-known and settled principles of Catholic theology, exposing to the public its general unsoundness, and showing clearly that its theory is not Catholic, and cannot be entertained by Catholics? As all others seemed to shrink from the disagreeable task of doing this, we, with great reluctance, attempted it, and should, as Catholic reviewers, have been remiss in our duty, if we had not. Let not, then, those who regret the controversy censure us, who have only sought to resist a novelty, and to maintain the purity of Catholic doctrine; let them blame, if they must blame somebody, those who made the controversy necessary. We take no blame to ourselves.

What we have done would not have been called for, if neither those without nor some of those within had been disposed to regard Mr. Newman's Essay as a Catholic work. This we said in the outset, and we have all along conceded that it was never intended to be such a work, or a work from which Catholic teaching could be gathered. The author does not profess to be a Catholic, to write as a Catholic, or to present Catholic doctrine. He writes, not from the Catholic point of view, but professedly from the point of view of private reason, — as a man standing outside of the Church, and exercising his private reason on the phenomena exhibited by Christianity, regarded solely as a fact in the world's history. He does not profess to take his theory from Catholic theology, he does not attempt to support it by Catholic authority, or to propose it to be held by any one after he has come to the Church. It is solely the view which private reason takes of the phenomena in the case, and for those who, as yet, can use only "reason in things of faith." The general design of the author is to show that reason, taking Christianity as a fact in the world's history, which it must do, and exercising itself fairly and candidly on the phenomena presented by its history, must, on the principles of the inductive philosophy, come to the conclusion that the Roman Catholic Church of to-day is the true historical development, continuation, or representative of the Church of the

Apostles, and therefore, in her communion, if anywhere, genuine Christianity is to be sought and found. But his Oxford friends, though prepared to admit that this conclusion seems warranted by the general historical phenomena in the case, yet contend that there are certain special phenomena which are, after all, irreconcilable with it. The special theory is designed to be an explanation of these special phenomena, and to show that they do not militate against the conclusion warranted by the general phenomena presented, confessedly in favor of communion with Rome. It is a theory, therefore, specially intended for and adapted to these Oxford friends, Puseyites, or Tractarians, as they are denominated, that is, specially intended to prepare the members of the school within the bosom of Anglicanism, which the author had founded, to follow him into the Roman Catholic Church, into which he had resolved to enter.

Christianity is a fact in the world's history. This fact is to be met and accounted for in some way, and all the general phenomena exhibited by it, all the general reasons and presumptions in the case, prove that it is divine, and point us to the Roman Catholic Church as its true historical representation. But there are persons out of the Catholic communion who, while they admit this, find, nevertheless, certain variations and discrepancies of doctrine, discipline, and worship in the history of that Church, which, in their view, are insuperable obstacles to entering her communion. Here is the special difficulty to be solved. Now, grant the fact of the variations and discrepancies; but suppose the Church, suppose her to be placed in the world, suppose her to be placed there to be active, to exert a controlling influence, and to subject to herself the minds and hearts of men, individuals and nations, religion and politics, science and art, public and private life; suppose her designed to do this, with a divine energy indeed, but after a human mode, in accordance with the present constitution of human nature, and without altering or changing any of its essential laws; — suppose this, and these variations and discrepancies are but the necessary incidents of the process she must institute and carry on, are only what we should naturally have anticipated, only what we must suppose the Founder, if we suppose him to have been divine, must have contemplated and provided for, and therefore, instead of being objections to entering the communion of Rome, they are really only so many arguments in favor of her being the true Christian communion.

Here is the special argument of the book, and, if allowable, it is certainly an argument not to be treated as of slight importance. Supposing it to be admissible, it is not only ingenious, not only profound, but is really a discovery of great value, — one of the most important contributions to polemical theology that can be conceived. It not only solves the objections of our adversaries, but converts their very objections into conclusive arguments against them, — vanquishes them on their own ground and with their own weapons. But whether admissible or not, it would have been no special affair of ours, if it had been regarded only as the argument of a man outside of the Church, addressed to his companions ; for then it would have been solely a matter between him and them, to be disposed of by themselves without our interference. But when the argument, as was the fact, is charged upon us as one which Catholics use or intend to use, or when it is assumed by some Catholics themselves as one we may use, the aspect of the case changes, and we are compelled to inquire, whether it be or be not compatible with Catholicity ; for we cannot use an argument for Catholicity which involves the denial of Catholicity. Neither Mr. Newman nor his friends deny or wish to deny this. Mr. Newman did not feel himself bound to teach Catholic theology, but he did understand very well that his theory would be inadmissible for the purpose he urged it, if it was incompatible with that theology, and hence he refers to Moehler, De Maistre, and some other recent Continental writers, — men, by the way, of no high authority, — who he supposes have asserted it, or something similar to it. Is the theory, then, which supplies this new argument compatible with Catholic teaching ? This question forces itself upon us, and, under the circumstances, we are as much bound to entertain and answer it as we should have been, if the Essay on Development had been the work of a Catholic doctor.

It is evident that the argument presupposes not merely the fact of developments, — Mr. Newman's name for the variations and discrepancies alleged, — but their necessity in the nature of the case. Hence, in his Essay, he spends his principal force in proving this necessity. Two questions, then, arise : — 1. Have there actually occurred the variations and discrepancies of *doctrine*, — for we waive discipline and worship, — as alleged by Protestants and conceded by Mr. Newman ? 2. Is the assertion of the necessity *a priori* of developments, that is, variations and discrepancies of doctrine, compatible with Cath-

olic faith and theology? Unless both of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the author is not at liberty to suggest his theory, his argument is fallacious, and can only mislead those who are without, — give them, at best, only a spurious Catholicity. We have answered both questions in the negative; we have denied the fact of the developments or variations alleged, as not historically proved or provable, as not acknowledged by approved Catholic doctors, and as contradicted by the Church, who uniformly through her Councils and Sovereign Pontiffs asserts the invariability of the faith; and we have denied the second, because it contradicts the assertion of the invariability of doctrine, because it is in opposition to the ground hitherto uniformly assumed by our divines in their controversies with Protestants, and because it makes Christian doctrine, not the revealed truth, but simply a human view of it, thus reducing, by Mr. Newman's own confession, Christian doctrine to the level of heresy and human philosophy. No answer has been given, nobody, as far as we have seen, has attempted to give an answer, to these reasons, and, till answered, they are undeniably conclusive.

But in denying both the fact and the necessity of development, what is it we have denied? *Development* is a word of vague and uncertain import. It may be the predicate of many subjects, — true of some, false of others; and it may be used, and by Mr. Newman and his friends actually is used, in several very different senses. We have not denied it of every thing pertaining to Christianity; we have denied it only of Christian doctrine, that is, of the material object of faith, and we have not denied it even of this in every possible sense. We have not denied or thought of denying the power of the Church to make new definitions of the faith, new explications of doctrine, as occasion demands, nor, in the sense of raising to the rank of formal faith what has heretofore been only material faith, have we denied, nor could we without asserting a condemned proposition deny, her power to establish even new articles of faith. What we have denied is the power of the Church to *found* or institute new articles of faith, or to define as of faith any thing which has not always been *materially* of faith, and the denial of which has not always been, at least, material heresy, although not always, for all persons, culpable heresy. This we have done on the ground that the Church does not make the law, does not create the obligation to believe, but simply declares it. What we have asserted is, that the material object

of faith is all the *revelata* deposited by our Lord through his Apostles with the Church, and nothing else ; and what we have denied is, simply, that any thing can be defined of faith, or become of faith, not *formally* included in the number of those *revelata*, that is, not in the *depositum*. We have denied what we understand Mr. Newman and his friends to maintain, that doctrines not included in the *depositum*, not originally revealed, but springing up from the pious feeling or meditation of the faithful, or from the speculations of human reason about revealed truths, may be defined *de fide*, although previously to being defined they are mere speculations, opinions, pious thoughts or feelings.

The Dublin Review reasons against us as if we denied that any thing can be defined of faith which has not always been *formally* of faith, or which it was not always formal heresy to deny ; and objects, that our doctrine denies that the Church can, for instance, rule the pious belief of the Immaculate Conception of the Ever-blessed Virgin, entertained now by all the faithful, to be of faith ; but it has no right to do this. All we say is, the Church can define to be of faith nothing which has not been materially of faith from the beginning ; for she is infallible, and nothing is materially of faith which is not of Divine revelation and handed down to us as such from the Apostles. The only question with regard to the pious belief of the Immaculate Conception, in our view of the case, is, whether it is or is not an Apostolic tradition, and included in the *depositum* ? If it is, the Church can define it to be of faith ; if it is not an Apostolic tradition, she cannot. Which is the fact we know not, and cannot know till the Church herself informs us. This she will do when she judges it necessary or proper, and that is enough for us. In the mean time, we take the belief as we find it, and hope we are behind none of our brethren in cherishing it in the sense and within the limits permitted. We are too young a Catholic to take it upon us to instruct the Church, to tell her what we do or do not wish her to do. We are satisfied to await her commands, and, in the mean time, to pray, as she permits us, — *Regina sine labe concepta, ora pro nobis !*

But things may be immediately or mediately, explicitly or implicitly, formally or only virtually, revealed, and *The Dublin Review* reasons against us as if we maintained that nothing can be of faith which is not immediately and explicitly revealed. This is not correct. We have maintained no such doctrine. We have simply denied that what is only *virtually* revealed, as

the property in the essence, is of faith or can be of faith, because it is easy to conceive that Almighty God could reveal the one without revealing the other, and one may deny the property without intending to deny the essence. Hence, with the generality of our theologians, we have denied that mere theological conclusions are of faith, and must do so, or else deny all distinction between faith and the science of theology. Theological conclusions are discursively obtained from premises, one of which is certain by the supernatural light of faith, the other by the natural light of reason. It is a principle of logic, that the conclusion always follows the weaker premise, —

“Pejorem sequitur semper conclusio partem.”

Consequently, these conclusions follow the premise from reason and are simply truths of reason, not revealed truths ; therefore neither are nor can be of faith, — for they want the formal reason of faith, — *prima veritas revelans*.

Yet among theological conclusions, commonly so called, we may distinguish between those in regard to which the premise from reason is causative, and those in regard to which it is merely applicative or interpretative. The latter we have conceded may be of faith, which is as much as we can gather from Vasquez, Suarez, and others who are supposed to maintain the contrary opinion. But even the admission, that the first class of theological conclusions, theological conclusions strictly taken, are of faith, concedes nothing in favor of the development we have denied. If such conclusions are not of faith, then, certainly, no developments ; but if they are of faith, it does not necessarily follow that there are developments. We lose, indeed, an argument against developments, but our friends obtain no argument for them. The number of such conclusions is limited by the nature of the case, and they all may have been known by the Apostles and explicitly handed over to their successors. If they are of faith, or, in the language of the developmentists, can be “ruled of faith,” it is some evidence that they were so, — that there is no one of which we can say that it was unknown in the age immediately succeeding the Apostolic, or which, for the simple reason that it is such conclusion, can be said to have been formally defined to be of faith by the Church.

But we are supposed to maintain that the whole faith has always been explicit, and that the Church can declare nothing to be of faith which has not been explicitly believed from the

beginning by all the faithful. But this statement is too strong. A large portion of the faith is never explicitly believed by all persons, and even with many who are not ranked with the simple, much of it is believed only implicitly. Also dogmatic facts and things which had not yet happened in the time of the Apostles are to be excepted. It is of faith that Christ died for me, because I am included in all men, and that Christ died for all men is explicitly revealed. But that he died for me could not have been explicitly believed before I was born. Hence, in the application of the faith to new facts which come up in the Church's history, there is, as Suarez maintains, a growth of faith, in the sense of some things becoming explicit which were at first only implicit. But, save what is included in these exceptions, we have maintained that the whole faith has been from the first explicitly held, believed, and taught by the Church.

The Dublin Review concedes this to be true as far as regards the *deposit* of faith; but it maintains that the *deposit* did not include the whole faith, or, in other words, the Apostles did not hand over to their successors the whole material object of faith which they themselves had received. It will search long before it finds any respectable authority for so singular an opinion. The Apostles were commanded to teach all things whatsoever our Lord had committed to them, and we are not at liberty to believe that they proved recreant to their trust. We must have the express testimony of the Church herself, before we can permit ourselves to believe that the deposit of faith was incomplete, and left by the Apostles to be completed by development. If it is conceded that what was handed over as the faith by the Apostles to their successors has always been explicitly held, believed, and taught by the Church, all is conceded, we apprehend, that is objected to only.

We have, as Catholics, something more to maintain than the infallibility of the Church in defining propositions of faith, or judicially declaring the faith on obscure or disputed points, that is, her authority and infallibility as judge in controversies of faith. We must also maintain her fidelity to her solemn trust to teach all things whatsoever have been committed to her. To be unfaithful or to fail here would be as incompatible with her indefectibility as it would be to err in deciding a matter of faith or morals. She cannot wrap up in a napkin the treasure she has received, and bury it in the earth; for she has re-

ceived it not merely to preserve, but to use for her Master's glory. Her office is to teach, and to teach the whole; and how in the world could she transmit the whole faith down to us, if she should neglect to teach certain portions of it? Where would remain that portion of the faith not taught? How could she be said to retain it? Where would she find it, nay, how could she find it, without a new revelation, when needed to condemn new errors and heresies? She must teach the whole, or not preserve the whole, and there is no *implicit* teaching. Whatever is taught is and must be explicitly taught.

But we do not maintain, as is evident from what we have said, that the whole faith is explicitly taught to every one of the faithful; nor, indeed, that the whole is explicitly known by every one even of the pastors of the Church. There may be a point on which this pastor is imperfectly instructed, or even misinformed; another on which that pastor is not fully or rightly instructed; but there can be no one on which all the pastors, or the pastors taken as a body, are at any time imperfectly instructed or misinstructed. Otherwise, the infallibility of the *Ecclesia dispersa* could not be asserted. It may often happen, too, that in particular localities, owing to causes which it is not necessary here to specify, the tradition of faith on certain points may, for a time, become obscure, or even lost, but it never can become so for the whole Church, or the Church as one teaching body, — especially for the Church of Rome, mistress and mother of all the churches. Thus, the African churches seem, in the time of St. Cyprian, to have lost the tradition of the validity of baptism conferred by a heretic. But the Church retained it, not implicitly only, but explicitly, as we know from St. Stephen. In this way are to be explained most of the phenomena relied on by the developmentists. The facts in the case prove always, that, though unknown in this particular locality or by this particular individual, misapprehended here or by this one, the truth is never unknown or misapprehended in the Church as a whole, and therefore the Church, in order to make it known or to present it truly, has not to develop and elaborate it, — has only to define anew what she has always held and proposed.

Again, in contending that the whole faith has always been *explicitly* held, believed, and taught, we do not contend that every point has always been *distinctly* held, believed, and taught. Faith may be explicit, and yet not distinct; that is, the

whole faith may be immediately apprehended by the mind, and explicitly known to be faith, without its several propositions being distinguished, or apprehended in their distinction from and relation to each other. Hence the definitions which the Church makes *contra errores insurgentes*, though they do not render explicit the faith which was before implicit, may often render distinct what before was indistinct. Implicit faith is faith which, though implied in what is immediately apprehended, is not itself thus apprehended; but indistinct faith is immediately apprehended, is the immediate object of mental apprehension, as truly so as that which is distinct; but it is not distinguished from other propositions also immediately apprehended. When we stand on the beach and listen to the roar of the ocean, we actually hear the sound of each particular wave which goes to make up the total sound; but we do not distinguish the sound of each from the sound of the others. So is it with the faith. Heresies and errors which arise from time to time draw the attention of the Church to particular points, and, in proposing the truth against them, the Church renders the faith more distinct and definite on those points than it was before, and, no doubt, the faithful can more clearly and *distinctly* apprehend it afterwards than they did or could previously. It is thus that faith gains, in process of time, as St. Vincent of Lerins says, in evidence, clearness, and distinctness, and to this gain heresies and errors, no doubt, contribute. Development of the faith in this sense we do not deny.

But even here we must be on our guard lest we go too far. The obscurity and indistinctness cleared up or removed by the new explications or definitions which the Church from time to time makes through her Sovereign Pontiffs and General Councils must not be lightly assumed to have existed from the beginning, nor can we always affirm that the faith on the points defined had never, previously to the definition, been clearly and distinctly apprehended. The obscurity and indistinctness may have been occasioned by errors which have arisen on matters not immediately pertaining to faith, and darkened the minds of many, rendered the faith, which was before clear, obscure, which was before distinct, confused, and the definition only restores the faith to its former clearness and distinctness. Thus, Pallavicini tells us that "all the Holy Council of Trent proposed to itself was to restore the faith which had become obscure by error to its pristine splendor," and the Holy Council

itself says as much. Indeed, we have met with no instance, in our theological reading, of a new definition by the Church, which was demanded for any other reason than to remove error and obscurity on points which had once been clearly and distinctly apprehended.

It seems to us that there is at the present time among many, from whom we should expect better things, a disposition to underrate the attainments in sacred science of the early Fathers; that the popular doctrine of progress has affected too many minds that should have been proof against it, and able to detect its falsity. The early Fathers were not the weak and ignorant creatures we moderns are too apt to fancy them. They were, even humanly speaking, the great men of their times, and their times were remarkable for great and even excessive intellectual cultivation. They lived, too, near the sources; they had been instructed by Apostles, or Apostolic men; and no man can read the fragments of their works which time has spared without feeling how much clearer, more vivid, and more loving were their views of Divine truth than are ours. We are, till we recall the wonders of grace, astonished at the grandeur, at the breadth and depth, of their views, the richness, variety, and precision of their statements. We feel how little we are in comparison with them, and that we become great simply in learning even a small portion of what they knew.

Undoubtedly, we may detect in the ante-Nicene Fathers expressions not safe or proper to be used after the Arian and other controversies arose; but this is no evidence that their views were inexact and their apprehension of the Divine mysteries was imperfect. Their language, at the time they used it, and in relation to the persons to whom they addressed it, may have been the best fitted to instruct and edify, on the topics they were treating, of any they could have chosen. Every age, as well as every nation, has its own language, which, though perfectly adapted to its own wants, becomes inappropriate and liable to mislead when transported to another. *Consubstantial* was an unsafe word when the Sabellian controversy raged; it became the appropriate symbol of the faith when the Arian controversy came up. It becomes again, not unsafe, but inadequate, now, when we have, as the rising error, the old Eutychian heresy, under a novel form, and are obliged to defend, not the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father, but the radical distinction between the human and the Divine.

The novel heresy concedes that "the Son is consubstantial to the Father," but adds, "and so are all men." There can be no doubt of the faith of the Church on this point, but we should look in vain in the symbol for a precise and formal condemnation of this blasphemous heresy, or the exact and formal statement of its precise contradictory. Hence it is that the Church has often to vary her expressions and to adopt novel terms to condemn novel errors ; but who from this concludes that she opposes to the error a novel faith, or that she only imperfectly apprehended her own faith before the error appeared ?

It may often happen, also, that learned and saintly men may continue to use the terms to which they have been accustomed a long time after, by the rise of novel errors, they have ceased to be accurate, and that, too, without any impeachment of the completeness, soundness, or exactness of their knowledge of the sacred mysteries. Such men are, in general, more engaged in the practice of truth than in the detection of errors of which they have not heard, and it may well happen that an error has stolen in unawares, has spread, and exerted no little influence, before they are fully apprised of its existence, or judge it worthy of attention. The great theologians of the Church, the learned and heroic souls, whom after ages are to venerate as saints, to whom it belongs in the providence of God to defeat Satan and his legions, and to triumph over error, are seldom the first to detect the approach of the error, and to sound the alarm. Men of smaller minds, less learning, less piety, less charity it may be, are the ones to do this, and they may be these, not because they better know the faith, but simply because they have had more familiarity with error, and live habitually nearer its confines. We could easily illustrate what we assert by examples which have come under our observation, but it is unnecessary.

Considerations like these are amply sufficient to account for the inaccuracies of language charged against some few of the ante-Nicene Fathers, and which are adduced as proofs that the sacred mysteries, during the ante-Nicene period, were only imperfectly developed and only imperfectly apprehended. The notion, that the faith, save in the respects we have expressly excepted, is better understood by us moderns than it was by the Christians of the martyr-age, — those Christians who lived so near the time when our Lord himself tabernacled among men in the flesh, who had such rich abundance of grace, who were so firm in their faith, so fervent in their piety, so heroic

in their constancy, who bore the Cross in triumph over Pagan art, philosophy, refinement, and superstition, and planted it on the Capitol of the world, — seems to us a gross insult to the memory of the Saints, and to proceed from an overweening conceit of ourselves, and base ingratitude to those to whom, under God, we owe it that we are not now ruthless barbarians, quaffing the blood of our enemies in honor of Wodin or Thor. Far more to the purpose, than to propagate such a notion, would it be for us to study to know our faith as well as they knew it, and to ask them to pray God for us, that we may have the grace at least to try to imitate their heroic virtues. They who rate highest the sacred science possessed by the Fathers will show the most gratitude and come nearest to the truth.

That the Apostles could not have communicated the whole faith explicitly to their successors without these successors being specially inspired to receive it, as is pretended by the developmentists, is a position which cannot be seriously defended for a moment by any one who does not confound faith with the *Gnosis* of the Alexandrians, or with the theological science of the Schoolmen. The Apostles had the whole clearly and distinctly in their own minds, and could far more easily and in a much shorter time communicate it to their hearers, than our modern professors of theology can to their seminarians. It was far less labor for their pupils to receive it, and treasure it up in their memories, than it is for us learn it now, when we have to spend far more time and thought in refuting error, in examining false systems, and meeting the objections of adversaries, than in learning the faith itself, — what is not to be believed, than in learning what is to be believed. This is sufficient; for we have never pretended that the faith, as the contradictory of error, was as well known in the beginning as it is now, or that the Apostles instructed their successors how to refute all the objections which the craft, the ingenuity, or the malice of men might raise through all coming time against their faith. Yet even here, in what is not faith, but theology, perhaps, were we to inquire, or if we had the means of inquiring, we should find that we have made, save as to method, but small progress since the Apostolic age. But does any body pretend that the answers of theology to objections, or the solutions of difficulties and illustrations of obscure points offered by theologians, are inspired? Do the developmentists ask us to prove that these are not and cannot be “ruled” of faith?

These remarks are all we wish to add to what we have before said. It would not be difficult to account for the error of our English friends, if that entered into our purpose. They have neglected to draw a sharp line of distinction between faith and theology, and seem to us to confound what the ancients called the *Gnosis*, or Science of God, built up by speculation and meditation on the foundation of faith, with faith itself. In this science there may have been, for aught we know, developments, and certain it is that most of the errors and heresies which disturbed the Church for centuries originated in the attempt to construct it, and to know more of God than he has chosen to reveal. But of this we have had nothing to say. Whether, in the way the Christian Alexandrians attempted to complete their science of God, any advance was or was not made, we leave without the expression of an opinion; for all that was developed or added in this way is evidently distinguishable from faith. It was never, as Moehler, in his essay on *The Unity of the Church*, tells us, included in the symbol, and by it the Christian perfects, not Christianity, but himself.*

* "It is, then, true to say that the Christian seeks not to perfect Christianity, but by Christianity to perfect himself; he who will do the one must renounce the other." — *De l'Unité de l'Eglise*, Bruxelles, 1839, chap. 4, p. 124. We cite the French translation of this work, for we have been unable to procure it in the original German. This, we believe, was the first work published by the learned author of *Symbolism*. It is not regarded as orthodox, which is the reason, perhaps, why *The Dublin Review* does not cite it; but it is clear to us that it is the work which has contributed more than any other to the theory of development; and it should be read by every one who would understand Mr. Newman's Essay. It is precisely the work, half speculative and half mystical, to captivate an erudite and philosophical mind *in transitu* from Protestantism to Catholicity. Yet even in this work, in which the author goes decidedly for development, and seems to hold it essential to the perfect Christian, he takes care not to confound the developed with the revealed truth, or the perfection effected by the developments with the perfection of Christianity itself. He nowhere holds, with Mr. Newman, that development is necessary to complete the faith, to fill up its gaps, or to provide us with additional dogmas; but contents himself with representing it as necessary to complete the *life* of the Christian, or to realize subjectively the complete life of faith, — a doctrine to which we do not object, for it means, in plain English, only the practical application of faith to our entire life, or the conformity of our entire life to the faith. Under the strange disguises in which our German friends delight, we often find only an old and familiar acquaintance, and sometimes an old and valued friend. We have cited this work of Moehler as good authority for us against the

But, in conclusion, we will say, in justice to Mr. Newman and his friends, that the whole responsibility of this unsound and uncatholic theory, as we hold it, does not belong to them. It has for some time been floating about in the minds, and showing now and then a feature of itself in the writings, of some Catholics, for several years ; and we had observed decided tendencies towards it in more than one quarter, and had even expressed ourselves in our Review against it, before the appearance of Mr. Newman's Essay. It was this tendency to the theory already existing in many minds, no doubt, that prevented a general reclamation against the Essay on Development, and, we may add, which made it peculiarly dangerous. If we have made the Essay the occasion of discussing the theory of development, it has been solely because in it the theory has for the first time assumed a definite shape, a tangible form, in which it could be seized and handled. Yet the fact that it was already floating about in Catholic quarters, or that some Catholics were indicating a tendency towards it, must be taken as no slight excuse for our Oxford friends ; and since this fact already existed, it was well that Mr. Newman published his Essay. It has brought the matter to a head, and placed the theory fairly before the Catholic public. We have given our views of it, and the grounds on which we justify them. It is for the proper authorities to decide who is right, who is wrong. We have no fears that the decision will be against ourselves ; but, if it is, we have nothing to do but to retract, to give up error for truth, to say we have been wrong and are sorry for it ; which is no great hardship.

ART. VI. — *Vie de Saint Dominique*, par le Révérend Père Frère Henri-Dominique Lacordaire, de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs. 2^{me} Edition. Paris. 1841.

WE have introduced this most interesting and instructive biography, not so much with the design of reviewing it, as to enable us to attempt what we have long wished that abler hands would have achieved, — to give a plain, though brief and

theory of development ; but it cannot, from its acknowledged unsoundness, be cited as authority against us.

unexaggerated, history of the Albigenses and the Albigensian wars, in which St. Dominic figured prominently, and with admirable success, though not in the manner that is but too frequently supposed. It is the popular belief, at least in this country, that Dominic acted as a sort of leader or generalissimo in those bloody scenes, and even some Catholics appear to think that his conduct in this matter requires an apology. The fact, however, is, that there never was a man more emphatically a man of peace, and a herald of the Gospel of peace, than the blessed St. Dominic. His name is never mentioned by contemporary historians in connection with the Albigensian wars, except as a teacher of the ignorant, a consoler of the afflicted, and a model of sanctity for all. We shall, indeed, find him on terms of affectionate intimacy with Simon de Montfort, the chief of the crusaders, and wielding an influence over the knights and men-at-arms, and we shall have occasion in this article to refer directly to the history of his mission; but in no instance shall we find him saying, doing, or suggesting any thing that could dim the effulgence of his name, or employing his influence in a manner to sully the spotless purity of his soul.

The Albigensian wars date their origin from the latter part of the twelfth century. The twelfth century had dawned gloriously. The banner of Christianity was waving in triumph over the Holy Sepulchre, and the Greek Church seemed more than ever on the point of reconciliation with the Latin. The Turks, vanquished on every side, and threatened in their very capital, halted in their ruthless and tempestuous incursions into Europe, and retreated to the defence of their own firesides. But bright though its dawn, the eve of this century was gloomy enough. The crescent had supplanted the cross on the minarets of Jerusalem, and the knights of Christendom had fallen before the sabres of the Mussulmans. The ungrateful and treacherous Greeks, in consequence of their insulting treatment of the Catholics, were farther than ever removed from the centre of unity. Worse than all, there prevailed among Churchmen a great degree of immorality, and all the efforts of the Popes to revive the spirit of piety and to restore ecclesiastical discipline were powerless against the rushing tide of simony, worldliness, and avarice. We need not be surprised, then, if upon the wave of so many abuses and crying sins there should appear another and yet more terrible evil, because less

likely to be cured, that of heresy. In the language of Father Lacordaire :—

“ One day, about the year 1160, Peter Waldo, a wealthy citizen of Lyons, saw a man struck dead by lightning at his side. This event made such an impression upon him, that he distributed all his goods to the poor, and consecrated himself entirely to the service of God. As ecclesiastical reform was then the universal demand, he had no difficulty in fancying that he was commissioned from above to bring it about, and he gathered around him a little band whom he persuaded to join him in embracing an apostolical life. How little do the projects of really great men differ from those of men who are but the disturbers of public tranquillity ! If Peter Waldo had possessed a greater degree of virtue and more genius, he might have been a St. Dominic or a St. Francis. But, unhappily, he fell a victim to a temptation that in every age has caused the ruin of men otherwise intelligent. He believed it impossible to save the Church by means of the Church. He asserted that the True Spouse of Jesus Christ had failed in the time of Constantine, who allowed the Church to come into possession of temporal goods ; that the Church of Rome was the harlot of the Apocalypse, the mother and mistress of every error ; that all prelates were Scribes, and all religious were Pharisees ; that the Pope and bishops were all homicides ; that it was unlawful for the clergy to accept of tithes or glebes ; that to endow churches and convents was mortal sin ; that it was the duty of all clergymen, of whatever rank, to gain their livelihood by their hands, as did the Apostles ; and finally, that he, Peter Waldo, was the one destined by the Almighty to reëstablish, on its primitive footing, the genuine society or assembly of the children of God.” — pp. 7, 8.

Under favor of the same circumstances that protected and gave stability to the heresy of the Waldenses, so called from this Peter Waldo, sprang up by its side in the south of France another heresy, that of the Albigenses, the history of whose origin and progressive march through Europe is invested with a peculiar interest to us, because a very numerous body of our fellow-citizens, respectable alike for their affluence, their learning, and their social virtues, claim these same Albigenses as their spiritual progenitors. We shall begin by tracing out the origin and progress of the sect.

Near the commencement of the third century of our era, was born, upon the estate of a rich widow, a certain slave. As he advanced to manhood, he developed a figure of remarkable symmetry and beauty, and gave evidence of genius and wit.

His mistress, captivated, we presume, more by his beauty than his talents, after presenting him with his freedom, adopted him as her son. She provided liberally for his education, selected for his teachers the most celebrated philosophers, caused him to be instructed in all the sciences, mysteries, and magic arts of Persian lore ; and then died, leaving him the sole inheritor of all her wealth. Among the books that constituted a portion of his inheritance were the works of a famous heretic, filled with extravagant and revolting theories, chiefly derived from the ancient Gnostics. This was food well suited to the cravings of his appetite, and he seized and devoured it with a greediness that increased in the ratio of the quantity consumed. To assist digestion, he occasionally appeared in public as a religious teacher ; and being gifted with a pleasing address and a melodious voice, he attracted crowds of eager listeners. Some of his auditors, were pagans, but a large number were Christians, who had degenerated from the pure faith of their fathers. He claimed to be a new apostle, nay, the very Paraclete, announced and promised by the Son of God. The very boldness of his pretensions gave him an influence over the spirits of men, and they regarded him with reverence, as a being commissioned from above, and attributed to him the power to heal disease and infirmity. The fame of his exploits reached the palace of the king of Persia, and he commanded him to heal his son, who was suffering under a malady pronounced incurable by his physicians. The impostor promised to heal the patient by the potency of his prayers. However, the prince died under the treatment, and the pretended apostle was thrown into prison. He escaped, proclaimed anew his pernicious doctrines, was retaken and flayed alive. Such was the life and such the death of Manes, the founder of the sect of the Manichæans.

As it will aid us somewhat in analyzing the subsequent conduct of the partisans of the sect we are about to encounter, we shall here briefly enumerate the leading points of belief of the ancient Manichæans.

1. They inculcated the existence of two Gods, one good and one evil, each independent of, and each laboring to destroy, the other. One was the author of good, the other of evil. The soul was the work of the Good Principle, and was, therefore, essentially good, and could do no wrong. The body, on the contrary, was the work of the Evil Demon, for the deeds of which, therefore, the soul was not accountable. This was no new doctrine, but had been taught by the *Gnostics*, or

knowing ones, in the Apostolic age, and before them by Zoroaster.*

2. They inferred, that, as the body was the work of the Evil Principle, marriage was unlawful, though every excess of passion was exempt from guilt.

3. They denied, for the same reason, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and consequently all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, and treated as idolatrous most of the pious practices of Christians.

4. They rejected the Old Testament, as the work of the Devil.

5. They were formed into a fraternity composed of different degrees, nearly corresponding with the degrees of modern Freemasonry. There were *novices*, *auditors*, the *initiated* or *elect*, and *grand-masters*. They were bound to the strictest secrecy, so much so as to hold it for a maxim to *swear truly or falsely, but never to divulge the secret*. Thus were they the fathers and models of secret societies.

6. Their political principles were comprised in two words, — LIBERTY and EQUALITY ; that is, with their views, licentiousness and contempt of superior authority.†

After the death of Manes, his followers daily multiplied, and continued zealously to propagate his impious doctrines, and added to them another, which, in the course of time, took precedence of all the rest, and in after ages constituted the characteristic feature of the sect, — namely, revenge for the death of their founder. He had been put to death by a king. His punishment had been that of a slave, — he was flayed alive. His doctrine had been condemned and successfully resisted by the Church. Hence his followers pledged themselves by the most terrible oaths to wage a bitter and interminable war against kings and governments, against all distinctions of rank, and, above all, against religion and its ministers. As religion was the basis of all order, and the ligature that bound men together, and cemented and strengthened the civil, social, and political compact, they concentrated all their efforts to impair its influence, and to destroy its institutions.

They proceeded adroitly. They began by familiarizing their victims with sneers against religion and with opprobrious epithets. They were the first that styled the Church the Scar-

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Vol. II. p. 273.

† *Ibid.* Also, Henrion, *L'Histoire Ecclesiastique*.

let Woman of the Apocalypse. From them their modern descendants have borrowed that expression. They also called it a den of thieves. The bells of churches they were pleased to denominate bugles of the Devil,* as their imitators and offspring of more recent times bestowed upon organs the quaint appellation of "Devil's bagpipes." St. Augustine, who in his youth had adopted their doctrines and knew them thoroughly, says, that they took an oath of secrecy, and received for a maxim, "*Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli* ; Swear true, swear false, but never divulge the secret." They adopted signs and passwords, and saluted with the cabalistic expression, "Have you seen the light?" and other similar phrases. On shaking hands, they could recognize an adept from one not initiated. In their places of assembling were to be seen mysterious emblems and enigmatic pictures ; most frequently representations of the sun, moon, and stars. St. Augustine says, that, when they prayed, they turned toward the sun by day, and toward the moon by night.† Among their mysteries was a frightful one called Bema. At a certain season every year they assembled around a mortuary catafalque, elevated on five steps, and covered with significant decorations. They rendered homage to the man supposed to rest under this catafalque. That man was Manes. It was his horrible death they celebrated, and it was on this occasion that they annually renewed their vow of extermination and death to kings and priests. The season devoted to these abominable orgies was the same that Christians consecrate to the death and resurrection of Christ. Few of these matters, however, were revealed, except to those in the highest grades, or the initiated. The ostensible object and character of the sect, that which met the public eye or attracted general attention, was that of a pious and charitable brotherhood. They professed great virtue and purity of life, and were ever ready to aid with money or protection the distressed members of their society, or their surviving widows and orphans.‡

For centuries the Manichæans went on multiplying and spreading the poison of their sentiments over every portion of the Christian world. Popes, princes, and magistrates knew of its presence, — they could perceive its effects by the devastation and misery it produced, — they knew well that the virus

* Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, Vol. VI.

† Hurter, Vol. II. p. 293.

‡ Henrion.

was at work and rapidly approaching the very heart of Christian Europe, —but they endeavoured in vain to detect it, and they knew not how or where to apply the antidote. The members of the sect concealed themselves with such art that it was almost impossible to find them. They assisted at mass and at the Church offices promiscuously with Catholics. They even received communion with the faithful, though they disbelieved the real presence; and if for any cause they were suspected and interrogated, they answered like Catholics. This was their spirit from the beginning,* and is particularly mentioned by St. Augustine and St. Leo. Peter of Sicily, and after him Cedrenus, speak of the same trait in the Paulicians, who were a branch of the Manichæan sect. When closely questioned, they disguised their true sentiments by artful equivocations. When at length they had become sufficiently numerous and formidable, they were less guarded, and in some places openly arrayed themselves against their princes and took up arms; in consequence of which Imperial laws were enacted in the ninth century, which condemned them to imprisonment and death.†

One thousand years of the Christian era had elapsed when the Manichæans appeared for the first time in France (A. D. 1017). The heresy was introduced by an Italian woman, who, by her fascinations and charms, (in which women are said to be preëminent,) succeeded in inveigling two canons of Orleans, who enjoyed a high reputation for learning and sanctity. From them the contagion spread, and as corruption of manners most commonly engenders extinction of faith, so, as men's morals were in that region at a low ebb, a large number of the clergy were infected before any remedy could be applied. The new apostates, like the fox in the fable, were anxious to involve as many as possible in the same dilemma with themselves. Accordingly, they devised a thousand ways to propagate their views. They tripped with mincing steps into private houses, proffering religious instruction to the inmates, assuming a sanctified countenance and a drawling accent, and wearing, we might almost add at a venture, black coats and starched cravats. They patted little children on the head, and spoke kindly to them, and would ask if they stood in need of raiment or of playthings. They insinuated themselves, both men and women, into the chambers of the sick, and inquired

* Sismondi, Vol. V.

† Bossuet, *Varia*, Tom. I.

tenderly after the health of the patients. They announced to all, that truth, and goodness, and peace of mind were to be found only in their community. They wrote an abundance of little tracts in which were contained their least offensive doctrines, and threw them into people's windows and doors, and scattered them by the way-side and in the fields. On the envelopes of these tracts it was announced that they had been composed in heaven, and had been brought thence by angels, in corroboration of which assurance the finder was invited to apply them to his nose, and snuff the celestial odor they distilled. They were strongly scented with musk. Many persons, among whom were some weak-minded ecclesiastics, allowed themselves to be taken in these snares, whilst others more clear-headed publicly exposed their impostures.*

At length, in 1022, a person of great repute, and of sound erudition, named Aréfaste, a sincere and fervent Catholic, determined to discover what these new professors really taught, and for this purpose insinuated himself into their confidence, pretending to seek instruction. He was after a while admitted to a seat in their assemblies, where they appeared to be constantly occupied in quoting and expounding the Sacred Writings. They exhorted him to be converted, to forsake the ways of darkness and to walk in the light. Aréfaste listened with a modesty and attention that delighted his preceptors. So soon as they felt sure of him, they expatiated freely upon the most sacred mysteries of Christianity, and treated them as the ravings of enthusiasts. They, at last, condescended to inform him that the heavens and the earth, by their very nature eternal, had neither cause nor beginning; that Christ was never born of a virgin, and had never suffered for men, but that a demon was crucified in his form; that he had never risen from the dead; that baptism was of no efficacy whatever; and, finally, that good works were useless, and the most violent excesses of passion innocuous. By night they assembled in a retired place, and, torch in hand, they recited after the manner of a litany the names of evil spirits, till one of them, either by jugglery or magic, actually appeared. Then, having extinguished their torches, unutterable abominations followed. At certain meetings, or rather Saturnalia, they burned an infant eight days old, the fruit of these infamous excesses. The ashes were collected and honored with religious veneration. It was used

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. p. 284.

in the reception of novices, and was given to the dying by way of viaticum.

Aréfaste, having carefully informed himself of these impious orgies, and of the principal individuals who practised them, communicated his discoveries to the king (Robert II.), who immediately hastened to the spot. The day after his arrival he ordered the arrest of all the persons accused. Aréfaste was seized with the rest, that they might not suspect him of being the informer. A council of bishops was forthwith convened, and the prisoners were brought before it. At first, they equivocated as usual, and professed to believe like Catholics; but, confronted with Aréfaste, and seeing no way of escape, they made a virtue of necessity, and boldly avowed the sentiments with which they stood charged; they derided the most sacred truths of Christianity, justified the revolting practices alleged against them, and set at open defiance the king and his laws. The people were exasperated to such a degree, that they could with difficulty be restrained from tearing the prisoners piecemeal; the latter were immediately sentenced and led forth to execution, and, in accordance with the laws then in force, paid with their lives the forfeit of their crimes.*

The vigorous measures adopted by King Robert effectually purged his domains of these dangerous sectarians, and forced them to seek refuge in other regions. By careful concealment of the worst features of their sect, they succeeded, at length, in establishing themselves in the neighbouring provinces. Thus was formed the germ of the sect which, under various names, became so notorious in the south of France, where the effeminacy and neglect of luxurious magistrates afforded them opportunities and means to acquire strength, and in the course of time to inundate the entire land with blood and threaten the safety and stability of both church and state.†

‡ This country was peculiarly adapted to the propagation and rank growth of Manichæism. It was in the twelfth century, in a commercial point of view the most flourishing, and in a literary one the most civilized, part of Western Europe. The soil was rich, and its produce exuberant, and amidst the corn-fields and vineyards arose many rich cities and many stately castles. It was there that the spirit of chivalry first laid aside its terrors and appeared as the inseparable associate of art and literature, of courtesy and love. The language of Provence

* Bossuet, *Varia*. Henrion, Tom. IV.

† Henrion.

was already the language of the learned and polite. A literature rich in ballads, in war-songs, in satire, and, above all, in amatory poetry, amused the leisure of the knights and ladies whose gorgeous mansions adorned the banks of the Rhone and Garonne. But, alas ! with civilization had come also freedom of thought and irreligion. Elsewhere, unbelievers and scoffers were regarded with execration, and dared not avow their sentiments. Not so in the rich and luxurious regions of Provence and Languedoc. The people lived in habits of courteous and lucrative intercourse with the Moorish kingdoms of Spain, from which they imbibed many skeptical notions. They gave also a welcome reception to teachers and mathematicians, who, in the schools of Cordova and Granada had become versed in all the learning and theological impieties of the Arabians. The Greek, too, still preserving, in the midst of his political degradation, the inquisitive spirit of his fathers, brought to the marts of Narbonne and Toulouse, together with the drugs and silks of remote climes, their bold and subtle theories. The Paulician theology, which was a modified Manichæism, spread rapidly among them and fastened deeply its roots. Religion lost all authority with all classes, from the great feudal princes down to the cultivators of the soil, and the clergy were regarded with contempt.* The troubadours, inebriated with their subtle theories, went from chateau to chateau, enlivening social reunions with jests upon things the most sacred, caricaturing priests, and relating scandalous tales of bishops, monks, and nuns ; by which means they engendered, at first, indifference, then aversion, to religion and to its ministers. The common people were pleased with the new doctrines, for they flattered their pride, and placed them on a level with the most aristocratic ; the higher ranks were enraptured, for they saw in the diffusion of these theories the perspective of a libertine life, wine and women, tilts and tournaments, luxury and pleasure.

It was in the year 1181 that the new sectaries became formidable in the south of France under the name of Albigenses, so called from the town of Albi, which was one of their strongholds. Protestants are fond of claiming the Albigenses as their progenitors, and amuse themselves with poetic and sentimental effusions upon the faithful few concealed in the verdant plains of Provence, in the passes of the Pyrenees, and

* *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1840.

in the valleys of Piedmont, that had not yet bowed the knee to Baal. But that these their boasted ancestors held to many of the distinguishing principles of the Manichæan sect is as certain as any fact recorded in history. Every candid Protestant writer admits it. Macaulay, in the *Edinburgh Review*, just cited, expressly declares it, and Sismondi, in his *History of the French* (Vol. VI.), states it as a fact. They themselves, when brought to the test, boldly confessed it. At the council of Lombez, though in many things they equivocated, as usual, yet in others they spoke plainly, and declared that they rejected the Old Testament altogether; that sacraments administered by wicked men were invalid, but that all good men, that is, men of their sect, whether ordained or not, could lawfully administer them; that judicial oaths were unlawful; also marriage and infant baptism. Father Renier, a Dominican, who wrote in 1250, and who had been for seventeen years a member of the sect, but, like another St. Augustine, was converted to Catholic truth, positively asserts that they were Manichæans, and clearly traces their descent from the Manichæans of Bulgaria. Many others, educated among them, give similar testimony; as, indeed, do all the Catholic authors of those times, who have treated at all on the subject. It is to be presumed that they must be hard pushed for ancestry, especially "the churches of the English communion," as Dr. Jarvis facetiously styles the Protestant Episcopal Church, who adopt a decayed, cast-off ancestry like this, and that for no conceivable reason but because they agree with them in abusing the Church and calling the Pope hard names.*

After sixteen years of forbearance and fruitless efforts to restrain the excesses of the Albigenses by the arts of persuasion, in 1181 recourse was had to arms. This measure became absolutely necessary in consequence of their daily and cruel depredations. Allied with the Cotteraux, a famous band of brigands and assassins, the terror of the country, and patronized by many powerful lords and knights, they ravaged the neighbourhood and committed frightful excesses. "I have witnessed," says a contemporary writer, — Stephen, abbot of St. Geneviève at Paris, — "on every road where I passed, the smoking ruins of churches consumed by them, and the habitations of men converted into the dens of wild beasts."

Raymond V., Count of Toulouse, demanded of the king

* Bossuet, *Varia*.

of France an armed force to protect the Catholics, and to bring the offenders to terms. A numerous army was marched to the field, which was completely victorious. The consequence was, that many of the rebels returned to their allegiance, and externally, at least, embraced the Catholic faith. A temporary tranquillity ensued. But it was only temporary.* In less than ten years the Albigenses were found stronger and more turbulent than ever, and in close alliance with the Waldenses, or Poor Men of Lyons, a sect that at first widely differed from them, but which in process of time adopted many of their peculiar principles. They had at the commencement of the thirteenth century, A. D. 1206, become the more formidable that they had for leader Raymond, Count of Toulouse, son of that Raymond who, a few years before, had so vigorously opposed them, and for patrons and supporters most of the nobility of the country.†

Raymond governed one of the most important provinces in Europe. It was a central region, communicating directly with France, with Italy, and with Spain. The provinces yet untainted were separated by this infected district.‡ The yeomen of fifty towns and of countless boroughs followed the standard of Raymond VI. One hundred and ten governors of castles acknowledged him as liege lord, and a multitude of noblemen always attended him. The court of his father had been accounted one of the most brilliant of Europe. The lady fair, the gallant knight, and the merry troubadour sang of love and of deeds of daring, and the whole year was an uninterrupted succession of holidays. His son, Raymond VI., was in his early youth confided to tutors of the Manichæan sect, and he imbibed their principles. When, therefore, in 1194, he succeeded to his father, he protected the Albigenses, and offered a large reward in money to every Christian knight that should apostatize.§ He followed out his principles by repudiating his wives as often as they ceased to charm him.|| Moreover, he had so little respect for religion and the laws of the Church, that he hired mountebanks to mock and caricature the priests while they were officiating at the altar. The very bishop of

* Henrion, Tom. V. p. 169.

† Henrion, Tom. V. p. 229.

‡ *Edinburgh Review*, *ubi supra*.

§ Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. III. p. 334.

|| Which example was scrupulously followed by one of his most distinguished imitators, Henry VIII., the father of "the Church by law established in England."

the diocese was obliged, whenever he went abroad, to take an escort of armed men for the security of his person.* The Divine Office was no longer chanted in public. Weeds and tufted grass grew up among the steps and flags around the churches, and the moss and ivy crept over their walls. Many churches were converted into forts and garrisons, and, while song and revelry arose from these sanctuaries, their towers and battlements resounded with the clash of arms and the shouts and imprecations of men in battle.

If ever there was a time for prompt and energetic action to stem the torrent of irreligion, and to save the world from anarchy and barbarism, it was then. The Church was the only power on earth that could interfere with any chance of success. So far back as in 1179, in the Eleventh General Council, the errors of the Albigenses had been condemned. The twenty-seventh canon is most severe against them. It smites them with anathema, deprives them of the right of ecclesiastical sepulture, condemns all who favor or patronize them, and finally exhorts Christians to take arms against them. This proceeding on the part of the Church seems to us harsh, and sets for ever at rest one point, and that is, that the Church, as such, in general council assembled, did countenance and advise the punishment and suppression of the Albigensian heretics. Protestant writers contend that this treatment of the Albigenses proceeded from religious bigotry, and was levelled against a peaceful, innocent, and virtuous community of Christians, whose only crime was a desire to serve God according to the dictates of their conscience. Mosheim says, that the Roman Pontiffs urged a most sanguinary war against them for merely teaching otherwise than the Church taught, and for calling in question the power and prerogatives of the Popes. Now this is not true, as is evident from all the proceedings instituted against them, and from the very words of the canon which condemned them. Had the Albigenses been content with simply holding a false doctrine, and with teaching and professing it among themselves, — had they not waged open war against the religion of the whole world, and sought to bring its authority, the only conservative authority known, into contempt, — had they not despised the laws of the land, and its civil rulers, and committed excesses that threatened the subversion of all law and order, of religion and of government, no war would have

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. III. p. 335.

been waged against them. The Church has often condemned heresies, but no instance can be shown wherein she has levelled her anathemas against the persons of heretics, unless the public weal, and the conservation of ecclesiastical or political institutions, or both, manifestly and peremptorily demanded it. We have, we think, already said enough to show that in this case they did demand it. The question was simply this : — Shall the Church stand and see herself ravelled out into threads, and held up to public scorn as a jest and a by-word, her ministers insulted and despised, her temples burned and razed to the ground, her institutions attacked on every side, her very existence menaced, though vainly, by a band of sworn and ruthless enemies, combining the subtlety of Manichæans with the ferocity of Moors, and lift no hand to save herself and you from one common ruin ? Or shall she buckle on her panoply, and, with the means with which God has endowed her, stand upon her defence ? The very words of the canon show that its object was not so much to convert them as to put an end to their cruelties. “ With regard to those heretics,” it says, meaning the Albigenses and other kindred sects, “ who *practise* such atrocities towards Christians as not to spare even churches and monasteries, nay, nor widows, nor orphans, but ruthlessly exterminate and slay, regarding neither age, nor sex, nor infirmity, we decree, &c. ; . . . and we enjoin upon all Christians to withstand such crimes, and, arms in hand, to protect their brethren.” * Even the French infidel Guizot does not regard the Albigensian wars as wars of religion, but styles them “ a contest between feudal France on the one hand and municipal France on the other,” — “ a struggle of the feudalism of the North against the attempt at democratic organization of the South ” ; in other words, an attempt of the existing powers to suppress the rebellion of a strong and dangerous faction.† The Church, however, saw farther than this, and with reason.

Scarcely had Innocent III. ascended the pontifical throne, than he spoke (A. D. 1200) in tones of alarm of the progress of these turbulent sectaries. He compared them to scorpions whose sting was mortal, to foxes and firebrands carrying burning and desolation into the harvest-field, and to the locusts of the prophet Joel, hidden in the dust, but devouring all before them. Deeply afflicted at the perversion of so many of his flock, fore-

* Palma, *Prælect. Hist. Eccl.*, Tom. III., P. I., p. 120.

† *History of Civilization*, p. 248.

seeing the perils that menaced religion on all sides, Innocent, who never executed any project by halves, was resolved to put forth all his energies and influence to suppress the evil, or, at least, to check its further progress. To this end, he called upon the faithful to amend their lives, to remove every occasion of scandal, and to set an example worthy of imitation; and he called upon the clergy to sound the silver trumpet of truth, that the walls of Jericho might be made to crumble.*

When these measures of persuasion failed, then, and not till then, Innocent felt called upon to urge the application of other means. He decreed that all who obstinately adhered to the sentiments and practices of the modern Manichæans should be excommunicated from the Church, and deprived of all ecclesiastical fiefs and revenues. He recommended to princes to banish them from their territories, and, if necessary, to take up arms against them. In the year 1203, Peter de Castelnau and Rodolphe, both of the Order of Citéaux, arrived at Toulouse, as the Pope's legates. They were men of fervent piety and prudent zeal, who had consecrated their lives to the conversion of these heretics. But, though willing to endure and to labor, they suffered such incredible hardships, and encountered such unexpected and insuperable difficulties in the prosecution of their mission, that they became fairly discouraged. The unfavorable report they made to the Sovereign Pontiff, and the sad picture they presented of the decline of discipline and the prevalence of brigandage and anarchy, determined Innocent to call upon the king of France in the most energetic terms to awake from his stupor and provide for the safety of his kingdom and of the Church. "The time has arrived," said he, "when the temporal and spiritual should unite for mutual protection, and they who would shake off the yoke of Christian obedience should be restrained by the secular arm. A solemn obligation rests upon you, therefore, to use the power that God has intrusted to you; and if you cannot in person march against these evil-doers, you are bound to empower some suitable person to act in your stead."

Nevertheless, all was in vain. Neither the arts of persuasion, nor armed battalions, were able to convert or to quell the proud, licentious, and rebellious Albigenses. The legates, wearied out and disgusted with a mission so perilous and fruitless, were on the point of throwing up their commission, when,

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. p. 305.

in the month of July, 1206, the Bishop of Osma, a Spaniard, encountered them at Montpellier, on his return from a visit to Rome.* He was accompanied by an humble priest, of medium height, limbs delicately moulded, of handsome features, smiling countenance, rosy complexion, and beard and hair of light auburn. His voice was rich, manly, and sweetly toned. His step was modest, yet firm and graceful, and his temper was uniformly gay and cheerful. His character was as remarkable as his personal appearance. He was swift as the lightning of heaven in forming a resolution, and firm as a rock of jasper in its execution. When all others hesitated, he quailed not, and he appeared always confident of success. His conversation invariably charmed and edified, whatever the rank or condition of his auditor. It always turned upon religion, and was garnished with eloquent and touching citations from the Sacred Writings. In the pulpit he was majestic, animated, and resistless. His discourses were like the progress of a storm, and they ended with a rainbow and a serene and unclouded heaven. To those who asked him whence he drew such sublime materials for his sermons he replied, *From the book of charity.*† Yet he was full of humility, and practised the most rigid self-denial. He shunned the notice of men, and was pained by their applause. And this was the man raised up by the Eternal for the deliverance of his people ; this was the man destined to achieve what cardinals, legates, bishops, and learned priests had in vain attempted, — what men in steel, knights in armour, and bristling battalions had failed to accomplish. This was the man — this youthful, modest, humble Levite — who was destined to hold aloft the lamp of truth, to sound its silver trumpet, to rejoice in its triumphs, and to compass the Manichæan Jericho with a chosen band of spirits like his own. Who was this favored champion of the Most High ? It was St. Dominic. The band he gathered around him were Dominicans, an Order celebrated throughout the world, and justly called one of “ the columns of the Church.”

Such was the man that the holy Bishop of Osma had selected as his companion, and with whom he entered the once lovely provinces of the Pyrenees, now desolate and dreary, blighted and scorched by fire and sword and heresy. Two venerable fathers, legates of Innocent III., furrowed with ungrateful and

* Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. p. 348.

† Hurter, *Tableau des Institutions*, Tom. III.

unsuccessful toil, downcast and disheartened, present themselves to the saintly bishop, inform him of their determination to resign their commission, and crave his counsel and advice. The bishop was sorely perplexed, and knew not how or what to reply, and appealed to Dominic, who with characteristic promptness took up the word, and thus addressed the legates : — “You missionaries have made a great mistake in your mode of conducting the mission. You ride about on horses, and employ beasts of burden to convey your baggage and provisions. You thereby give an advantage to the enemies of religion. ‘Look,’ they say, ‘see those horsemen coming up the road ! how finely they ride ! They are coming a-horseback to proclaim the Gospel of one who always went afoot. As to the poor, they cannot stop to notice them, for they would have to dismount.’ No, sirs, you will never have success in this way ; but, if you would prosper, you must lay aside all pomps and luxuries, and unarmed, on foot, and without shoes, proceed to your task like veritable apostles.” This was bold, plain language to be addressed to Papal legates, but it was received in the spirit in which it was given. The advice of the youthful canon* was literally followed. The bishop resolved to join them, and set the example by sending immediately home his servants and horses. The others did the same, and all set forth on foot, without shoes, and rather in the garb of mendicant pilgrims than of Papal missionaries. The good bishop was soon after (1207) taken ill and died. St. Dominic, however, remained, and prosecuted the work so happily begun. He went through all the towns and villages, praying, singing, and exhorting to peace and reconciliation and love, and always remained longest where he found the most hardships and the greatest dangers, esteeming himself but too happy in being instrumental in the salvation of souls, or in laying down his life in the cause. It was at this time that he instituted the celebrated devotion of the Rosary, which consisted in the recitation for a certain number of times of the sublimest of prayers in honor of the Mysteries of Redemption, and as a reparation for the blasphemies and insults that had been heaped upon them by the sectaries. This devotion was not only an eloquent appeal to Heaven, but was also a most instructive and intelligible book in which the great truths of Christianity were made plain to every capacity, from the lord of the castle to the humble peasant.

* He was canon and subprior of the cathedral church of Osma.

The devotion and humility of the gifted missionary, the ardor and perseverance with which he pursued his sacred calling, the zeal and patience with which he catechized and instructed both parents and children, his calmness in the hour of peril, and the eagerness with which he sought persecution and martyrdom, so won upon the respect and confidence of the people, that an infinite number, among whom were some that had been his most violent enemies, were convinced of their errors, were seized with compunction for their crimes, and threw themselves with enthusiasm into the bosom of the Church. Having received special faculties and instructions for the prosecution of his undertaking, he received the penitents with tears of joy, and welcomed them to their father's house. The most stubborn and refractory he sometimes accused to the secular authorities. This last proceeding has called forth unmitigated condemnation from their children and successors of later days, and St. Dominic has been called the father and founder of the Inquisition, in its odious sense, as an execrable and murderous tribunal. The truth is, St. Dominic never established any sort of special ecclesiastical tribunal. He merely exercised the power* of entering a complaint in the civil courts against disturbers of the peace and enemies of the common weal. Such, surely, were the Albigenses, if outlaws, brigands, church-burners, blood-thirsty adventurers, and secret plotters against the state may and ought to be so denominated.

Though, among the simple-hearted and sincere, the labors of St. Dominic were crowned with brilliant and unlooked-for success, yet, on the other hand, they served only to arouse the fury and vengeance of the proud and licentious chiefs, and of their unprincipled followers. The cry of priestcraft was raised, and ran like wildfire. Banners of liberty, so called, rolled in blood and baptized in fire, were unfolded in every village, and multitudes gathered around them. Men were appealed to, if they would consent to be priest-ridden. "Away with the priests! to the gallows with the priests!" From words and shouts and execrations they proceeded to corresponding actions. They patrolled the whole country in armed bands of from five to eight thousand men. Churches were again attacked and burned, and priests and religious were seized and put to death, and in many cases flayed alive. Peter de Cas-

* A power often exercised by priests similarly situated, and recognized by the then existing laws of Europe.

telnaud, the legate of Innocent III., was assassinated (1208) in open day by a servant of the Count of Toulouse, and another ruffian, and was placed by the Church on the catalogue of her martyrs. These events, but especially the murder of the legate, caused a universal shudder, and set all Christendom in flames. The Count of Toulouse and his followers were excommunicated anew, and all the places they occupied, and the cities that gave them refuge or protection, placed under interdict. The king of France awoke at last from his stupor and inactivity, and an army was set on foot, to punish, and, if necessary, to extirpate, the authors of these crimes.* The same indulgences were promised that had been granted to the Crusaders in Palestine. An immense army was rapidly equipped, and was commanded by the most illustrious barons, lords, and knights of France, among whom were Otho, Duke of Bourgogne, who had commanded the army of the Crusaders at the Holy Sepulchre, the valiant Peter de Courtenay, the celebrated and devoted Simon de Montfort, and a multitude of others, no less distinguished by their bravery and feats of arms than by their rank and influence.†

Fifty thousand combatants assembled at the point of rendezvous, wearing the red cross on their breast. The chiefs met, and chose Simon de Montfort commander of the expedition. In 1209, the army marched, and immediately entered the unfortunate countries infected with the Albigensian heresy. Victory attended the crusaders on every side. Cities and posts were invested and carried by assault. The war was continued on both sides for a long series of years, with a ferocity and thirst for blood that has ever characterized civil wars, and all the horrors and cruelties of a fierce and protracted warfare filled the land with devastation and misery, and inundated it with blood. Success, however, attended the crusaders, and the Albigensian Manichæans, more brilliant in tilts and tournaments and letters than in the battle-field, were either swept from the earth, or forced to conceal themselves in its remotest corners, there to remain unknown and unhonored until again brought into notice by the political and religious commotions of the sixteenth century, like certain monsters of the deep, who pursue unknown tracks in the depths of the ocean, and never

* Alban Butler, *St. Dominic*. Sismondi, *Histoire des Français*. Henrion, liv. 39.

† Hurter, *Innocent III.*, Tom. II. liv. 13.

show their heads above the waves except in time of storms and tempests.

We are far from being an advocate for war, and as followers of the Prince of peace we would use our feeble influence, to the extent of our ability, in dissuading men from this terrible alternative. Still less do we advocate, or attempt to justify, the employment of the sword for the advancement of the truth, never sanctioned or permitted by the Church, believing that the truth hath power sufficient in herself, being "more piercing than any two-edged sword, and reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow" (Heb. iv. 12); and believing, too, that to force men's consciences is only to transform them into knaves and hypocrites. But still, with Father Lacordaire, we repudiate the principles of the non-resistants; we hold that there may exist a state of society where forbearance on the part of even Christian people ceases to be a virtue, and cheerfully adopt the following from the eloquent Dominican: —

"War is an act by which a nation resists injustice at the expense of its own blood. Wherever there is injustice, there is legitimate cause for war. . . . *Religion*, indeed, *teaches* us what is right, but war *defends* the right. The one is God's word, the other is his arm. *Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God of hosts*; that is, God of justice, the God who commissions the strong man to succour the feeble, who overthrows haughty dynasties, raises up a Cyrus against Babylon, breaks down the gates of brass, and changes the executioner into the soldier, and the soldier into the victim. But war, like things the most sacred, may be abused, and degenerate into a measure of oppression. Hence, to judge of its merits in any given case, we must know its object. A war of emancipation is holy, a war of oppression is accursed.

"Up to the period of the Crusades, almost the only motive to war among Christian nations was the defence of their country and of their respective governments. The soldier died on the frontiers of his country, — and that word *country* was the war-cry that inspired him with courage and with strength on the battle-field. But when Gregory VII. had awakened in men's minds the idea of a Christian republic, the horizon of brotherhood and that of self-devotion were both equally enlarged. Europe, bound together by a common faith, held that every oppressed people professing the same faith, whoever might be the oppressor, had a just claim to her aid and protection, and could lawfully take up arms for themselves. It was then that chivalry was born; and war became, not only a Christian, but a monastic employment, and the outposts of the West were guarded and hedged about by the hair-cloth and the bucklers of

whole battalions of monks. Every Christian man felt that he was a minister of justice against tyranny, and, being the workmanship of Him whose ears are ever open to the supplications of his children, that it was his duty to fly promptly at the first cry of distress. As a sportsman stands all armed at the foot of a tree, listening to the sounds borne upon the breeze, so did Europe in those days, her lance at rest and her foot in the stirrup, listen attentively to the cries of the oppressed. Whether the oppression proceeded from the throne or from the tower of a castle, whether it were necessary to cross the sea or merely to mount a charger, neither weather, nor place, nor danger, nor rank could impede the achievement of their object. No one talked of profit or of loss. Blood is shed freely, or it is not shed at all. Conscience rewards men in this world, and God in the next.

“Among the weaker powers which the chivalry of Christendom had sworn to protect, there was one more sacred than all the others, — it was the Church. The Church, having neither soldiers nor ramparts to defend her, had ever been at the mercy of her oppressors. Whenever a sovereign had the will to injure her, he could do it. But chivalry no sooner appeared than it proclaimed itself the champion of the City of God; at first, because the City of God was feeble, and then, because the security of its freedom was the cause of man. Being oppressed, the Church had a right to claim the protection of the knight; being a Divine institution for the purpose of perpetuating the work of terrestrial freedom and of eternal salvation, the Church was the mother, the spouse, and the sister of every one who had gentle blood or a good sword. I do not believe that there exists a man incapable of appreciating the sentiments that I have advanced. It is the glory of our age, amid all its misfortunes, to have discovered that there are interests more elevated and more universal than the interests of family or of nation. The sympathy of nations overleaps once more their boundaries, and the voice of the oppressed finds again an echo in the world. Where is the Frenchman that would not accompany with aspirations for success, if not in person, an army marching to the succour of the Pole? Where is the Frenchman, unbeliever though he may be, who does not place upon the list of crimes of which that ill-fated country has been the victim, the violence offered to religion, the exile of its priests and bishops, the spoliation of its monasteries, the desecration of its churches, and the violence done to the consciences of its people? If the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of an Archbishop of Cologne created in modern Europe so great an excitement, what must have been the state of public feeling in the thirteenth century, when it was known that a Papal legate had been most treacherously and cruelly assassinated?” — pp. 63 – 67.

But the assassination of the legate was not the only crime of

the Albigenses, nor was it by any means the only cause of the crusade that was marshalled against them. Monasteries, as we have seen, were laid in ruins, churches were pillaged and transformed into garrisons, bishops were ejected from their sees or kept in a constant state of anxiety and alarm, priests were cruelly scourged and many were flayed alive. Religion was despised, and its most sacred rites were made matter for ridicule and caricature. Bands of marauders and assassins patrolled the country, leaving devastation and blood in their path. When, therefore, it was known that to all these insults and cruelties was superadded that of the murder of a Papal ambassador, and that the murderer was publicly protected and befriended by Raymond, Count of Toulouse, the acknowledged patron, protector, and head of these modern Manichæans, is it surprising that all Christendom should instantly have been in flames, and, shaking off her lethargy, harnessed herself for battle, and rushed forth to the succour of her oppressed brethren. The cup of injury and insult had been filling for ages. It had now overflowed and threatened to deluge the world. Forbearance was no longer a virtue, but a crime. The cause of God, the cause of humanity even, demanded retribution. The day had come, and the retribution was paid in blood.

But neither St. Dominic nor any of his companions had any hand or part either in proposing or in prosecuting the long and sanguinary wars which followed. In fact, the outbreak of the war placed St. Dominic in a most embarrassing position, which, however, served only to show forth all the fervor of his piety and all the grandeur of his genius. Two paths lay before him, of equal danger; the one, to abandon his mission, the other, to enlist all his influence on the side of the crusaders. In the one case he would have turned his back upon the cause of God, and in the other he would have divested his mission of its peaceful and apostolic character. But he was equal to the emergency, and he did neither. He did not fly from the danger, but rushed into its very midst, and established himself at Toulouse, the head-quarters and stronghold of heresy, imitating therein the example of the Apostles St. Peter and St. Paul, of whom the one chose Antioch and the other Corinth for the field of his toils, and both died in Rome, the queen city of paganism. On the other hand, though war raged furiously on every side, not a flush of passion mantled his cheek, not a cloud of angry feeling obscured the peaceful serenity of his countenance. Amid the armed chivalry of France, he ap-

peared only as a messenger of peace, and a herald of grace and reconciliation. It is a remarkable fact, that no contemporary historian ever mentions his name in connection with the Albigensian wars. He is never present either at councils, or at conferences, or at sieges, or at triumphal celebrations. Once only is he mentioned in connection with a battle, and then he is at prayer in a neighbouring church. This silence is the more expressive, since the historians of that period belonged to different parties and schools ; some being ecclesiastics, and some laics ; some friends, and others enemies of the crusades. Had St. Dominic taken the part in these wars attributed to him by some modern writers, it is impossible that the historians of the time should have been mute thereupon, as if by common consent. All contemporary writers assure us that St. Dominic and his companions occupied themselves in works of mercy, and that they prosecuted their sublime mission with no other arms than their crucifix and rosary, reproving and restraining the crimes and excesses of the crusaders as energetically as they did those of their enemies.

It is a great mistake to regard the Albigenses and the Albigensian wars through modern optics. If we would see them in their true light, we must consider them as occurring in the thirteenth century, and not in the nineteenth. In the thirteenth century, man's temporal happiness even was so closely interwoven with the faith of the Church, that, the moment the latter was weakened, the former fell into threads. Political Europe was in a state of transition from barbarism to civilization. It was divided and subdivided into innumerable petty principalities, mostly independent of each other, but dependent for their very existence upon the pleasure of the Roman Pontiffs. This dependance they had voluntarily chosen ; nay, in many cases they humbly and earnestly besought it. Having embraced Christianity, they naturally threw themselves upon Christianity for the preservation of their civil rights and liberties. What was to deter a powerful baron from seizing by force the castle and dependencies of one less potent than himself ? What was to prevent constant recurrence of civil wars, of daily murders, of public pillage ? There was nothing but religion. But religion could not make its voice heard, nor its authority respected, except by its ministers. When, therefore, religion was attacked, its doctrines assailed, its institutions menaced, its ministers insulted or assassinated, all the sovereigns and princes and feudal lords of Europe might well

tremble, for religion was the ligature that bound them, the cement that gave them cohesion. Each blow, therefore, aimed at the Church made every castle in Christendom shake as though riven by an earthquake, and struck upon their walls like the crash of a thunderbolt. If, then, it be true that the enemies of the Church were necessarily enemies of the state, and as such to be punished and suppressed, what are we to think of the Albigenses, who were a leagued band of traitors and unprincipled ruffians, aiming at the subversion of all government, of all restraint, and of all religion ?

In conclusion, we cannot forbear to recommend the eloquent *Life of St. Dominic* by Father Lacordaire to our readers generally, as eminently interesting and instructive. Its author is well known, and has been for some time held to be one of the most eloquent preachers living. This work appears to have been compiled with great care, and is admirably adapted to the men of this age who have a prejudice against any thing ascetic. We commend it to those Protestants who always couple St. Dominic in their minds with the Spanish Inquisition, and take the Spanish Inquisition to have been all that the imagination and malice of apostates, heretics, and infidels have painted it. They may learn to love and reverence one whom they ignorantly and rashly denounce as a monster of cruelty. There is nothing in the life of St. Dominic for which a Catholic can blush, and we cannot better end than by saying, “ St. Dominic, pray for us ! ”

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Saints and Servants of God.* — 1. *The Life of St. Philip Neri, Apostle of Rome, and Founder of the Congregation of the Oratory.* Vol. I. 2. *The Lives of St. Thomas of Villanova, Archbishop of Valencia, and Augustinian Friar ; and of St. Francis Solano, Apostle of Peru, of the Order of St. Francis.* 3. *The Life of St. Alphonso Maria de Liguori, Bishop of St. Agatha of the Goths, and Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.* Vol. I. 4. *The Life of the Blessed Sebastian of Apparizio, Franciscan Lay-Brother, of the Province of The Holy Gospel in Mexico.* 5. *The Life of St. Ignatius Loyola, Founder of The Jesuits.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. London: Richardson & Son. 1847 and 1848. 8vo.

THESE are five volumes of the series of *Lives of Modern Saints* now in the course of publication by Messrs. Richardson and Son, England, and Messrs. Dunigan & Brother in this country, under the editorship of the Rev. F. W. Faber, of St. Wilfrid's. They are not, we believe, all the volumes which have been issued, but they are all which we have

received. We cannot too highly recommend the series, or too cordially thank Mr. Faber and his associates for the service they are rendering the Catholic public in England and this country. The Lives of the Saints show us Christianity applied, in its practical power and sweetness, and constitute the most profitable species of reading for both old and young, and at the same time are even more attractive to a well-disposed mind than the most high-wrought romances of the day.

The several Lives before us are translations from the Italian, French, and Spanish, and have different degrees of literary merit. The Life of St. Philip Neri is from the Italian of Father Bacci. It is an authentic Life of that great Saint, but might have been much better written. In literary merit, it is far below the other volumes of the series. The Life of St. Thomas of Villanova is from the French of Father Claude Maimbourg, and is admirably written, with spirit, grace, elegance, and unction. The Life of St. Ignatius is from the Italian of Father Francesco Mariani, a Jesuit, and is executed in a manner not unworthy of the Founder of the Society of Jesus. The Life of St. Alphonsus de Liguori is a fine specimen of hagiography.

The Life of St. Alphonsus is preceded by an *Essay on Beatification and Canonization*, which is full of interest, and marked by a noble and thorough-going Catholic spirit. It is by Mr. Faber himself, who, for the most part, follows Benedict the Fourteenth; but he gives some paragraphs of his own, which prove that he is, however it may be with some other recent converts, Catholic to the core. We detect here and there, indeed, traces of the Oxford School, which we would willingly miss, and now and then come across a "line of argument" the precise value of which we are unable to determine; in one or two instances we meet opinions which, though entertained by, here and there, a theologian, yet of questionable soundness, are assumed as undoubted and indisputable truth; but the spirit and unction which pervade it make it, upon the whole, one of the most thorough-going Catholic essays we remember to have seen in the English language.

We commend to our readers especially the Life of the Blessed Sebastian of Apparizio, a poor Franciscan lay-brother, showing to what sanctity a man may attain even in the world, while engaged in secular affairs. The Blessed Sebastian practised heroic virtue long before he became a religious. It is a Life, also, to remind people of a truth which we in this age are exceedingly prone to forget, namely, that heroic virtue can be practised by those in humble, every-day life, as well as by those who are distinguished for their rank, their wealth, or their learning, — the truth which lies at the foundation of all genuine socialism.

There are some verbal criticisms on these volumes which we would suggest, had we room. The translators have, indeed, a good command of their mother tongue, and their several styles deserve great praise; but they are somewhat careless, and adopt not unfrequently forms of expression which are incorrect and inelegant, and admit neologisms which are unpardonable. *Neither* — or, instead of *neither* — nor, is of constant recurrence, and it is *being* done, as "the book is *being* written," the "house is *being* built," &c., meets us at every turn; locutions which are un-English, uncalled for, and borrowed from the newspapers, those general corrupters of language as well as of morals. To write English grammatically is no merit; but to write it ungrammatically is a great demerit, — especially in Oxford scholars. However, we highly prize these volumes. They are supplying a want in English

literature which all intelligent Catholics have long felt, and Mr. Faber and his friends are rendering us a service which cannot fail to secure the blessing of Heaven.

2. — Messrs. Dunigan & Brother have sent us *Clara*, and *The Madonna*. By CANON SCHMID. Nos. IV. & V. of their *Popular Library of Instruction and Amusement, illustrated by Chapman*.
3. — We have received from the same publishers Vols. III., IV., V., & VI. of Lingard's *History of England*.
4. — *Shandy M'Guire, or Tricks upon Travellers*. By PAUL PEPPERGRASS, Esq. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. Part I. 16mo. pp. 168.
5. — *Modern French Literature*. By L. RAYMOND DE VERICOUR. *Revised, with Notes alluding particularly to Writers prominent in the late Political Events in Paris*. By W. S. CHASE, A. M. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 444.
6. — *The Catholic Bride, or Moral Letters addressed to Julia, Daughter of Count Salarno della Margarita, on the Occasion of her Marriage with Count Eduardo Demorri di Castelmagno*. From the Italian. By C. C. PISE, D. D. Baltimore: John Murphy. 1848. 16mo. pp. 189.
7. — *A Doctrinal Catechism*. By the Rev. STEPHEN KEENAN. First American Edition. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. 18mo. pp. 395.

* * This number closes the second volume of the New Series of our Review, and we return our cordial thanks to the Catholic public for the liberal support which they have extended to it. It has, indeed, not proved acceptable to political demagogues, to namby-pambies, latitudinarians, and radicals; but we have reason to believe that it has met the approbation of the bishops and clergy generally, as well as of the intelligent laity. Many who were startled, in the outset, at the bold, manly, and uncompromising course which we marked out for ourselves, are now among its warmest friends, and there is, so far as we are aware, no serious opposition to it from any Catholic quarter. We have aimed to make it Catholic, and have always consulted those best qualified to instruct and direct us, and, if it has any merit, it belongs solely to them. Its faults, errors, defects, are our own, and we alone must be held responsible for them.

But though the Review has been warmly received and liberally supported, yet, as it appeals to no ephemeral interests, avails itself of no popular passion or sentiment, it, probably, is less liberally supported than its friends generally suppose, and we are sure, that, if aware of this fact, they would willingly exert themselves to extend its circulation. We are sure the Catholic public would not willingly see it, our only Catholic Quarterly in the country, discontinued. We know it has warm and powerful friends in all sections of the Union, and we appeal to them with full confidence to exert themselves in our behalf, and to enable us to start our next volume with an increased list of subscribers. It was at the request of a large number of distinguished American prelates that we undertook, after our conversion, to conduct a Catholic Review. We have done all we could to make the Review worthy of patronage, and we appeal to the reverend clergy, who have been such stanch friends to us from the first, to continue to us their support,—hoping to be able, as we acquire experience, and as the list of our contributors increases, to make it more genuinely Catholic, and less unworthy of their disinterested patronage.

